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Abstract 
Recent years have seen a rapid growth in the development of web services technology. 
BPEL (Business Process Execution Language) as a de-facto standard for web service 
orchestration has drawn particularly attention from researchers and industries. BPEL is 
a semi-formal flow language with complex features, so it is essential to apply automated 
validation tools in finding the interaction inconsistencies of BPEL processes. In addition 
to validating the model properties by verification, it is desirable to test the correctness 
with respect to the functional requirements. To test a model thoroughly, we need to 
cover different execution scenarios. As is well known, it is tedious, time-consuming, and 
error prone to design test cases manually, especially for complex modelling languages. 
Hence, it is desirable to apply existing model-based-testing techniques in the domain 
of web services. 
This thesis proposes a web service automaton as the operational semantics for 
BPEL, and presents an automatic test framework to verify and test BPEL processes. 
From the testing point of view, we show the suitability of using web service automaton 
formalism for BPEL by modelling various BPEL features. Based on the web service 
automata, we provide a model checking based test framework to verify the general 
properties and generate test cases for BPEL processes. The framework supports both 
control-flow and data-flow testing of BPEL. Two levels of test cases can be generated to 
check the behavioural and interface conformance for web services. To our knowledge, 
none of the prior research studies the verificatioll and testing for BPEL control and 
data flows in a unified approach. 
The formal work in this thesis underpins the development of an automated test case 
generation and execution tool that has been integrated into the DBE Studio that was 
developed under the EU funded Digital Business Ecosystems Integrated Programme. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In recent years, Service-Oriented Computing (SOC) has been actively researched. SOC 
provides a systematic and extensible framework for application-to-application inter-
action, built on top of existing web protocols and based on open X~IL standards. It 
defines a standardised mechanism to describe, locate, and communicate with online ap-
plications. In a SOC environment, each application becomes an accessible web service 
that is described using open standards. Due to the advantages of open standards, the 
SOC paradigm provides a flexible, re-usable, and loosely coupled model for distributed 
computing. SOC offers three main functions: communication protocols, service de-
scriptions, and service discovery. In this work we look at the service descriptions, with 
a focus on the verification and testing of the behavioural aspect of web services. BPEL 
is the de-facto industry standard language to model the behaviour of web service com-
positions. BPEL is a semi-formal flow-based language with complex features, which 
may thus include fault behaviours. It becomes essential to verify a web service design 
before publishing it, and to test whether the published service conforms to the design 
model. The manual writing and verification of test cases for complex models is tedious, 
time-consuming and error prone. Hence, it is vital to automate this process. This the-
sis provides the theoretical background to a test-case generation and execution plug-in 
that has been developed for the DBEStudio. The plug-in may be downloaded from the 
Source-Forge DBE Project. 
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1.1 Background 
SOC is the emerging paradigm for the realisation of heterogeneous, distributed systems, 
obtained from the dynamic combination of remote applications owned and operated by 
distinct organisations. SOC characterises a collection of autonomous and self-contained 
web services. The essence of SOC lies in independent web services which communicate 
with each other exclusively through messages. No knowledge of the partner service 
is shared other than the message formats and the sequences of the messages that are 
expected. The agreed-on standards of service description, discovery, and communica-
tion explicitly allow that the partner service may be implemented with heterogeneous 
technology, with diverse applications written in different programming languages and 
running on different operating systems and hardware. 
In the SOC architecture, there are three roles: service provider, service consumer, 
and service registry. Service providers can publish their services in a service registry. 
Service requesters or consumers can use the services that are retrieved via the service 
registry. A service registry provides facilities for service providers and consumers to 
find each other. A web service can play any or all of these roles. 
A. Web Service Stack 
To support the SOC architecture, web services must provide standards-based defini-
tions of interoperability communication protocols, mechanisms for service description, 
discovery, and composition as well as quality of service (QoS) protocols. The web 
service stack is shown in Figure 1.1 below. 
The initial specifications of web services consisting of SOAP, WSDL and UDDI, 
provides open XML-based mechanisms for service communication, service description, 
and service discovery . 
• UDDI (Universal Description, Discovery and Integration)[3] provides a standard 
way for publishing and discovering information about web service . 
• WSDL (Web service Definition Language) [17] defines a public interface of a web 
2 
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SBVR II Bus~ness B les 
Choreography (WSDL-CDL..) Business 
Processes 
Quality of 
Service 
I Discovery 
WSDL, WS-Policy I Description 
XML Schema, SOAP II Messaging 
HTIP, MQ, SMTP II Transport 
Figure 1.1: Web Service Stack 
service, by describing the functions that can be provided by a web service. WSDL 
enables dynamic discovery and binding of compatible services which are used in 
conjunction with registry services. 
• SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) [4] is a platform and language indepen-
dent communication protocol that defines an XML-based format for web services 
to exchange information over HTTP by using remote procedure calls. 
Web services describe their functionality using WSDL and they interact with each 
other by exchanging SOAP messages serialised in XML and sent over a transport pro-
tocol, usually HTTP. Moreover, UDDI is used to interconnect service providers and 
service consumers. This basic SOC model covers discovery, description, messaging, 
and transport layers of the web service stack in Figure 1.1. 
To move beyond this basic model, mechanisms for service composition and QoS 
protocols are required. Several specifications have been proposed in these areas: 
• Business rule layer: SBVR (Semantics of Business Vocabulary and Business Rules 
Specification) [45] describes the business rules using the pre-defined business vo-
cabulary. 
• Business process layer: WS-CDL (Web Services Choreography Description Lan-
guage) [~)G] provides a conversation protocol to describe the global interact ions 
of web services. BPEL (Business Process Execution Language) [10] and 0\ \'L-S 
(Ontology \Yeb Language for Services) [3] specify sen'ice compositions. 
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• Quality of service layer: WS-Security ensures end-to-end message integrity. con-
fidentiality, and authentication. WS-Reliable Messaging allows messages to be 
delivered reliably between distributed applications in the presence of software 
component, system, or network failures. WS-Transaction provides a means to 
compose transactional qualities of service. 
• Description layer: XML Schema describes the data formats used for constructing 
the messages addressed to and received from web services. WS-Policy extends 
WSDL to all the encoding and attachment of QoS information to services, in the 
form of reusable service policies. 
In order to give an intuitive view of the main web service standard languages, 
we use UML diagrams to link SBVR, WS-CDL, BPEL, and WSDL. In Figure 1.2, 
SBVR may be seen to play a similar role to UML use case diagrams in capturing the 
business requirement; WS-CDL is similar to UML collaboration or sequence diagrams 
in modelling the global web service interactions; BPEL has a similar role to UML 
statecharts in modelling local web service interactions and the stateful behaviour of 
individual web services; finally, WSDL has similarities with UML class diagrams in 
describing web service interfaces. 
UML Diagrams Web Services 
Use Case Diagrams 
Collaboration /Sequence Diagrams ~-----+:~ 
~==~ 
Statecharts 
Class Diagrams 
Figure 1.2: UML diagrams and web service specifications 
B. The Relationships of BPEL and Others 
Since our work is focused on BPEL, in order to clarify the BPEL position in the 
1.1 Background 
web service stack, we will discuss the relationships between BPEL and WS-CDL, BPEL 
and OWL-S, as well as BPEL and WSDL . 
• BPEL and WS-CDL 
Two main approaches are currently investigated for static service composition. The 
first approach, referred to as web service orchestration (e.g. BPEL), combines available 
services by adding a central coordinator that is responsible for invoking and combining 
the web services. The second approach, referred to as web service choreographer (e.g. 
WS-CDL), does not assume the exploitation of a central coordinator but rather it 
defines the conversation that should be undertaken by each participant. The aim is to 
model the peer-to-peer interactions among the collaborating services. 
Briefly speaking, BPEL aims to model the interactions of web services with respect 
to a central coordinator, while WS-CDL is in a layer above BPEL and provides a 
conversation protocol for the global interaction of web services. 
• BPEL and OWL-S 
Both BPEL and OWL-S are workflow languages for modelling business processes 
composed of a set of service invocations. The structure defines the partial order of 
invocation of the services and their interactions. BPEL, as an industrial standard, aims 
to provide rich control flow structures to integrate existing web services in a flexible 
way. BPEL supports exception handling and compensations, while OWL-S does not 
define recovery protocols. Also, BPEL provides more mature execution engines. OWL-
S, as one of the standards in the Semantic Web community, aims at fully automating 
all stages of the web services lifecycle. By using OWL-S, Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
planning techniques can be used to automate the service composition. 
Therefore, BPEL supports static service composition, with a focus on representing 
composition where information flow and the binding between services are known in 
advance. OWL-S supports dynamic service composition, with a focus on modelling the 
preconditions and post-conditions of the process so that the evolution of the domain 
5 
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can be logically inferred. It relies on ontologies to formalise the domain concepts which 
are shared among services. The research groups of Standford University and Carnegie 
Melon University have led the work in adapting BPEL for semantic web, such as O\\"L-
S . 
• BPEL and WSDL 
BPEL has close relationships with WSDL. Interactions with services are modelled 
as partnerLinks. A partnerLink has a partnerLinkType, which defines which ,,'SDL 
portType is used in a relationship with any given partner and which portType is used 
when a partner interacts with the process itself. The BPEL process is exposed as 
a service and therefore has its own WSDL interface. The relationships between web 
services are defined in the partnerRole and myRole attributes of the partnerLinkType. 
WSDL uses messages to define and carry data types. In a BPEL process, a variable is 
defined to carry a data type, which is declared in WSDL. 
1.2 Motivation 
Recent years have seen a rapid growth in the development of web services technology. 
However, some issues such as the compos ability, compatibility, conformance and sub-
stitutability, correctness, and coordination of service compositions have not yet been 
thoroughly investigated. For instance, conformance and correctness should be checked 
to find errors as early as possible in the workflow design phase. 
BPEL activity relationships can be categorised into control-flow and data-flow. 
Since BPEL is a semi-formal flow language, various formal semantics have been pro-
posed, so that BPEL models can be verified rigorously. However, most current formal 
models only focus on modelling BPEL control flow, and do not cover the BPEL data 
flow analysis. 
There exist two kinds of interactions of BPEL: internal and external. The external 
interactions between BPEL models are by message passing. The internal interactions 
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between activities of a BPEL model, which are modelled explicitly by control depen-
dencies and implicitly by data sharing. Those internal interactions caused by dat a 
sharing will be omitted if an approach does not cover the BPEL data flow analysis. 
Furthermore, there are fewer efforts in the literature in using behavioural web service 
models (e.g. BPEL models) as the test models for deriving test cases. To our knowledge, 
none of the prior research studies the verification and test rase generation of bot h BPEL 
control-flows and data-flows in a unified approach. 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
The objectives of this work are: 
• To design a formal model that can cover most features of the BPEL, and cover 
BPEL internal and external interactions. 
• To demonstrate that it is essential to separate verification and testing of BPEL 
control flow and data flow. 
• To show that it is suitable to apply model checking as the test generation engine 
to generate test cases from BPEL models. 
1.4 Methodology 
Existing model checking tools can be reused for the purpose of verification and testing 
of BPEL. Our formal model is intended to be used by such verification tools. \Vith 
model checking, a BPEL model can not only be a design model for verification, but 
also be a test model for deriving test cases. The formal semantics proposed to date 
for BPEL can be categorised as process algebra based, Petri-net based, and automata 
based. We follow the automata-based approach, in order to facilitate the use of model 
checking tools. We propose a Web Service Automaton (WSA), an extension of Mealy 
machines, which covers data, supports message passing communication, and adapts 
the c)s,nlchronous interleaving semantics. \Ve justif)T the suitability of \\'SA for BPEL 
1.5 Contributions 
on three counts. First, its multiple-input events capture most features of the BPEL 
language, while most automata-based formal models for BPEL only cover the core 
subset features of BPEL. Second, its message passing communication provides a uniform 
semantics for both BPEL internal and external interactions. Third, our model supports 
separate analyses of BPEL control and data flows. 
Based on WSA, we provide a model checking based test case generation framework 
for BPEL. We support the application of both SPIN and NuSMV model checkers as the 
test generation engines, and we encode the conventional structural test coverage criteria 
into LTL and CTL temporal logic. State coverage, transition coverage, and predicate 
coverage are used for BPEL control flow testing, and all-du-path coverage is used for 
BPEL data flow testing. Two levels of test cases can be generated to test whether 
the BPEL processes conform to the functionality and whether individual operations 
conform to the WSDL interface models. The generated test cases are executed on the 
JUnit test execution engine. 
1.5 Contributions 
Our theoretical contribution is to propose a formal model to formalise BPEL semantics. 
This formalisation enables us to reason about properties of BPEL processes such as their 
correctness and compatibility. Our practical contribution is to provide an automatic 
verifica.tion and test case generation framework for BPEL and WSDl. The key benefits 
of our approach are: 
1) The multiple-input events of our formal model can capture most features of BPEL 
language, including the most interesting scope-based fault handling and compen-
sation handling features of BPEL, and also can reduce unnecessary machine state 
space. 
2) The explicit data handling of our formal model enables separating control flow 
testing and data flow testing of BPEL. 
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3) The message passing communication mechanism of our formal model provides a 
uniform semantics for BPEL internal and external interactions. 
4) The test framework can automatically generate BPEL based test cases and \VSDL 
based test cases. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 1 introduces background information and key concepts of web services. Chap-
ter 2 gives a review of relevant literature. Chapter 3 presents our formal model, its 
static and dynamic semantics, and discusses the model's compatibility. Chapter 4 pro-
vides detailed analysis of BPEL features in our formal model. Chapter 5 outlines our 
automatic test framework. Chapter 6 introduces the tool architecture and evaluates 
the tool with case studies. Chapter 7 summarises the thesis with conclusions and 
suggestions for potential future work. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
There exists an extensive literature of related work on the formal semantics and ver-
ification of process models exists. In order to maintain the focus of this thesis, we 
concentrate on the verification and testing of BPEL based web service models in this 
chapter. The aim of this section is not to thoroughly compare all the existing ap-
proaches, but to point out the motivation of our proposed work by reviewing related 
work. 
2.1 Formal Semantics and Verification of BPEL 
To a service composer, it is desirable to be able to verify that the composition is well-
formed. For example, that it does not contain any deadlock or livelock which would 
cause the composition not to terminate under certain conditions. It is possible to verify 
these properties using formal notations and existing verification tools. The verification 
tools have the advantage that they allow one to simulate and verify the behaviour of 
one's model at design time, thus enabling the detection and correction of errors as 
early as possible. As such, the model verification phase helps increase the reliability" of 
web services. The works of [~H, 41] provide good reviews for the current verification 
approaches. In the literature, there are three branches of formal models for BPEL: 
Petri nets, Process Algebra, and automata. 
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2.1.1 Petri Nets based approaches 
A Petri net [48] N = (P, T, F) consists of places P nodes, transitions T nodes, and 
flow relation F as directed arcs to connect places with transitions. The current state 
of a Petri net is represented by a set of black tokens distributed over the places. The 
places from which an arc runs to (resp. from) a transition are called the input places 
(resp. output places) of the transition, respectively. A transition is enabled if all of its 
input places contain tokens. An enabled transition fires by removing the tokens from its 
input places and adds a specified number of tokens into each of its output places. One 
can map BPEL based web services to Petri nets by assigning activities to transitions 
and process states to places. Fig 2.1 shows an example of Petri nets modelling BPEL 
activities [46]. 
x 
. ",\ 
~ 
", 
I~ l' 1:''( <flo\\ n<ll1lc="X"> aCli\il) A 
aCl!\il\ H 
<It"l<)\\> 
Figure 2.1: An example of Petri nets for BPEL activities [46] 
Each BPEL activity associates a Petri net with an input place ri and an output 
place Ii' The places ri,si,ci, and Ii denote states ready, started (running), completed, 
and finished, respectively. Transitions are of three types. The first type, denoted as 
unlabelled bars, is auxiliary transition. The solid bars denotes a transition which models 
internal actions for checking pre-conditions or evaluating post-conditions for activities; 
and the other bars are used to implement composite constructs. The second and third 
t)'l)es are denoted as labeled boxes. The second type is substitution transition, which is 
an abstract representation of subnets for the enclosed BPEL activities. The third t~'I)(' 
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is an activity transition which models the events or actions of a BPEL activity. On the 
left of the figure, the Petri net models a BPEL basic activity X. If X is to receive a 
message m, the transition labeled with X can be replaced by ?m. On the right of the 
figure, the Petri net models a BPEL flow activity, when the flow is started, subnets 
A, B will be executed, and the flow completes after A, B are completed. 
In a standard Petri net, tokens are indistinguishable. In Coloured Petri nets 
(CP-net) [35], every token has a value. CP-nets extend Petri nets with the primitives 
for defining data types (colour) and the manipulations of data values, thus a CP-net is 
more concise than a Petri net. 'ITansition eligibility depends then on the availability of 
an appropriately colour token in all the input places of this transition. Likewise, the 
output of a transition is a specifically colour token. 
Web service algebra is proposed in [28] to define a set of web service composition 
operators. The authors use Petri nets as the formal semantics for the proposed web 
service algebra. The works of [46, 56] present Petri net semantics for the control flow 
of BPEL, with consideration of BPEL advanced features such as fault handling, event 
handling, and compensation handling. In [56], the tool BPEL2PN is developed to map 
BPEL code to Petri nets, and model checker LoLA [54] is used to verify CTL temporal 
logic. The author of [~37] extends the work of [56] by using Petri net to capture 
the global interactions between BPEL processes. In [46], the tool BPEL2PNML is 
developed to map BPEL to Petri nets, and a verification tool WofBPEL is used as the 
analysis engine. The paper discusses how to verify the activity reachability and some 
pre-defined BPEL constraints. As a summary, the above works abstract from data. As 
shown in our motivation example, it is important to consider BPEL data dependencies. 
In [61], they claim to capture both BPEL control and data dependencies in CP-nets, 
and CPN tools [2] can be used to verify the process. However, the paper only shows 
how to map a core subset of BPEL to CP-nets. There is no discussion of how to capture 
BPEL data dependencies, and no concern of modelling faults or compensations. They 
summarise a set of properties of CP-nets to be checked and their corresponding meaning 
in the verification of web service composition, including boundness, deadlock-freedom, 
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liveness, fairness, home, and reachability. 
In [62], they use CP-nets as the process composition models, and apply CPN tools 
as the verification engine. BPEL skeleton code can be generated from the process com-
position model. In the CP-nets models, messages (events) and process variables are 
represented by tokens. Abstract colour sets are declared for the messages and variables 
such that each colour set is kept small to speed up the analysis. They also use an al-
gorithm to automatically derive the conversation protocol, which is also CP-net based, 
from the process composition models. The conversation protocol in their context only 
models the interactions between the service consumer and the service provider, and 
hides the internal process details such as those providing data manipulation and inter-
action with other service partners. Instead of verifying the BPEL process, their work 
focuses on designing a correct CP-net based model and generating a BPEL skeleton 
process. 
Petri nets provide the constructions for specifying synchronisation of concurrent 
processes. Petri net adopts interleaving semantics for concurrency, and asynchronous 
communication. In Petri-nets, every transition is restricted to modelling a single event, 
which will heavily increase the model state space. 
2.1.2 Process Algebras based approaches 
Process algebraic service composition aims to introduce much simpler descriptions than 
other approaches. The underlying semantic foundation is based on labelled transition 
systems, i.e. automata. Many variants have been defined and the field comes with a 
rich body of literature. The most well-known process algebras are CCS [42], CSP [31], 
and LOTOS [14], and Pi-calculus [43]. 
Pi-calculus extends CCS with mobile-ability, in which the basic entity is a process -
it can be an empty process; that is, a choice between several I/O operations and their 
continuations, a parallel composition, a recursive definition. and a recursive invocation. 
I/O operations can be input (received) or output (sent). For example, :r(y) denotes 
receiving tuple y on channel x; x[y] denotes sending tuple y on channel x. Dotted 
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notation specifies an action sequence. Parallel process composition is denoted with 
A lB. Several processes can execute in parallel and communicate using compatible 
channels. Describing services in such an abstract way allows us to reason about the 
composition's correctness. 
In [22], a two-way mapping is defined between BPEL and LOTOS, and the model 
checking toolbox CADP [21] is used as the verification engine'. The mapping from 
LOTOS to BPEL does not preserve the structure of a process, due to the expressive 
and flexible structure of LOTOS. The disabling operator is used to capture the BPEL 
interruptions. In LOTOS, the processes communicate synchronously by rendezvous. 
In [23], the process algebra FSP (Finite State Processe) developed by [38] is 
used for the BPEL semantics and the model checker LTSA [38] as the verification 
engine. The web service composition specification is modelled in an MSC (Message 
Sequence Chart), and the implementation is modelled in BPEL. Both MSC models 
and BPEL processes are translated into FSPs, such that the BPEL implementation 
can be verified against the YISC specification by trace equivalence checking. The work 
of [24] extends the earlier work to verify the interacting BPEL processes and checks 
their compatibility. A tool LTSA-WS was implemented as an Eclipse plug-in. FSP is 
abstract from data, so their mapping does not cover BPEL data dependencies. Also, 
FSP supports synchronous communication. 
In [59], they use Pi-calculus as the BPEL formal model and NuSMV model checker 
as the verification engine. A tool, OPAL, is developed to automate the mapping from 
BPEL to Pi-calculus, and from Pi-calculus to the input language SMV of the NuSMV 
model checker. It points out that there exist two approaches to model check Pi-calculus. 
One is to analyse Pi-calculus processes based on a proof system, and the other is to 
transform Pi-calculus into automata. The authors follow the second approach. They 
model a shared variable x of BPEL as a shared storage register Reg(x), where the 
stored value can be read from or written to Reg(x). 
In [58], they propose a language named CDL to extend WSDL for modelling the 
behaviour of individual web services, and propose a composition language which can 
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support both centralised and distributed orchestrations. The formal semantics of these 
two languages are based on Pi-calculus. They point out that the use of shared variables 
in BPEL makes it difficult to coordinate the execution in a distributed manner. Their 
composition language has two core concepts: a task and a process. A task is equal to a 
BPEL activity. For inter-task dependency, they explicitly consider control dependencies 
and data dependencies. The review of web service data dependency modelling will be 
covered in section 2.2. They further point out that the current tools support for 
verifying of Pi-calculus is immature. Most do not support the complete language and 
require a complex and error prone input syntax. A solution is to map Pi-calculus to 
the input languages of mature model checkers such as SPIN. Since the input languages 
of most mature model checkers are automaton-based, we believe an automaton-based 
formal model is more suitable for those input languages. There are other works that 
also use Pi-calculus as the formal semantics for the orchestration language [H~, 2fi, Ll0]. 
In the above Process Algebra approaches, they consider both the core BPEL ac-
tivities and the advanced BPEL features with fault handling, compensation handling, 
and event handling. However, since the BPEL scope based fault and compensation 
handling mechanism is complex, only a few works give it in-depth analysis. In [50], 
Pu et al. propose a BPELO language to capture the BPEL scope based compensation 
handling features. They propose a n-bissimulation relation, which reflects the scope-
based compensation mechanism, to define the equivalence between BPELO programs. 
An execution engine for BPELO is developed. In [IG], Bulter et al. formalise the no-
tions of compensation in a StAC language (Structured Activity Compensation). They 
model the BPEL control flow using StAC and the model the BPEL data manipulation 
in B notation. The semantics is clean and precise, but it is not clear how to verify or 
test such models in an automatic way. 
2.1.3 Automata based approaches 
Automaton is a well-known formalism for system specification. There are many different 
kinds of automata, including finite state machines (FS'\Is) such as Mealy and Moore 
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machines, which are always finite state. Label Transition systems are automata, which 
are generally infinite state. An FSM is a machine that, given an input symbol, transfers 
it through a series of states according to a transition function. A Mealy machine is an 
FSM that generates an output based on its current state and the input. The transitions 
will include both an input and output signal. In contrast, a Moore machine is a FSl\1 
that generates an output based on its current state only. A transition is associated 
with an input signal. For both types of machines, an input is required to trigger a 
transition. For each Mealy machine, there is an equivalent Moore machine, and vice 
versa. Mealy machines are most commonly used, and there exists a variety of models 
extending Mealy machines with data, hierarchy, or time. 
In [G7l, BPEL models are mapped into deterministic finite state automata for the 
matchmaking of web service composition. The STSs (State Transition Systems) are 
used in [L19] to be the BPEL formal semantics, and a tool is developed as a part of the 
ASTRO toolset [1]. Both of these formal models are abstracted from data. 
In [25], they propose guarded automata (GA) to be the formal models for both 
BPEL and the conversation protocol. GA extends Mealy machines with data, and 
every transition is equipped with a guard in the form of an XPath expression. The 
model checker SPIN is used as the verification engine. BPEL processes communicate 
by sending asynchronous messages, and each process has a queue. A global watcher 
keeps track of all messages. The conversation is introduced as a sequence of messages. 
They propose a set of sufficient conditions so that asynchronous communication can be 
replaced with synchronous communication. A tool WSAT is developed to map BPEL 
to guarded automata, and map guarded automata to Promela (the input language 
of SPIN). In their approach, each BPEL activity is mapped to a GA, so the BPEL 
process as a whole is a composition of a set of GAs. The interleaving semantics of 
concurrency is used. However, they omit the inter activity data dependencies. Also, in 
their models, the GAs representing BPEL processes communicate by message passing, 
but it is not clear how the GAs represents the BPEL activities communications. In 
our formal model, we believe it is clearer from the theoretical view to provide a single 
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communication mechanism for both external and internal interactions, where machines 
communicate by either message passing or by data sharing, but not both. In their 
mapping from GA to Promela, the XPath expressions in the GA transition guards are 
also translated into Promela, so that the data manipulation can be verified. We believe 
this will decrease the speed of model checkers, and that symbolic transition guards can 
reach the same verification result. We will discuss this in section 5. 
Similar to [25], the author of [44] transforms BPEL into an extended FSM named 
EFA. A tool is developed to automate the mappings from BPEL to EFA, and from 
EFA to Promela. EFA extends a Mealy machine with data, and it adopts asynchronous 
interleaving semantics of concurrency. They also have no concern of the interactions 
among BPEL activities due to data dependencies. Furthermore, it is not clear which 
communication mechanism is used when they are modelling read and write data by 
BPEL activities. 
The above automata based approaches, only cover core subsets of BPEL activities 
and do not consider fault handling, compensation handling, or event handling. 
2.2 Analysis of Data Dependencies in Orchestration 
Referring to the works discussed in the previous section, most existing work abstracts 
frolll data and focu:-;e:-; attention 011 the control flow. When data is omitted, the transi-
tion guards and variables are left out, so selecting one of two control paths, solved by 
the evaluation of data, needs to be modelled by a nondeterministic choice. Even for 
work that does consider BPEL data, data dependencies are not modelled in an explicit 
way. In this section, we review work with consideration of modelling data dependen-
cies in the orchestration models such as BPEL models. The purpose of analysing data 
dcpcndencies is to ensure that data is always defined before being used. 
In [47], they propose a BioOPera Flow language to model the control dependencies 
and data dependencies between tasks (BPEL activities) as visual flow graphs. In order 
to maintain consistency, they provide a set of constraints when constructing a data flow 
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graph. For instance, in a process data flow graph, data always flows from output to 
input parameters of tasks. The input parameters of a process can only be connected to 
input parameters of tasks, and output parameters of the process may receive data only 
from output parameters of tasks. A constant variable can be connected to multiple 
input parameters, but an input parameter bound to a constant variable cannot have 
any othc:r incoming data flow edge. A toolset is developed to support the visualisation. 
Even though their focus is not rigorous verification of design models, they show the 
importance of considering control and data dependencies in separation. 
In the composition language proposed by [58], each task (equal to a BPEL activ-
ity) has an input Dependencies section to describe the control dependencies and data 
dependencies from itself to other tasks. For instance, variable x is the output data of 
task tk1 and the input data of task tk2, tk2 will declare a data dependency in its input-
Dependencies section to specify tk1 as the source which sends x to it. The task which 
receives a message from an external web service will send the message to other 'down-
stream' tasks which have dependencies on this message. Their composition language is 
mapped to Pi-calculus. In Pi-calculus, a process denotes a web service task, channels 
represent data dependencies, and control dependencies are represented implicitly using 
the operators of Pi-calculus directly. The composition service as a whole is modelled 
as a parallel composition of all of these processes. Their data dependency modelling 
makes the data definition and usage clear. With this in mind, our WSA should also be 
able to capture the data dependencies of BPEL activities in an explicit way. 
A grid workflow language is proposed in [20], where each activity may have a 
data-in port and data-out port. The data exchange describes that the data flows from 
data-out ports to data-in ports. They discuss the constraints added on to the data 
exchanges in conditional activities (e.g. BPEL switch and pick), in sequential loop 
activities (e.g. BPEL while), and in parallel loop activities (e.g. BPEL flow). 
The authors in [11] provide a model of data flow in addition to control flow for 
OWL-S process models. They transform OWL-S to Promela so that SPIN model 
checker can be used to verify the OWL-S process model. Their scope of the data flow 
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is limited to within a composite process. The processes in a composite process can 
exchange data among themselves or with the parent process. In OWL-S, a process 
is similar to a BPEL activity. We also add such level-based constraint to the BPEL 
internal data exchanges, which will be discussed in section 4.2. 
For external data exchanges between orchestration models, if there is a conversation 
protocol available, the data dependencies between web services can be directly derived 
from the conversation protocol; otherwise, one needs to analyse the data exchanges to 
get the data dependencies. The work of [15] discusses how to analyse data exchanges 
between YAWL workflow models, so that the resulting data dependencies between web 
services can be used for service matching. In [19], they propose a OWL-P language 
to model both the conversation protocol as well as the orchestration models. When 
composing orchestration models, the designer needs to define a set of composition ax-
ioms to add constraints on the conversation protocol. A data-flow axiom states the 
data exchange dependency among the orchestration models. In our test framework, we 
do not assume a conversation protocol is available, and the data dependencies between 
BPEL processes need to be analysed. 
In [:39], they propose data nets to capture data exchange and data manipulation 
within an orchestration model, as well as data exchange between composition models. 
The control flow of a orchestration model is modelled by the STS (State Transition 
System) [49]. STS with data is the synchronised product of all the STSs and data 
nets. A tool is needed to do the experimental evaluation. Since our WSA includes 
data, there is no need to add a separate data model. Data flows can be derived from 
WSAs based on existing data flow analysis techniques. 
To sum up, it is necessary to model data exchange explicitly in our formal model, in 
order to capture the data dependencies within a BPEL model and the data dependencies 
between BPEL models in a correct way. 
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2.3 Testing of BPEL based web services 
As we can see from the previous section, there is intensive research on providing precise 
semantics for BPEL and verification of BPEL models. However, there is less effort on 
using BPEL as the test models for deriving test cases. 
A framework is proposed in [12] to augment WSDL with a UML2.0 PSM (Process 
State Machine) for modelling web service interactions. After transforming PSM to a 
Symbolic Transition System, existing ioco-conformance testing tools can be applied. 
In [:29]' they use Graph Transformation Rules along with WSDL to generate test 
cases. WSDL-S is proposed in [55] to be the service behaviour model, which extends 
WSDL by adding a pre-condition and post-condition to each WSDL operation. The 
WSDL-S is mapped to EFSM (extended FSM) so that the existing test techniques for 
EFSM can be applied. Yuan et al. [60, 6:3] propose a XCFG (extended control flow 
graph) to represent a BPEL process. First, they propose a DFS (depth first search) 
based algorithm to generate sequential test paths from the XCFG, according to branch 
coverage criterion. Second, the sequantial test paths will be combined into concurrent 
test paths based on various BPEL structures. Finally, a constraint solver is used to 
remove the unexecutable test paths, and to generate test data. They assume that the 
BPEL eventHandlers can only have on message thread, and assume that there is no 
interruption due to either fault propagation or process termination. 
There exist other works related to web service testing, but the focuses are not on 
test case generation. For instance, Zhu [66] analyses the problems specific to test web 
services, and introduces an ontology called STOWS for testing services. The testing 
services themselves are web services. Based on the ontology, the testing services can 
be registered, requested, or retrieved. The mapping from their ontology to the O\\,L-S 
is yet to be developed. 
For the purpose of providing automated test case generation and execution environ-
ment, our test framework should allow users to choose test criteria in an easy way. Test 
case generation techniques can be categorised as test purpose oriented and coverage ori-
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ented. Test purpose oriented techniques allow testers to define interesting scenarios as 
test purposes, but the testers need to have knowledge to encode test purposes into tem-
poral logic formulas for model checkers. Instead, coverage oriented techniques release 
testers from writing temporal logic formula manually. Therefore, we target coverage 
oriented test generation. It is not new to apply model checking to achieve test coverage 
[30, 33, ;")2], but it is new to apply such a technique in the domain of web services. 
2.4 Multiple Inputs Automata 
The concept of finite state machines (FSM) is widely used, and there is considerable 
similarity between FSM notations. In particular, most of the notations allow single-
input-event transitions. For those complex systems, it may not be convenient to con-
sider the FSM to have only single input events. Multiple inputs and multiple outputs 
may be a more natural model, such that the state machine can react to a set of simul-
taneous input events. We review some works in the literature that advocate multiple 
inputs state machine. 
In the embedded system domain, Yun et al. [G4] proposes a burst-mode Mealy 
machine to allow multiple-input changes in a burst fashion. The input events can 
arrive in arbitrary order and the outputs are generating concurrently. A transition 
consists of an input burst with a non-empty set of input events, and an output burst 
with a set of output events. In their earlier work, a transition is enabled after all the 
input events in a input burst have arrived. Two extensions were proposed. First, by 
allowing directed-don't-care input events in the input burst, as long as one input event 
in the input burst has arrived, the transition is enabled. Second, the transition guard 
is added, a transition is enabled when both the input events have arrived and the guard 
is evaluated to true. In our \YSA, their don't care concepts can be modelled by linking 
events with logical OR, and the transition guard concept has been supported by most 
state machines that consider data handling. 
Luttgen et al. [21] proposes a propositional logic (with logical operators such as 
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AND, OR, NOT, implies, and equivalent) based step semantics for Statecharts. A step 
consists of a source machine configuration, a transition, and the target machine configu-
ration. The transition has a trigger and an action, where the trigger is a conjunction of 
events and negated events (e.g. ell\. -,e2) describing under which condition a transition 
is enabled. The logical AND together with NOT can model the implicit priorities on 
transitions imposed by the state hierarchy. In WSA, we include the logical AND and 
NOT to model the priority events. 
Alexander [53] extends the state machine by adding regular expressions of events, 
aiming to reduce the complexity of FSMs. A FSM's transitions based on regular expres-
sions containing Kleene closure (i.e. if K is a set then K* is also a set) or concatenation 
are mapped into internal FSMs. In this way, the internal FSMs can add hidden states 
to the set of states of the original FSM. The extended FSMs are used as the source for 
Java code generation. If more than one regular expression matches an incoming event, 
the first transition is fired. As a common rule, the multiple transitions with event 
expressions whose languages overlap should be properly guarded. No mathematical 
model is provided in the paper. Their focus is to simplify the design model, by moving 
the complexity from the design model to the intermediate model. 
In the domain of embedded system, Girault et al. [27] present a Ptolemy framework 
to integrate FSM with various synchronous concurrency models. In their FSM, the 
components of a transition include a guard and a set of output events, where the guard 
is represented as a Boolean expression (logical AND, OR, NOT) of the input events, 
and an event can be either present or absent. Their FSM also supports hierarchy, 
where a state may be further refined into another FSM, and the inside and outside 
FSMs are called slave and master respectively. In their transitions, guards are Boolean 
expressions over input events. Their work can be the foundation of our web service 
automaton in terms of adding Boolean expressions over input events. We will consider 
data handling, and our transitions should be associated with two kinds of guards, one 
adds constrains to input events, the other puts constrains on variables. As pointed 
out in their paper, the hierarchical FSM makes the model more intuitive and easy to 
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understand, but the hierarchy does not reduce the number of states. For the purpose of 
testing, the composite states need to be flatten to explore the execution paths. So, as 
an intermediate operational model, web service automaton does not support composite 
states. Also, instead of integrating the machine with synchronous concurrency models, 
web service automata will target at modelling the interaction between distributed web 
services, so asynchronous semantics will be applied. 
In summary, due to the complexity of BPEL features, which include concurrency, 
fault propagation, and interruption, we believe it is more natural to allow multiple-input 
transitions. 
2.5 Summary 
It is hard to design the interactions of asynchronously executing web services in a 
consistent and complete manner, so it is essential to apply automated tools in finding 
the inconsistencies and checking the functionalities. It is a challenge to test BPEL 
processes because of its semi-formal nature and complexity. Therefore, we need a 
suitable formalism for the BPEL language, as well as a suitable model-based-testing 
technique for testing the BPEL processes automatically. 
Both Petri nets and process algebras are precise and well-studied formalisms that 
allow automatic verification of certain properties of their behaviours. Likewise, they 
provide a rich theory on bi-simulation analysis; that is to say, one can establish whether 
two processes have equivalent behaviours. Such analysis is useful to establish whether 
a service can substitute another service in a composition or to verify the redundancy of 
a service. Process algebra approaches have the advantage that the composition opera-
tors of process algebras are convenient in capturing the semantics of BPEL structured 
activities, and they support simulation and bi-simulation analyses, which are useful for 
model substitution and refinement. The limitation of Petri-net based approaches is the 
single event restriction on every transition, which will easily cause large model state 
space. In order to apply model checking, process algebra based approaches normally 
23 
2.5 Summary 
need three layers: the process algebra models, the automaton models, and the model 
checker adapters. The automata provide the operational semantics of process algebra. 
On one hand, this additional automata layer can reduce the cost of verifying process 
algebra model by model checkers, because automata are easily manipulated by graph 
transversal and searching strategies. On the other hand, it enables the use of wider 
choices of model checking engines. 
As a result, for the purpose of verification and testing, the automaton formalism 
is especially attractive due to the straight usage of model checking tools. The model 
substitution and refinement is not the focus of our test framework. Therefore, we have 
investigated the usability of automata approaches. Thus we only need two layers for 
model checking: the automata models and the model checker adapters. However, most 
Petri net based and process algebraic models can handle compensations and exception 
handling, but this remains to be seen for the automata based models. Our automata 
based formal model needs to fill this gap. Also, due to the complexity of BPEL features, 
allowing multiple-input transitions is a natural choice to reduce the model state space 
and complexity. To summarise, in order to solve some of the current problems, it is 
essential to design a formal model which fulfils the following requiremcnts: 1) The 
formal model should be able to fill the gap of current automata based approaches 
to capture not only the basic BPEL features but also the advanced BPEL features to 
model fault handling, event handling, and compensation handling; 2) The formal model 
should be able to capture both control dependencies and data dependencies between 
BPEL activities; 3) The formal model should reduce state space for model checking; 4) 
The mapping from the formal model to the input language of model checkers should 
contain abstraction to speed up the model checking. 
In this chapter, we reviewed the formal models for BPEL including Petri-nets, Pro--
cess Algebra, and automata; the verification approaches based on these formal models; 
the testing approaches of deriving test cases from web service behavioural models; 
and approaches to analyse data dependencies internal and external to an orchestration 
model. We discussed the motivation to propose a formal model, and the required fea-
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tures of the formal model. Thereafter, we presented the reason to design and develop an 
automated test generation framework. In the next chapter, we will present the formal 
semantics of our proposed web service automaton. 
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Web Service Automata 
The previous chapter identified a number of problems with existing formal models of 
BPEL. In order to address these, we propose a new formalism: Web Service Automata. 
In this chapter, we provide the formal semantics for web service automaton (WSA). 
Web service automaton provides a formal description of the legal protocol for web 
service interaction, and following some translation steps it can be used as a reference 
model for test case derivation, applying well established algorithms from formal test 
theory. In WSA, each message is represented by a channel. Unique names for channels 
corresponding to each message type are assumed. 
3.1 Static Semantics 
The static semantics of a web servic(, automat OIl extends a finite state machine with 
signature, data structure, and message storage schema. The dynamic semantics of 
a web service automaton includes machine configurations and execution traces. The 
formal definitions are given below. 
Definition 1. A Web Service Automaton (WSA) III is a sextuple !II = (ft.!. S;\I . .'iO,\I· 
Sf /II, T/II, OM)' As a convention, we omit the subscript of !II so that iU = (I, S, .'io , Sf. T, 0). 
1) I is the signature of !II. denoted as a triple I = (E, L. 0). where E. L, 0 are pair-
wise disjoint and represent sets of input, internal, and output e\'ents. respectiwly, 
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Let M sg = (L U E U 0) be the set of events, we assume that L is the disjoint 
union of a set Lin of internal input events and a set Lout of internal output events, 
and the elements of (E U 0) will be called external events. 
2) S is a set of states, So E S is the initial state, Sf ~ S is a set of final states. 
3) T ~ (EX U {n}) x EX x (p(AX U 0 U Lout) U {n}) is a set of transitions. where: 
• EX is the set of Boolean expressions over input event sets E U Lin, linked 
by logical operators AND, OR, and NOT, denoted as 1\, V, and -, respec-
tively. Let V be a countable infinite set of variables of 1\1. AX is the set of 
assignments over V. EX is the set of Boolean expressions over V. 
• For each transition t = (ex, g, a) E T (graphically denoted as e.r[g]/a), e.r E 
EX U {n} is the input event expression, 9 E EX is the guard predicate, 
and a ~ p(AX U 0 U Lout) U {D} is the action set composed of assignments 
and output events. D indicates the omission of an input event expression 
or an output event. The components of transition t are denoted as t.e.r = 
ex, t.g = g, t.a = a. 
• If there exist two statements Stl, st2 E t.a n AX where def(stl) = def(st2), 
then Stl _ st2 (see the definition of de f below). 
4) 8 ~ S x T x S is the transition relation (graphically denoted as s ~ s'). If s ~ s' 
with t = (ex, g, a), then if the machine is in state s, the t.ex and t.g are evaluated 
to true (see the definitions of evalJ, evalc below), then the machine executes the 
set of instructions a and change state to s'. 
Let st denotes a statement that represents an input event of machine 1'1, output 
event of 1\1, assignment, or Boolean expression. First, we define three functions: 
• def : (AX U EM) -+ p(V), where def(st) ~ p(V) returns the assigned variables 
of a statement, i.e. the variable on the left hand side of an assignment, and the 
input event parameters of AI. 
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• cuses : (AX U GAd -t p(V), where cuses(st) ~ V returns the variables on the 
right hand side of an assignment, and the output event parameters of JI. 
• puses : EX -t p(V), where puses(st) ~ V returns the variables in the Boolean 
expression over variables. 
Next, we define two functions for assigning values to variables and for evaluating 
whether an event in the input evet expression exists in the machine input buffer: 
• Let V be a countable infinite set of variables and a set D of values. ETlL'\' is the 
set of all functions E\, : V -t D, where an element E\' E Enu\' represents the 
current values of variables in some system configuration (see definition 6). Let 
ST be a set of statements. E\! : ST ---+ D evaluates a statement to obvious values 
in D by applying EV to any free variables in the statement. For instance, for a 
statement y = f(Xl, :[2, .. , x n ), we have f\.(y) = f(q,(xl), q'(X2), .. , q·(xn )). 
• Let ;3(E U L ill ) be' the multi-set input buffer of Jlf (see definition ;J). Elii'] 
is the set of all functions f I : E -t {true, f alst'} that satisfies E I (e) = true 
iff e E (3(E U Lin). Let ST be a set of statements. Ej : ST ---+ {true, false} 
evaluates a statement to {true, false} by applying EI to any free variables in the 
statement. For instance, for an event expression t.ex = f(el, e2, .. , en), \VC have 
Accordingly to the above functions, we define an event Boolean function, a guard 
Boolean function, and a variable update funtion to evaluate the current values of t.ex, 
t.g, and t.a n AX for a transition. Let 1: E t': 
1) We define a function eLl : EX -t EU Lin to return the input event set of an event 
expression. For instance, for an event expression t.ex = (el A -,e2) V (e2 A -,el). 
the input event set ev(t.ex) = {el,ed· Let eL'(t.e:r) = {el . ... c n }. \Ye define 
an event Boolean function evall : EX x Em'l ---+ {true, false} that satisfies: 
f'L'ah(t.ex, EI)(el . .. ,en ) = true iff Ej(t.ex) holds. 
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2) Let X = {Xl, .. , x n } be the set of variables in st E B X. We define a guard Boolean 
function evalc : BXxEnvv -----t {true, false} that satisfies: evalc(st. EV)(Xl .... . I'n) = 
true iff E\;(st) holds. For instance, evalc(x < y,E\,')(X,y) = true iff q·(x) < 
E\/(Y)· 
3) Let sti E t.a n AX. We define a variable update function eL'al\· : AX x Em'\" -----t 
Envv that applies assignments in the obvious way. Note this well have following 
properties: 
• If there exists x E cuses(st) and x tJ- def(st), then eual\·(st, q·)(.r) = EV(X). 
It indicates that the value of .1' is unchanged when x is used and not defined. 
• If for all q·(x) E Env we have evalv(stl' Ev)(X) = eval\·(st:,2, q.)(.1') , then 
stl st2. It indicates that given an q' (x) and two statements, if the updated 
values of x are equivalent, the two expressions are equivalent. 
• Since a variable can only be defined once in a transition, this allows us to 
unambiguously define a set of statements X ~ t.a n AX. euak(X, q' )(.1.) = 
{ 
evalv(st, q·)(x) = Ei.(st) if x E def(st) 
E\' (x) otherwise 
Definition 2. The data structure of machine AI is a triple (\'~\1, AXM U El\J U 
o l\J , B X l\J ), where AX l\J , B X l\J can be retrieved from the transition set Ti\!. AX l\J = 
{st E AXI3t E T.st E t.a} and BXlIf = {st E BXI3t E T.st E t.g}. VAl is the union of 
UstE(ASi\lUEJ\1UOi\l) (def(st) U cuses(st)) and UstEBSA/ puses(st). 
Definition 3. Suppose that transitions ti, tj begin with the same start state s, and end 
with states s', s" respectivel.v, a WSA is deterministic iff the guard is non-overlapping 
ti.gffitj.g in the case of ti.e;r = tj.ex. Consequently, in a deterministic \\'SA, \:Is, s',...," E 
. . t, t" , " h ld S.vt E T, the condltIOn s -----t s 1\ s -----t S =} s = s 0 s. 
We use symbols ?,!, @ as a convention in diagrams to indicate whether an event 
is input, output, or internal event, denoted as ?e E E,!e E O. ~'e E L. respcctiwh-. 
Conversely, going from the formal description to a diagram, ?!. @ are introduced de-
pending on membership of E, 0, L. For instance if ,\1 sends a message m to JI', then 
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in the composite automaton (definition l1),?m and !m will become @?m and @!m 
to indicate that the external input and output events become the internal input and 
output events, respectively. 
Definition 4. We define a message x to be a pair of send and receive events (1.[;, ?:r). 
If machine IIh sends message x to machine IIh. then 1:r E 0 1 A? x E E 2 . 
3.2 Dynamic Semantics 
We have defined the static structure of a 'VSA. We now explain its operation semantics 
for dynamic semantics. We assume, first of all, that each "'SA is equipped with a finite 
multi-set buffer (definition 5) (3(EULin ) to store the incoming messages. In one step 
of the WSA, either: 1) a message e is received from the environment e E E, and added 
to the buffer (3(EULin ); or 2) all euabled transition fires, possibly causing a state change 
and change to the values of some variables v E VI\[. In order to define a step precisely, 
we need to formalist' the notion of a configuration "l which records the current state. 
the current values of the variables associated with 111 and the current content of the 
buffer. 
A transition t is enabled in a configuration "l, when: 1) its triggering event expres-
sion t.CT is either empty, or is evaluated to true evaIJ(t.e:r. EJ )(e1' '" en) = true where 
cl'(t .. e:r) = {(:'1, '" en}; and 2) its guard is evaluated to true f'L'ol(;(t.g, EV )(Xl' '" xn) = 
true where {;rl' '" ;rn} is the set of variables in t.g. \\'hen a transition t is enabled, a 
set of actions t.a is executed, and the state machine moves from the start state to the 
end state of t. Such a transition is an enabled transition. 
Tht' commonly used buffering schemes can be categorised as two hranches: single 
FIFO and multi-set. buffering schemes. In the single FIFO buffering scheme, each 
machine has one FIFO buffer. This scheme is applied in CFS~r [13] and the guarded 
automata [25]. A message can be consumed only' when it is at the head of the FIFO 
buffer. There exist three types of multi-set (definition 0) buffering schemes, as follo\\'s. 
1) l\Iulti-set buffer with FIFO sub-buffers: A machine has one multi-set buffer that 
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consists of FIFO sub-buffers, where each FIFO sub-buffer corresponds to a mes-
sage type. A message can be consumed when it is at the head of each FIFO 
sub-buffer. 
2) Multi-set buffer without sub-buffers: A machine has one multi-set buffer. A 
message can be consumed as long as it is in the buffer. For those messages of the 
same type, the machine will randomly consume a message in the buffer. 
3) Multi-set buffer with multi-set sub-buffers: A machine has one multi-set buffer 
that consists of multi-set sub-buffers, where each multi-set sub-buffer corresponds 
to a message type. The machine consumes messages in the same \Va)' as above 
2). 
The multi-set buffer with FIFO sub-buffers, i.e. type 1), is used in WSA . .:\ote t,hat 
without loss of generality, we assume the communication channels are lossless, so that 
every message is always received after it is sent. 
A machine is associated with a set of event.s, and an cv('nt may have multiple event 
occurrences. When considering a machine's dynamic behaviour, we need to distin-
guish event occurrences from evC'nts. Similarly, a message sent between machines may 
have multiple message instances, and message instances also need to be distinguished 
f1'0111 llH'Ssagcs. We ddillC a fuuctio11 A : I n:i ---+ C to map class instances Ins to classes 
C. 1) When applying A to event occurrences and events, A(O) = e returns the event 
f' for an event occurrence o. For an enabled transition t, if ?x E t.m then wc say t 
corresponds to the event occurrence 0i with A(Oi) =?:r. 2) \Vhen applying A to message 
instances and messages, for a message instance om = (!om, ?om), there exists message 
m = (!m, ?m) such that A(!om) =!rll and A(?om) =?m. 
During machine communication, message overtaking may occur. Figure 3.1 shows 
two types of message overtaking in f\lSCs (f\lessage Sequence Charts). For t)'pe-A, 
suppose messages :r = (!.r, ?x) and y = (!y, ?y), there exist lllessage instances ox = 
(!ox, ?ox) and oy = (!oy, ?oy) where A(O.r) = ,r and A(OY) = y, respectiwly. :-lcssage 
overtaking happens when the order of receiw eWllt occurrencl'S ?ox, ')oy is different 
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from the order of send event occurrences lox, loy. For type-B, suppose message x = 
(!x, ?x), there exist message instances OXI = (!OXI, ?OXl) and OX2 = (!OX2. ?OX2) where 
A(OXI) = A(OX2) = x. Message overtaking happens when the order of receive event 
occurrences ?OXI, ?OX2 is different from the order of send event occurrences !oxl, !ox2. 
M~l M~OY M~l M2)OX2 
lox ?ox !oxI ?oxl 
loy lox 
type-A type-B 
Figure 3.1: Message overtaking 
Different buffering schemes allow different message overtaking. For the single FIFO 
buffering scheme, no l11C'ssagC' overtaking is allowed. For multi-set buffering schemes, 
the type-A message overtaking is allowed in the buffers of type 1), and both type-A 
and type-B message overtakings are are allowed in the buffers of type 2) and type 3). 
Definition 5. A finite multi-set is formally defined as a pair (X, n), where X is some 
set and n : X --t N is a function from X to the set N of natural numbers. A multi-set 
differs from a set in that each element has a multiplicity. 
For instance, {a,b,b,c,b,a} is amultiset, and the multiplicities are n(a) = 2,n(b) = 
3, n(c) = 1, respectively. The usual set operations such as union, intersection, and sum 
can be generalised for multisets. We have (D+E)(x) = D(x)+E(x), (D+y)(x) = D(x) 
if ):: -1= y and (D + y)(y) = D(y) + 1. 
Assumption 1. A final state of a machine has no outgoing transitions. A machine 
IH terminates when it reaches one of its final states. i.e. the lifecycle of j1 ends. \\'(' 
assume that the buffer is always empty when !II is in a final state. If the buffer is not 
empty then the remaining messages will be discarded because they cannot be consumed 
within this lifecycle. 
Definition 6. A configuration of a machine ..'.1 is of the form TJ = (s, B, q' ), \\" here 
s E S, B ~ {3 (E U L I Tl) is the current buffer content, and function q' E Ell L'. The 
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set of configurations of AI is denoted as con f s (M). Let EVO and q' n be the variable 
values when the machine is in the initial state So, and a final state .'in E Sf, respectively. 
1]0 = (so, 0, EVO) is the initial configuration, and 1]n = (.'in, 0, q'n) is a final configuration. 
Definition 7. A step is a triple (1],x,1]') E confs(.llI) x (TUEUL in ) X confs(JI). 
A step 1] f--tX 1]' changes machine M from configuration 1] to configuration 1]' in the 
following forms: 
1) If x E E U Lin, representing the case when an arriving message x is added to the 
buffer B, then (s, B, EV) f--tX (s', B', E~) iff s = s', EV = E~., B' = B + {x}. 
2) If:r = t E T, representing the case when either the message set c t!( t . c.r) is already 
in the buffer or there is no triggering event associated with t, then (s,B,f\') 1---+1 
( S' , B' , E~ .. ) iff 
• (.'i, t, Sf) E 6, evalc(t.g, q.) = true, B' = (B \ f'U(t.t';l·) + (t.a n Lin)) where 
evalI(t.ex, EI)(el, .. , en) = true where t'u(t.e;l:) = {el' .. , cn}. 
• According to 1) of definition 2, in the definition of (s, B, E\') I---+t (s', B', t~, ), 
we have E~. = evalA (t.a n AX, EV)' 
Definition 8. A transition sequence of 1\1 is a sequence of enabled transitions 
tran(o:) = (to, .. , tn-I), where ii E T,o: = (1]0, to, .. , 1]n). 'It I---+ti 1/:+ 1 for i = 0, .. , n, and 
tran( 1]0) = 0. Here 1]0 is the initial configuration and I7n is a final configuration. \Ve 
denote the set of transition sequences by transUI, 1]0) or trans(M). 
We define a trace of machine 1\1 to be a non-empty sequence of external event 
occurrences trace(o:) = (01, .. , On), where for all enabled transitions t of a transition 
sequence, >.(Oi) E ev(t.ex) ~ E and EI(>'(Oi)) = true, or >'(od E t.a n 0 =1= 0 holds. \\'c 
denote the set of traces by traces(lU, '(70) or traces(~~I). 
Definition 9. Let SReach(1\I) = {s E SI30: E trczcfc','·;(.;U),so ~ s} be the set of 
states reachable from the initial state of ;'\1, and let T Reach(JI) {t E TI3s E 
SReach(l\I).3s' E S.s -.!..... Sf} be the set of reachable transitions. So a machine .\1 is 
fully reachable iff SReach(AI) = S 1\ T Reach(;'\I) = T. 
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3.3 Composition 
In order for our notion of composition to be commutative and associatiw. we introduce 
the unordered Cartesian product (definition 10). The commutative property is easy to 
obtain based on the unordered Cartesian product, but the associative property requires 
further constraints 011 the individual WSAs. We define a general composite automaton 
with an interleaving sC'mantics (definition 11). Such a composite automaton has a set 
of properties (lemma 1, lemma 2) but it is not guaranteed to be a \\'SA (definition 12). 
We then elicit a set of constraints on the individual \VSAs for a composite automaton 
to be a WSA (corollary 1, theorem 1). or to be a deterministic \\'SA (proposition 
1, theorem 2). For a composite automaton composed by strongly composable \\'SAs 
(definition 13), we derive its property (proposition 2), also wc prow tlwt the buffer 
content of such a composite automaton is a unique pair (lemma 3) and both the 
configurations and configuration sequences of individual \VSAs call be projected from 
the composite automaton (lemma 4, lemma iJ). \Ve also prove that the composition 
operator is commutative (lemma 6), and it is associative when the composed \\'SAs 
are strongly composable (lemma 7). In the following, we suppose l\h, "~h are \VSAs. 
Definition 10. If (X/ )iEI is an indexed family of sets, we define TIiEI X t to be the sd 
of all functions w : I ---t UiEI Xi satisf)'illg w(i) E Xi for each i E I, \Ve refer to TIiEI Xi 
as the unordered Cartesian product of a set of Xi. Note that TI is a commutative 
and associative binary operator. 
Definition 11. \\'e define the Composite Automaton Jf 
structure if = (i, 5, sQ, Sf, t. ()), where 
Jh II .J.\h to be the 
1) i = (E, 1. 6), we define COnl12 to be the common messages of Jh, Jh b)' comu = 
(E1 n 02) U (E2 n 0 1), :\ ow we can define i by E = E 1 U E 2 - com 12 = (E 1 - Q2) U 
(E2 - 0 1), i = L1 UL2UCOI1l12, and 6 = 0 1 U02 - com12 = (01 - E2) U (02 - £1). 
3) So = {sn TI{s6}. 
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4) Sf = {S}} TI{S]}. A state of Ml II M2 , .. , IIA1n is final if, for all machines, the 
local state Si of Mi is final. 
5) T = Tl U T2 . Note we assume that for all v E Vi, v is a local variable of machine 
All' There are no shared variables between t E Ti and t E Tj where i =1= j. Let 
msg(x) be the message with msg as the message name and x as the message 
parameter. Given that msg(x) E com12, i.e. !msg(x) E 0 1, ?msg(x) E E'2. there 
exists t E Tl with msg(x) E t.a n 0 1, and t E T2 with msg(J:') E edt.e.r). After 
Ml have sent message msg(x) to M 2, msg(x) is appended to the input buffer of 
M 2 , and EJ2(msg(;c)) = true. Here x is an output parameter of 1\11 and an inplI.t 
parameter of A12 . 
6) 5 ~ S x T x S. If t E T1 then (sl s?) ~ (sl s2) {:} s2 = s2 !\.<;1 ~ sl 
1'1 J'J 1 JI J' 
similarly if t E T2 then (s}, s;) ~ (sJ' S]) {:} s; = sJ !\ sf ~ .. } It follows 
from the asynchronous interleaving semantics that a transition of the composite 
automaton is either from 1\1 or 1\1' but not from both machines. 
Lemma 1. If 1\1 = 1\11 II 1\h, then (1) En L = (E1 n L 2) U (E2 n L 1) - COfll12; (2) 
6 n i = (01 n L 2 ) U (02 n L 1 ) - com12; (3) En 6 = 0. 
Proof. By E n i = (E1 U E2 - com12) n (L1 U L2 U com12) and pair-wise disjoint 
property Ei n LI = 0 we can get (1). Also, (2) holds because of the symmetry of E, 6. 
From En 6 = (El U E2 - com12) n (01 U O2 - com12), by pair-wise disjoint property 
Ei n o'i = 0, we can get (3). 
Corollary 1. If E1 n E2 = L1 n L2 = 0 1 n O2 = 0 (1), then ;.\'1 = l\h 111\h is a \\"SA. 
Proof. Expanding 1\1 sgl = E1 U L1 U 0 1 and 1\1 sg2 = E2 U L2 U O2, we get ;.\1 Sgl n 
1\1 sg2 = comI2U(E1nL2)U(LlnE2)U( 01 nL2)U( 02nLl)U(E1nE2)U(L1nL2)U( 01 n02) 
(2). If (1) holds, from (2) we can deduce (E1nL2)U(E2nL1)U(01nL2)U(02nL1) ~ 
com12U(ElnE2)U(LlnL2)U(01n02) (3). ILl" E (E}nL2)U(E2nL1) thenr i:. cOfll]2 
where com12 = (El n O2 ) U (E2 n 0 1 ), because of the pair-wise disjoillt Oi n L/ = 0. s(} 
from (3) we call derive (E1 n L 2) U (E'2 n L 1) ~ (E1 n E2) U (Ll n L'2) U (0] n 02)' 13.\' 
(1) of lemma 1, we haw En i ~ (El n £'2) U (L1 n L 2 ) U (01 n O2) \ coml2. Ba::;ed on 
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the pair-wise disjoint of Ei , Li , Oi, if x E En i = (E1 n L2) U (E2 n L1) \ com12 then 
x tJ- (E1 n E2) U (L1 n L2) U (01 n O2) \ com12. So we have En in ((E1 n E2) U (L1 n 
L2) U (01 n O2)) = 0. Based on set theory An B = 0 and A ~ B =} A = 0, we have 
En i = 0. Similarly, ani = 0 holds. Finally, by (3) oflemma 1, we have t n a = 0. 
Definition 12. Ah, Ah are composable iff L1 n02 = L1 nE2 = L2 n01 =L2 nE1 = 0, 
where the internal events of each machine are disjoint from the extenal inputs and 
outputs of the other machine. 
Definition 13. Ah, Ah are strongly composable iff 1) .ilh, l\h are compsosable; 2) 
E1 n E2 = 0 1 n O2 = 0, where the inputs and outputs of each machine ar(' pair-wise 
disjoint from the inputs and outpus of the other machine, respectively. 
Theorem 1. if = Ah II Ah is a WSA iff l\h, Ah an' composable. i.e. L1 n O2 = 
L1 n E2 = L2 n 0 1 =L2 n E1 = 0 (1). 
Proof. From definition 11, E = (E1 - Q2) U (E2 - 0 1), i 
a = (01 - E2) U (02 - E1)' 
Given that A~f is a WSA, i.e. E, i, a are pairwise disjoint, we need to prove (1). 
E 1,01)' We have Eni = 0 =} ((E1-Q2)U(E2-01))n(L1UL2Ucom12) = 0. Based 
on set theory (AUB) n (CUD) = 0 =} AnC = BnC = AnD = BnD = 0, wc have 
L1 n (E2 - 0 1) = 0 =} L1 n E2 = 0 and L2 n (E1 - O2 ) = 0 =} L2 n E1 = 0. Because 
o is symmetrical to E, L1 n O2 = 0 and L2 n 0 1 = 0 can be proved similarly. So (1) is 
proved. 
Conversely, given (1), we need to prove that ft, i, a are pairwise disjoint. By (1), \\"e 
have ftni = ((E1-Q2)U(E2-01))n(L1UL2Ucom12) = ((E1-Q:dU(E2 -01))nCom12, 
where com12 = (E1n02)U(E2n01)' Based on set theory (AnB)n(A-B) = 0, we haw 
((E1-Q2)U(E2-01))n((E1n02)U(E2n01)) = ((Eln02)n(E2-01))U((E2n01)n 
(E1 - O2)), By pairwise disjointment of E l • Oi, we have tni = 0. Similarly, ani = 0 
can be proved. Finally, En a = ((E1 - Q2) U (E2 - 0 1)) n ((01 - E2) U (02 - £1)) = 0. 
So, ft, i, a arc proved to be pairwise disjoint. 
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Lemma 2. If M = M1 II M2 is a WSA where MIl M2 are strongly composable, then 
T1 n T2 = 0. 
Proof. By definition 1, T1 ~ (EX1 U {n}) x EX1 X (p(AX1 U 0 1 U L 1out ) U {n}), and 
T2 ~ (EX2 U {n}) x EX2 X (P(AX2 U O2 u L 2out ) U {n}). \Vhen ill is a \\"SA. we have 
L1 (resp. L 2) is pairwise disjoint from E2, O2 (resp. £1.01). If l\h. Jh are strongly 
composable, then L1 (resp. L2) is pairwise disjoint from L2, £2,?2 (resp. L1· £1' 0 1): 
El, E2 are pairwise disjoint; 0 1 ,02 are pairwise disjoint. So, T1 and T2 are pairwise 
disjoint, i.e. T1 n T2 = 0. 
Proposition 1. AI = Ah II M2 is deterministic iff Ah, .\h are deterministic. 
P f S () tET (' I ) ( ) tET (1/ ") b 1 .). h roo. uppose Sl,S2 --+ sl,s2 /\ Sl,82 --+ sl,.')2' yemma -. lilt ecase 
f T h tETl, tETl /I d -, /I b h I /I 1 o tEl, we must ave Sl --+ 8 1,Sl --+ Sl an .')2 =.')2 = S2' ut t en Sl = 8 1 )y 
deterministic of Ah, so (S~, S;) = (8~, s~). The case t E T2 is similar. \Ve have proved 
that if Ah, Ah are deterministic. then AI is deterministic. 
. - tETl I tETl Next we consIder the converse. For t E T, suppose t E T1 we have 81 -----t Sl/\ Sl -----t 
s~, then (Sl' 82) tg (8~, S2) /\ (Sl, S2) tg (s~, S2). If iI is deterministic, we must have 
s~ = 8~. Hence Ah is deterministic, likewise Ah is deterministic. 
Theorem 2. AI = Ah II AI2 is a deterministic WSA iff 
(1) Ah, Ah are deterministic; 
(2) Ah, Ah are composable. 
Proof. If AI = Ah II Ah is a deterministic \\-SA. then (1) is proved by proposition 1. 
and (2) is proved by theorem 1. Conyersely. the condition (2) proves that leI is a \VSA 
following theorem 1: and the condition (1) proves that ill is deterministic following 
proposition 1. 
Proposition 2. If Ah, Ah are strongly composable, then 
(1) If Ah, 1\h are deterministic, then JI = Jh II .\h is deterministic: 
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(3) !'Ih, M2 are composable. 
Proof. By proposition I, (1) can 1)(' pwv('cl. From definition 13. we have E 1 nE2 = 0, 
0 1 n O2 = 0, and L1 n E2 = L1n2 = L2 n E1 = L2 n 0 1 = 0 (a). Also, suppose 
ii = All II M2, we have En L = 0 (b). By (a)(b) and the pair-wise disjoint property 
of E I , Li , Oi, we can prove that (2) holds. (3) holds following corollary 1. 
Lemma 3. Suppose M1, M2 are strongly composable, let ii = "~h II ilh and B E 
f3(E U L), then there exists a unique pair B1 ~ ;3(E1 U L 1) and B2 ~J(E2 U L 2) such 
that B1 U B2 = Band B1 n B2 = 0, i.e.B = B1 + B 2· A buffer projection from B to 
Bi, i = 1,2 is denoted as proji(B) = Bi · 
Proof. Let Bi(X) = , we shall show that (E1 UL 1)n(E2UL2) = { 
Bi (:r) x E Ei U L i 
o otherwise 
0(1), from this it follows B1 n B2 = 0 so that a message x E B1 implies x ~ B2· From 
definition 13, Li n E j = 0 where i i= j. From proposition 2, if !'Ih,!'Ih are strongly 
composable then E1 n E2 = L1 n L2 = 0, so we can prove that (1) holds as claimed. 
Lemma 4. Suppose !'Ih,!'Ih are strongly composable. Lct !'I-I = l\h II !'Ih and 
7] = s, B, f\' IV E conJs(!'lI) , where f\' IV assign values to the variables of V. A con-
figuration projection from conJs(!'IJ) to conJs(!'IIi), i = 1,2 is denoted as projecti(7] E 
con Js(!'IIi) where project I (s, B, f\' 1,-0) = (SI' proji(B), E\' WI) . i.e. project lr7) = 7]i· 
Proof. By lemma 3 we have proji(B) E [3(Ei U L i), it follows that the configura-
tion of individual automaton lli can be projected from the configuration of composite 
automaton 17 E conJs(!'I'J) by projecti(7]). 
Lemma 5. Suppose that l\h,!'Ih are strongly composable, let !'II = !'Ih II J\h, then 
ct E tTans(!'II) ==> projecti(a) E trans(lUi ) (1). 
Proof. Since traces(iJ) can be retrieved from trans (1',-J) , it is sufficient to prove (1) 
holds. Based 011 defiuition 6, we need 7] f--t.!' r/ to represent a step between configura-
tions. 
First, when;r = e E i;, \\"chaw7] f--t.r 7]' iff 1) In thecaseof.r E E1\l.projectl(7]) f--t.r 
Pl"Ojf' ct 1CI7') and project2(7]) = project'2(7]'). By lemma 3 it follows .1' E t ==> 7]1 f--t.r 
3.3 Composition 
17~ /\ 172 = 172· From definition 7 it follows that the conditions Sl = s~, Bi = Bl + x. and 
EV1 = E~l holds for 171 1------+.1' 17i. 2) In the case of x E E2 \ i, project2(17) I------+,T project2(17') 
and project1(17) = project1(17'). Similar to 1), we can get x E E ~ 172 I------+ x 17; /\ 171 = 171, 
and the conditions S2 = s~, B; = B2 + x, and Q'2 = E~2 hold for 172 I------+ x 17;· 
Second, when x = t E T, we have 17 I------+ x 17' iff 1) In the case of x E T1 , project1(17) 1------+:[ 
project1('T/) and project2(17) I------+x.anE2 project2(17'). By lemma 4, it follows x E T1 ~ 
171 I------+ x 17~ and 172 I------+x.anE2 17;. 2) Similarly, in the case of x E T2 , project2(17) I------+ x 
project2(17') and project1(17) I------+x.anEl project1(17')· By lemma 4, it follows .r E T2 ~ 
172 I------+ x 17; and 171 I------+x.anEl 17i· 
As a result, for projection on transitions and messages, we have projtcl i(XO, .. , :r n -l) = 
projecti(XO) , .. ,projecLi(xn-1). If :fi E T1 U El \ i then project1(-.ri) = Xi· If Xi E T2 
then project1 (-..ri) = t.a n E 1· 
Lemma 6. The composition operator is commutative, i.e. 1\h 111\h = 1\£2 II 1\12' 
Proof. Given 1\IA = 1\h II 1\h = (lA, SA, SAO, SAj, 'T41 dA) and 1\IB = 1\h II 1\11 
(IB, SB, SBO, SBj, TB, dB)' following thc ddillition of \v('b S('l'vi('(' ii.utulllaton, th(' de-
ments of 1\h are symmetrical with the elements of 1\h· For instance, EA = (E1 U 
E2) \ com12 = EB. Following the commutative nature of the set operators (U, n, II), 
we can prove 1...1 = IB, SAO = SBO, SAj = SBj, TA = TB and dA = dB. Hence 
1\h II1\h = 1\h II1\h is proved as claimed. 
Lemma 7. Suppose that 1\h, 1\h, 1\h are strongly composable, the composition oper-
ator is associative, i.e. (1\h II flh) II1\h = 1\h II (1\h II1\h)· 
Proof. Suppose filA = (1\h II1\h) II1\h = (lA, SJ" SAO, SAj, TA, dA) and MB = J\h II 
(flh II flh) = (IB, SB, SBO, SBj, TB, dB), following the commutative nature of the set 
operators (U, n, II), we can prove SAO = SBO. SAj = SBj, TA = TB and dA = dB· We 
can derive IA = IB from EA = EB,LA = LB. and 0...1 = OB· In the following, we let 
E = E1 U E2 U E3, L = L1 U L2 U L3, 0 = 01 U O2 U 03. and X = X 12 U X 13 U X 23 
where X 12 = com12, X 13 = coml3, and X23 = com23· Let U = E U L U 0, based on set 
t.heo1')', we have X = u \ X ~ A \ X = A. n X. 
First, we need to prove EA = E B . 
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• Let Ea = Ell12UE3 and Xa = (ElI12U03)U(01112UE3), where El112 = (E1 UE2 )n 
X 12 and 0 1112 = (01 U O2) n X12. We have EA = Ea n Xa (1). From (1), we can 
derive Ea = En(X12UE3) (2), Xa = X12n(X13UX23) and Xa = X12n(X13UX23) 
(3). From (2)(3), EA = En ((E3 nX12 ) UXU (E3 n (XUX12 )) (..t) can be derived. 
By proposition 2, E i , E j are pair-wise disjoint, we have E3 n X 12 = 0 (5). From 
(4)(5) it results EA = En (X U (E3 n X)) = En X . 
• Similarly, let Eb = E2113 U E1 and Xb = (E2113 U 0 1) U (02113 U E1), where E'2113 = 
(E2 U E3) n X23 and 0 2113 = (02 U 0 3) n X 23 . We have EE = Eb n X/, (6). 
From (6), we can derive Eb = En (X23 U E 1) (7), Xb = .K23 n (X12 U .\13) and 
Xb = X23n(X12UX13) (8). From (7)(8), EE = En((E1nX23)UXU(E1n(XUX23)) 
can be derived. Since Ei , E j are pairwise disjoint, we have E1 n .\23 = 0, such 
that EE = En (X U (E1 n X)) = E n X. So EA = EE is proved. 
Second, because 0 is symmetrical to E, we have 0,4 = OE = (0 n X) as claimed. 
Third, we need to prove LA = LE. By LA = (LlI12UL3)U(ElI12n03)U(01112nE3) and 
L1112 = L1 UL2 UX1112 , we have LA = LUXl 112 UXa where Xa = (El112 n03) U (0111 '2 nE3) 
(9). By (3)(9), LA = L U X1112 U X1113 U X2113 = LUX can be derived. Similarly, 
by LE = (L2113 U L1) U (E2113 n 01) U (02113 n E1) and L2113 = L2 U L3 U X2113 , we 
have LE = L U X2113 U Xb (10), where Xb = (E2113 n 0 1) U (02113 n E1)' By (3)(10), 
LA = L U X l 112 U Xl113 U X2113 = LUX can be derived. Therefore, LA = LE is proved 
as claimed. 
3.4 Compatibility and Anti-patterns 
In this section, we define syntax and semantic compatibility. Since syntax compat-
ibility is easy to check from machine interfaces, we focus on checking the semantic 
compatibility by checking the individual machines against anti-patterns . 
..to 
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3.4.1 Compatibility 
After selecting a set of candidate WSAs, we need to check whether the \YSAs can inter-
act properly as expected. Syntactic compatibility involves checking machine interfaces 
for the matching external events. Semantic compatibility means checking the machine 
behaviours for the absence of pathologies. 
Definition 14. Two WSAs l\h, M2 are syntactically compatible if Jh sends a 
message x to M 2 • then there exists x = (L1::, 7x) such that !x E 0 1 and 71' E £2· 
Definition 15. Two WSAs M 1, M2 are semantically compatible if a) they are 
strongly composable, and b) trans(Ml Ill\h) i= 0. 
Now we discuss when the transition sequence trans(l\h II l\h) = 0 holds. This 
condition holds iff for any r, = (( s6. s6), B, (ELl' E~O)) there is no transition t E t such 
that r, 1-----+1 ~', where (Et.O' E~O) denotes the initial values of variables. First. suppose 
the initial configuration is r,o = ((s6,s6),B, (Et'O,E?'O))' if BE (3(E) then there exists ex 
such that r,o 1-----+° r,B = ((s6, s6), B + ex, (Et·O' E?·O))' where 0 consists solely of external 
input events, i.e. 0: E E. Second, from definition 11, it shows (s}, sr) ~ (sJ. s;) iff a) 
if t E Tl then sr = s7 1\ s; ~ sJ' or b) if t E T2 then s} = sJ 1\ s7 ~ s7' Therefore, we 
have r,B I-----+tET1{:} 7711-----+tETl or 771I-----+tETz. Here 77B = (si).proji(B), E\·O)' and proji is 
the buffer projection operator. \\'ithout loss of generality suppose of] I-----+tETl 77', we have 
s6 t§ll si, t.m E B, and t.g is evaluated to true. Conversely. we have ,(r,B I-----+tET1) iff 
for all B either ,(s6 t§ll), t.m ¢:. E. or t.g is evaluated to false. 
As a result. condition tTans(l\h II l\h) = 0 holds iff for VB E (3(E). there does 
not exist t E T such that r,B I-----+t. which indicates that no transition is possible aft c1' 
receiving as many as external inputs. 
3.4.2 Anti-patterns 
According to definition 15, the condition trans(~Hl II ;\12) -=1= 0 can be checked only 
after constructing the composite \YSA. This indicates that a thorough SClllalltic com-
patibility checking has to be done 0)' exploring the whole state space of the composite 
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automaton. However we can speed up the model checking, if some obviously incompat-
ible behaviours can be identified by only checking individual \YSAs. 'Ye propose anti-
patterns for such obviously incompatible behaviours. As a complementary approach 
to post-checking, we provide warnings so that the problematic \\'SA can be either re-
selected or modified in the earliest stages. Furthermore, since a \ VSA's local ordering 
(definition 18) only needs to be computed once, the local ordering can be re-used for 
pre-checking the compatibility with other machines. After pre-checking, post-checking 
can be applied to thoroughly check the composite automaton for safety and lin'lll'ss 
properties. Note that our anti-patterns are mainly used as design guidelines. f'dodels 
with anti-patterns have potential to cause problems. 
Referring to the event occurrences and message instances discussed in section 3.2, 
the anti-patterns discuss the temporal relations over event occurrences in traces of 
individual machines. We follow the standard definitions of strict partial order and 
mutually exclusive relation in set theory (e.g. [9]). 
Definition 16. In a machine 1\1, suppose e, e' E 1\1 sgM, the strict partial order over 
event occurrences 01 < 02 where ),(01) = e, ),(02) = e' indicates that 01 happens 
before 02 in a trace of 1\1. 
Corollary 2. Suppose there is a message m from machine l~h to 1\h, if we have a 
message instance om = (!om, ?om) where ),(!om) =!1II and ),(?om) =?m, then the 
str-ict par-tial or-der- over an event occurrence pair tom <?om enforces that a message 
instance lllUSt be received after it is sent. 
Definition 17. In machine "U, suppose e. e' E 1\1 :3!j;\J. the mutually exclusive relation 
on event occurrences 01~02 where ),(01) = e, ),(02) = e' indicates that 01 is branch-
conflict with 02 in a configuration sequence of ill. Intuitively, two branch-conflict 
event occurrences cannot happen in the same trace. 
Definition 18. The local ordering on a single machine j1i is a strnct ure Ii = (C. <i 
Il.) where C- is the eW'llt occurrence set of E/ U Oi, <i and ~/ are the strict partial 
,l-h , t 
order and the mutual exclusion relations on C. respectively . 
.J2 
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Definition 19. For multiple machines {1\h, .. , 1\1 n}. we define message orderings 
to be the structure <x= U>-(lom),>-(?om)EX(!om <?om), where am = (!017l. ?om), X ~ 
U1~i,j~n COmij is the set of messages sent between machines {11h, ... 1Un }. and < is the 
strict partial order on event occurrence pairs. 
Definition 20. The causal ordering for a set of machines {l'h, ." l\Jn } is the struc-
ture --<"0= (U1~i~n li)U <x, which describes the transitive closure of the set of local 
orderings and message orderings. 
Definition 21. A machine M is said to be blocking iff there exists a state s tt Sf and 
a trace a E traces (M) such that So ~ sand -, (s ~) for 'lit E T. Referring to definition 
9, let Sd be the set of all blocking states, Sd = {s E SReach(1\I) \Sf: 'lit E T.-,(s ~)}. 
so M is blocking iff Sd i- 0. 
In state machine diagrams, an initial state is pointed out by a st art arrow with a 
filled black circle, and a final state is shaded. For the anti-patterns. we suppose for two 
messages :r = (!x, ?:r) and y = (!y, ?y) sent between machines l\h and Jlh. there exist 
message instances OJ: = (!ox, ?ox) and oy = (!oy, ?oy) of :r and y, respectively. such 
that ,\(!ox) =!x and '\(!oy) =!y. Message Sequence Charts(l\ISCs) are used to show 
the anti-pattern scenarios. In the examples, we introduce index k to identify a message 
instance of a message in a trace, denoted as oe[k] = (!oe[k], ?oe[k]). The index k can 
be omitted when there is only one message instance. 
Anti-Pattern 1. Suppose !.r E 0 1,?X E E'2 and !y E 0 2,?y E E), "~h II l\h has 
unspecified reception if ?oy <1 lox and ?0J' <2!OY (I), 
?OMN1 M2 
lox ?ox 
loy 
lox 
• ?ox 
• '~ 
'.'0;' 
loy 
~ ?oy 
• lox 
• ',lox 
Figure 3.2: Unspecified reception 
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3.4 Compatibility and Anti-patterns 
Figure 3.2 shows the corresponding MSC on the left and the causal ordering on the 
right. Machine MI sends message instance ox to machine A12 , and "~h sends message 
instance oy to MI. MI cannot send ox until it receives oy, while Ah cannot send 
oy until it receives ox (1). Based on message ordering and (1), the causal ordering 
--<c consists of lox <?ox <loy <?oy and loy <?oy <lox <?ox. This conflict indicates 
that M I , M2 wait for message instances from each other but never get them. HellCC. 
MI II M2 has an unspecified reception, \yhere the blocking state sets of both machines 
are not empty. 
" ... - : 'lei 
I 8 I \: - -.-: 83:" ---~\ 84 Ilel ~ C~ [", J / ,,,.~ C4 . I \ : 
\~ /. ?el [g2] ?el ~/ 
--< ·'d ,.. '---. .. / 
MB Me 
Figure 3.3: An example of anti-pattern 1 
Figure 3.3 illustrates an example. tT(]('(s(.MB) includes (?oel [1], ?oel [2]. !O(2) and 
(?oel[I], !oe2, ?oed2]). tTCI.ces(Alc) includes (!oel[I], ?oe2, !oel[2]) , (!oel[I], ?oe2, ?oe3), 
(!oel[I]), and (?oe3)' The partial order ?oed2] <B!oe2 and ?Ot2 <c!oel[2] can be ob-
tained from one of the traces of AlB and the trace of Ale, so according to anti-pattenI, 
AlB II Ale will deadlock when ?oel [2] happens before !oe2 in ilIB and ?oe2 happens 
before ?oel [2] in Ale- The blocking states are S/l = {B2} and 55' = {Cd· 
Anti-Pattern 2. Suppose!.r E O l ,?X E £2 and !y E Ol ,?y E £2, Ah II j\h has 
non-local branching choice if !OX~I loy (2). 
Ml M2 !ox 
# !oy !ox # !oy ~ ) , IOX~~- .?ox '.'OX , , , 
-Ioy'- - -
c--
'4, 
-~?oy .'oy ?ox # ?oy 
L ease I case :2 
Figure 3...1: .Kon-local branching 1 
t 
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3.4 Compatibility and Anti-patterns 
Figure 3.4 shows the MSC and causal ordering. MI sends message instances ox, oy 
to M 2 . In M I , a send event occurrence of ox is in branch-conflict with a send occurrence 
of oy (2). Two cases may exist in M 2 : 
1) If ?ox <2?OY, M2 waits for both message instances ox and oy from Jh. but 
MI cannot send these message instances in the same run due to (2). we have 
--<c:!ox~!oy/\!ox <?ox/\!oy <?oy/\ ?ox <?oy. By !Of; 1 loy and message ordering, 
we have ox ::::} ,(loy) ::::} ,(?oy) and oy ::::} ,(lox) ::::} ,(?oor), so ?ox <2?OY does 
not hold. 
2) If ?0;r~2?oy, we have causal ordering --<c:!oor~!oy/\!().J' <?ox/\!oy <?oy/\?o.J';'!oy. If 
!o:r (resp. loy) happens in Ah and ?oy (resp. ?O.1') happens in Jh. then Jh will 
wait for message instance oy (resp. ox) forever due to (2). The blocking state set 
of M2 is not empty. 
Figure 3.5 shows an example, in which we have !(JITI2PA!om3. In case 1)0 we have 
?om2 <B?om3, so AlA II AlB has non-local branching choice with Sf = {Hd or 
Sf = {Es}. In case 2), we have ?om2~H?om3, so AlA 111\IB has non-local choice with 
Sf = {Ed or Sf = {E4}. 
. -" 
, AI', 
"-< [gel '1112 [gil '"~ ", 
Ae! : A4' 
/~m3 
, B3', 
~/ i\IB ~: 
i\lA 
Figure 3.5: An example of anti-patterns 2 and 3 
Anti-Pattern 3. Suppose!.1' E 0 1 ,?X E E2 and !y E 0 2,?y E E 1 • Jh II j\h has 
non-local branching choice if !oodl ?oy and ?oort2!oy (3). 
Figure 3.6 shows the I\lSC and cansal ordering. JJ] sends message illstance (J.e to 
flh. and Ah sends message instance oy to Jh· The causal ordering is -<',,:!(J.l' <?o.r. 
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Ml M2 
lox #?oy 
, .. 
?ox#! oy 
Figure 3.6: Non-local branching 2 
loy <7oy, !OX~70Yl and 70:d!oy. If t0y happens in IIh and '?o.r happens in J\h. machine 
Ml (resp. M 2) will wait for message instance oy (resp. oJ") forever due to (3). The 
blocking state sets of both machines are not empty. 
III Figure 3.5, !om3~A 7om4 and ?Oln:1~B!om4 hold. Whell 70111,1 happens ill 1\1.4 and 
70m3 happens in IIIB , lilA II IIIB has non-local choice and each machine has blocking 
states st = {A4} and Sf = {B2 }. Similarly, !om2PA 70ml and 7om2jA!olli1 will cause 
non-local choice. In this example, om2~Aom3 will also cause non-local choice with the 
type of anti-pattern2. 
3.5 Summary 
The formal static semantics and dynamic semantics of \\'('b Sen'ice Automaton are 
given in this chapter. The message-passing mechanism is used for machine communica-
tions, so that the internal interactions of BPEL activities and the external interactions 
of BPEL processes can be model in an uniform way. \\'c believe the web servic(' au-
tomaton is more suitable to model the BPEL features, because of our consideration of 
multiple-input ('vents and data, and machine communication. Abo. anti-patterns are 
identified for web service interactions. In the next chapter, according to the proposed 
web service automaton, we will analyze the BPEL features in details and show how to 
model them in web service automata. 
46 
Chapter 4 
BPEL Analysis and modelling 
Based on the web service automaton presented in the previous chapter, we will anal-
ysed the BPEL features and demonstrate how to model these features in web service 
automata. BPEL consists of two categories of activities: basic and structured activi-
ties. Basic activities are atomic actions, including receive, reply, assign, invoke, throw, 
terminate, empty, and wait. As with programming languages, the structured activities 
impose control flow dependency constraints on the executions of either the basic or 
structured activities within them. A structured activity can contain an arbitrar)' depth 
of sub-activities. The structured activities include pick, switch, while, sequence, flow, 
scope, eventHandlers, faultHandlers, compensationHandler. For data handling, BPEL 
uses the blackboard approach, where a set of variables is shared by all activities within 
the same scope. 
We will analyze the BPEL control dependencies and data dependencies in sepa-
ration, and then we will illustrate how to capture these dependencies in web service 
automata. Thereafter, we will show how to model BPEL activities in web service 
automata. The BPEL scope-based error handling features are also modeled, which in-
clude scopes, eventHandlers, faultHandlers, and compensationHandlers. These feat ures 
are important because they affect much of the behaviour of BPEL models that deal 
with exceptional cases. \Ve do not model the BPEL correlation sets and time related 
features. 
-17 
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We use machine as shorthand for a web service automaton and call the machine , 
associated with BPEL x activity as x machine. In state machine diagrams, an initial 
state is pointed to by an arrow started with a filled black circle, and a final state is 
shaded. 
4.1 BPEL Control Flows 
We will analyse the BPEL control dependencies and illustratc how to capture the 
behaviour semantics of BPEL basic activities and structured activities in \\'SA. The 
error handling in business processes is important to support long running transactions. 
In BPEL the scope, compensate, faultHandlers, and compensationHandlers activities 
are used for error handling. However, existing automata based approaches omit the 
modelling and verification of error handling related BPEL activities. \\'e aim to fill such 
gaps by capturing the semantics of both normal BPEL activities and error-handling 
related BPEL activities in \\'SA. 
4.1.1 Hierachical BPEL activities 
Since a WSA has no hierarchy, we simulate the hierarchical BPEL activit ies by the 
parent and child relationships betw('cll machines. If machine 1\{J, sends a start message 
to machine 1\IB, then 1\IA is the parent machine of JIB, and J\IB is the child machine of 
1\IA. A child machine can optionally send a done message to its parent machine when 
reaching one of its final states. Each machine has 0 .. 1 parent machine, and 0 .. * child 
machines. Since the BPEL basic activity is atomic and a BPEL structured activity is 
hierarchical, the machine for a BPEL basic activity has no child, and the machine for 
a BPEL structured activity has 0 .. * children. 
Fig .J.1 shows parent and child relationships between the machines of the loanap-
proval example that is described in detail in section 6.1.1. A machine without an 
incoming dark arrow (start message) is the process machine. The machine without all 
incoming hollow arrow (done message) is a basic machine. The process is the pan'nt of 
4.1 BPEL Control Flows 
flow, and the flow is the parent of receivelink Wrapper, which in turn is the parent of 
recewe. 
Figure 4.1: An example of machines with parent and child relationships 
A machine without a child machine is called simple machine, otherwise a machine 
with any child machine is called compound machine. Let A B . As be the BPEL basic 
and structured activities, respectively. A B , As are associated with simple or compound 
machines according to the following rules. 
• For AB without source or target link, it is associated with a simple machine. 
• For AB with source or target links. it is associated with a simple core machine 
and a compound linkWrapper machine (see section cl.1.3). 
• For As without source or target link, it is associated with a compound machine. 
• For As with source or target links, it is associated with a compound core machine 
and a compound link Wrapper machine. 
A simple machine has two kinds of FIFO queues: 1) an adminQueue for start and 
stop messages; and 2) a set of messageQueues where each messageQueue corresponds to 
a exchange message type. Each compound machine has four kinds of FIFO queues: 1) a 
adminQueue for start and stop messages: 2) a faultQueue for fault lllessages propogated 
from its child machines; 3) a set of done Queues where each doneQueue corresponds to 
cl9 
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a child machine; and 4) a set of messageQueues where each messageQueue corresponds 
to a exchange message type. 
Common compound machine layout: With consideration of faults and in-
terruptions, the compound machines for BPEL structured activities have a common 
layout, shown in Fig 4.2. A machine can have one or more child machines. Each 
compound machine has a stopStatus as a local variable. Suppose AI is a compound 
machine, we can derive three scenarios from this common layout: 1) when .U receiws 
a fault from its children and no stop message arrives. it forwards the fault to its parent 
(t'i,3), and the 2) scenario is followed; 2) when 1\1 is interrupted by receiving a stop 
message, it propagates the message to its children (ti.a) and updates the stopStatus to 
true. Upon receiving the child machines' done messages, if the current stopStatus is 
true, then the machine enters an abnormal final state(ti.l); 3) when .1\1 receives the chil-
dren's done messages and no fault or stop message arrives, it ends normally (ti.2). In a 
fault message fault(f), the message parameter f contains faultName and fault Variable 
elements. 
WSA transitions: 
tLO: si->si, parent?stop(tm)/stopStatus:=true;child1 !stop(tm); .. ;childn!stop(tm) 
tL1 : si->s 1 ,child1 ?done .. & .. childn?done [stopStatus=truel/paren~done 
tL2: Si->Si+1' child1 ?done .. & .. childn?done 
&""ichild1 ?fault(f) .. I .. childn?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm))/parent!done 
tL3: si->si, (child 1?fault(f) .. I .. childn?fault(f)) & -, parent?stop Iparent!fault(f) 
Figure 4.2: The common layout of compound machines 
It can be observed that the priority of the incoming events from high to low 
are: stop, fault, and done messages. In transition ti.2, we do not use the predicate 
stopStatus! = true to guard the transition. In the case that both done and stop mes-
sages have arrived, the stopStatns is updated to true onl:v when the stop message is 
consumed, so the predicte stopStatus! = true has no impact on the selection of con-
suming done or stop message. \\Yithout using the priority constraints on events. 1 he 
machine only consumes one of them randomly, So. we introduce multiple-input c\'ents 
to the transition. 
30 
4.1 BPEL Control Flows 
4.1.2 Concurrency, Fault Propagation, and Interruption 
In this subsection, we show that a machine's input events with logical AKD, OR, .\'OT 
can capture various BPEL features. 
parenr?starV child1!done& child2?done 
~_cM~11start; .. ;childn:~, ~il~~!dOnelpa~ne 
(11~~ ,f" ----~ ~S!/' .. '.' ... (~ ""~) 
('::~hlld1IjaUll(fll child2'?fault(f) .. I . .chlldn!fault(f)/parent.lfault(f) 
(2) \ 51 ) 
"/ 
~ ~ " II 0 parenr?SIOp{lm) (3) Si~'" I, 1 chilcj?fau!t(~ /I. "parcnt?stop(lm) j .... I, 2 1e & "'Chlldl'?filUIt(f) & "parent?stop(lm) 
Figure 4.3: Multiple-input events and common machine structure 
Concurrency: BPEL flow, scope, and event Handler activities allow the enclosed 
activities to perform concurrently. We use flow activity as an illustration here. When 
the flow enters, all the enclosed activities start. The flow ends when all the enclosed 
activities end. We model this by two transitions, shown in (1) Fig .±.3. On the left 
of (1), the flow machine starts all its children as a transition action, so that all child 
machines will start at the same time. On the right of (1), a logical-A."JD operator is 
added to the transition input events, so that the flow machine will not end until all its 
children end by sending done messages. 
Fault propagation: When a structured machine receives a fault message from its 
children, it forwards the fault message to its parent. Suppose the structured activity 
encloses more than one activity. The fault is propagated as long as one of the enclosed 
activities raises a fault. We model this b~' adding a logical-OR operator to the transition 
input events, shown in (2) of Fig .±.3. Instead of using a queue for each fault, we use 
one FIFO queue to store all fault messages, so the fault message sent from the activity 
lllachine to its parent depcnds on which child's fault COllll'S first. 
Interruption: BPEL has two kinds of Interruptions. First, when a termination 
message is thrown when a terminate activity is reached, the process machine ends 
abnormally, and a stop message is propagated downstream from the process machine. 
Second, when a fault is thrown b~' a throw acti\'ity or an invoke acti\'ity, the fault 
will be propagated upstream until it can be caught b~' a scope or process activity that 
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has the faultHandlers to handle this fault. The scope or process acti\'ity will stop its 
normal activities before enabling the faultHandlers. The stop message is propagated 
downstream from the scope or process machine. When a structured activity is stopped, 
all its children need to be stopped first. This is modelled by propagating a stop message 
downstream. The priority of a stop message is captured by adding logical-A:\D together 
with logical-NOT to transition input events. A stop message has higher priorit), than 
a fault message, which in turn has higher priority than a normal message. In (3) of 
Fig 4.3, transition ti.O is triggered when a stop message arrives. The transition ti.l will 
be triggered when it receives a fault message from its child, and only when no stop 
message arrives. It indicates that a fault will not be propagated when the machine is 
asked to stop. The transition t i .2 indicates that a fault or interruption message has 
higher priority than a normal incoming message. 
4.1.3 Synchronisation of Activities and Dead-Path-Elimination 
A set of links can be declared in th~ flow construct to express the synchronisCltion 
dependencies between activities within a flow. A link is a Boolean variable, and each 
link is associated with a pair of source activity and target activity. For instance, if 
MA and AlB are source and target activities of a link h, respectively'. then h is l\lA's 
outgoing link with source tag, and AlB'S incoming link with target tag. 
The synchronisation between source and target activities is realised by setting and 
getting the link value. The source activity sets the link to be true or false, and the 
target activity gets the link value. The target activity can start when 1) all the incoming 
links' values are defined by the source activities, and 2) its associated join-condition is 
satisfied which is a user-defined logical constraint on link values. The default logical 
, 
constraint is OR. If the join-condition is false. the target activity will not be executed 
and this effect will be propagated downstream in the flow model. This is called Dead-
Path-Elimination in BPEL. We capture the dead-path-elimination feat ure by updating 
the related links to false, and sending the link-related dat a exchange messages to the 
target acti vi ty machines. 
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The target tag and source tag are standard elements of BPEL constructs. indicat-
ing every BPEL activity mayor may not have incoming links and outgoing links. It 
would be too complicate to consider handling for each activity, so we use a supporting 
linkWrapper machine to handle links. When an activity has incoming or outgoing links, 
it will associate with a linkWrapper machine and a core machine. The link\\'rapper 
will be the core machine's parent. When an activity has no link, it is only associated 
with a core machine. This separation simplifies the structure of a machine, and allows 
BPEL activities to share a common machine structure for link handling. Fig 4.-1 shows 
the linkWrapper machine structures, which covers the cases when an activity 1) has 
source links but no target link, 2) has target links but no source link. 3) has target 
links and source links. 
Let m denote the number of targetLinks, 0< i, j, k<m+1; and let n denote the number of 
sourceLinks' transitionConditions, 0<x,y,z<n+1, ~tO,,-.1~ __ 
(A) No targetLink: 
D.1: s2->s3, parentl start/child!start; 
(8) With targetLink: 
D.2: sO->s2, parent?start t3.n 
12.0: s2->s3, IinkSender1 ?msg(tli) .. & .. linkSenderm?msg(tlm) 
['(tI1 =true .. joinCondition .. tlrn=true )]/sl1 :=false; .. ; sln:=false; 
parent!done; linkReceiver1 !msg(sI1); .. ;linkReceivern(sln); 
12.1: s2->s3, linkSender1 ?msg(11) .. & .. linkSenderm?msg(lm) 
01 =true .. @joinCondition . .Im=true]/child!start 
(C ) No sourceLink: 
B.1: s3->s4, child?done & '(child?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm)) Iparent!done 
(D1) With one sourceLink: 
t3.1: s3->s4, child?done & "(child?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm))1 
slx:=true; parent!done; IinkReceiver1 !msg(sI1) 
(D1) With more than one sourceLink: 
t3.x: s3->s4, child?done & ",{child?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm))[@transitionConditionx]/ 
six: =true; sly:=false: .. slz :=false; 
parent!done; linkReceiver1! msg(sl1 ); .. ;linkReceivern( sin); 
t3.00: s3->s3, parent? stop(tm )/stopStatus:=true;child!stop (tm) 
t3.01: s3->s1, child?done[stopStatus=true] 1 sl1 :=false; .. ;sln .=false; 
parentl done; linkReceiver1 !msg(sI1 ); .. ; IinkReceivern(sln); 
t3.02: s3->s3, child?fault(f) & 'parent?stop(tm)/parent!fault(f) 
Figure -1.4: link\happer machine 
Suppose AlB is the core machine and AlA is the linkWrapper machine for an activity. 
several scenarios can be derived from the machine structure. For ('a~l' 1), when an 
activity has source links but no target link, two normal scenarios follow the pat hs 
(t t ) (t t t) The machine 1\1..1 ::;tart::; b~' rl'cei\'ing a ::;t,art llll'Ssage from 0.1, 3.1, 0.1, 3.1,,., 3.n . 
its parent, and it starts the child machine l\JB (to.1). After JIB has finished. J1.J, 
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send a done message to its parent. If the activity has one source link h, .AIA sets the 
link h to true and sends the link exchange message msg(sll) to the machine of the 
link's target activity. If the activity has more than one source link Sll, .. sl n. for the 
transition Condition of link six is evaluated to true, only one link slx is set to true and the 
rest links are set to false. Thereafter, MA sends the link messages msg(sll); .. ;msg(.sln) 
to the machines of the links' target activities. For case 2), when an acti\'ity has target 
links but no source link, a normal scenario follows the path (to.2' hI, t3.1). JIJ, receives 
link messages msg(th), .. msg(tlm ) from the machines of the links' source activities. 
MA waits for all the link messages to arrive and check whether the links satis(v the 
joinCondition. For case 3), when an activity has target links and source links, machine 
1\IA handles the target links in the same way as the case 2), and the machine handles 
the source links the same as the case 1). 
When all the link messages have arrived and the links do not satisf.v the joinCon-
dition, a joinFaiiure occurs and 1\IA ends abnormally by updating all the source links 
to false and sending the link messages to the machines of links' target acti vi ties (t2.0). 
Alternatively, when 1\IA receives a fault from 1\IB (t3.02), )\IA propagates the fault to its 
parent. As long as 1\IA receives a stop message from its parent (hoo), .I\JA propagates 
the stop to 1\IB. After having received 1\IB's done message, l\fA ends abnormally by 
setting all source links to false and sending the link messages msg(sll); .. ; msg(sln) to 
the machines of the links' target activities (t3.Ql)· 
4.2 BPEL Data Flows 
The current automata based approaches omit the BPEL data dependencies. In order 
to address this shortcoming, we demonstrate how to model BPEL data dependencies 
in our proposed web service automata. 
When the flow or scope's variableAccessSerializable attribute is set to yes, the flow 
or scope provides concurrellC~' control in governing access to shared variables bet WCCll 
event handling threads inside a scope. For those shared variables that are not protected 
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as such, we assume that their read and write order is not determined at the design 
time. Since general handling of shared variables protected by variableAccessSerializable 
attribute is difficult and it will not be covered in our transformation. 
4.2.1 Motivating Example 
In BPEL, variables and links may affect the control flow, variables may appear in 
expressions on the conditions in switch and while, and may also be used in the conditions 
to fire particular links in the source element. There are two types of variables explicitly 
declared in a BPEL model: BPEL variables and flow links. BPEL variables em' declared 
in the variables construct of either process or scope act ivities. Flow links are Boolean 
variables declared in the link tags of the flow activity. The output link of an activity 
is defined as true if the associated activity completes normally. otherwise the link is 
defined false. BPEL variables and links can be used and defined by the process or scope 
enclosed activities, and t.he flow enclosed activities, respectively" 
process 
flow 
" var2 
\ 
...... "link2 J 
AND-jo'7n ...... ~
Iink1  
Figure 4.5: Unreachable and deadlock activities 
Fig 4.S shows the importance of analysing BPEL data flow. The boxes. the solid 
arcs and the dashed arcs denote BPEL activities, control flO\y, and data flow, respec-
, 
tively. The process encloses a flow. which in turn includes pick, switch, and E running 
concurrently. The example contains unreachable and deadlock activities. Firstly, B 
never instantiates variable varl, due to the int eract ion between data flow and control 
flow. III the pick, A and B arc Illutunll,\' exclusive in control flow, but tIl(' output of 
A is the input of B in data flow, so B cannot instantiates L'orl. E is unreachable due 
to the faulty design of links. In the switch, C and Dare lllutuall.v exclusiw in control 
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flow, so that linkl and link2 cannot be both true to satisfy the A.'\D-join condition. 
Therefore, E can never be executed. Secondly, there is a deadlock between swtich and 
E, which is caused by the cyclic data flow between them. On one hand, E waits for 
both linkl and link2 to be true but this condition can never be satisfied. On the other 
hand, the switch wait~ for its input var2 to be defined but var2 cannot be defined b)" 
E because of the falsity of either linkl or link2. This illustrates the necessity to verify 
both control and data dependencies of BPEL models. 
4.2.2 BPEL Data Dependencies 
In a system, a BPEL process P is seen as a component, and the partnerLinks declared 
in P correspond to the components interacting with P. In the loan-approval ('xample 
that will be used later in this paper, the BPEL process loanapproval includes three 
partnerLinks, ~o the system has four components: loanapproval, customer, assessor. 
and approver. From the testing point of view, when more than one BPEL model 
is considered, the system boundary needs to be included. The components within 
the system boundary are called SUT (service under test), and a component outside 
the system boundary is called tester or environment. In the following, for a Illessage 
msgCr) E Ell! UOM, msg and x denote the message name and input/output parameter, 
respecti vely. 
Let {J\I,II .. J\1n} be the set of machines selected as the SUT, a message msg(v) sent 
from machine J\h to machine J\12, and a transition t associated with variable 1", we 
have: 
• t IS annotated with df(x) if a) I is defined in an assignment action of t, i.e. 
{:r E def(e1"p)It:'.rp E t.a}; or b) 1" = v is the input parameter of "\h where "'h 
and J\h are tester and SUT respectively, i.e. {:r E def( t'.rp) It E T\J2 1\ C.lp E t.( .r}, 
J\h E {J\1m .. J\1n}, J\h ~ {"Um .. .lHn}. 
• t is annotated with US (x) if a) x is used in an assignment act ion or guard of 
t, i.e.{:rEcuses(e.rp)le.rpEt.a} or {I Epuscs(t.rp)!c1·pEt.g}: or b) l' = v is 
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the output parameter of MI where l.\h and M2 are tester and SeT respec-
tively, i.e. {x E cuses( exp) It E TMI 1\ exp E t.a n OMl}' ilh E {iUrn .. JIn}. Jh tf-
{Mm .. Mn}. 
• Let PI, P2 be two BPEL processes. t is annotated with idf(x) if x = ~'is the input 
parameter of M2 where MI , M2 belong to different BPEL processes but both are 
SUT, i.e. {x E def(exp)lt E TM2 1\ exp E t.eJ"}. l\h.l\h E {jIm .. .l\In}. 
• Let PI, P2 be two BPEL processes. t is annotated with ius(:r) if x = t' is the out-
put parameter of MI where l\h, l\h belong to different BPEL processes but hut 11 
are SUT, i.e. {x E cuses(exp)It E Tf\[l 1\ c.rp E t.a n O;'II}, i\h, Jh E {.MIIl .. ilIn }. 
The i in idf(x), ius(:r) means internal. For silllplicity. a transition t is called with 
def-x if t can be either annotated with dfCr) or idf(x), while t is called with use-x if t 
can be either annotated with us(x) or ius(x). 
Definition 22. A variable .f is globally defined and used if t here exist transit ions 
tl E TAIl, t2 E TAn, where tl, t2 are with def-x and 11SC-.J", respectively. The variable 
:r is locally defined and used if: 1) there exist transitions t 1 , t2 E Tf\[. where t 1 , t2 
are with def-x and use-x respectively; or 2) there exits a transition tl E T;\l where tl is 
with def-x and use-;r. 
According to the BPEL 1.1 [10], in a \YSA the case 1) and 2) will not exist for 
those variables explicit ely declared in BPEL models (i.e. BPEL variables and flow 
links). Therefore, we only consider globall:-.' defined and used variables, such that a 
machine can either have a transition with def-x or have a transition with use-x but not 
both. As a result, the def-x (resp. use-x) annotation of a machine .M can be retrieved 
from the def-x(resp. use-x) of a transition t E T;\f. A exdu-pair of .1" is a transition pair 
( t t) where t is with def-x and tJ· is with use-x. The pair of machines with def-x and /" ) ~ 
l1S(,-.1" is called rnachine-exdu-pairs. 
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4.2.3 Data Exchange Models 
An internal data exchange model is used for a single BPEL process to specify the 
relation between inputs and outputs of BPEL activities. An external data exchange 
model is used to capture how messages are transferred from one BPEL process to other 
BPEL processes. When a single BPEL process is selected as the SUT, an internal data 
exchange model is enough to capture the BPEL data semantics. When multiple BPEL 
processes are selected as the SUT, a global data exchange model which is the union of 
the internal and external data exchange models is required to capture the BPEL data 
semantics. 
A. Internal Data Exchange Model 
In this section, we identify different types of data dependencies of BPEL activities, 
and discuss how to capture these data dependencies in WSAs. 
Rule 1. In a BPEL process P, let x be a BPEL variable or a flow link ('xplicitly 
declared in P, and Mi be the WSA associated with BPEL activity B i . BPEL activities 
can be categorised into four types. 
1) When Bi receives msg(x) from an external BPEL process, given that the partner 
which sends msg(x) is a tester and Bi is SUT, Ali is with def-x. The BPEL 
activities belonging to this type include: receive activity, invoke activity with x 
as outputVariable, pick activity, and eventHandler activity. 
2) When Bi uses x in a predicate or assignment, it reads the value of x and Aft is 
with use-x. The following BPEL activities belong to this type: assign activity 
with x on the right of assigment expressions, while activity and switch, and an 
activity with x as a targetLink. 
3) When Bi sends a message msg(:r) to an external BPEL process, given that the 
partner which receives msg(x) is a tester and Bi is SUT. lIft is with use-;r. The 
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BPEL invoke activity with x as the input Variable , and reply activity belong to 
this type. 
4) When Bi defines x in an assignment, it writes a value to x and Ali is with def-:r. 
Two BPEL activities belong to this type: assign activity with x on the left of 
assignment expressions and an activity with x as a sourceLink. 
Rule 2. In a BPEL process P, the data can only exchange between two machines 
M I , M2 E P if one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
1) M I , M2 have a same parent machine, i.e. they are same-level machines; 
2) M I , M2 are parent and child, or vice-versa. 
For simplicity, condition 1) will be checked first, and condition 2) will be checked 
when 1) is false. 
The rationale behind rule 2 is illustrated by an example in Fig 4.6. The BPEL model 
fragment is shown in Fig 4.6( a), where the solid lines denote the node hierarchy of BPEL 
activities. It has a sequence activity that encloses flow, while, and switch activities. 
The flow activity encloses A and B activities. The while activity encloses C activity. 
The switch activity encloses C and D activities. In the example, MA is used to denote 
the machine for activity A, and M j , M w , Ms are short for Mjlow) Mwhile, Jl.lswitch. By 
analysing model(a) acccording to rule 1, suppose we have MA, Me with def-x, M w , Jl.1s 
with use-x, ME with def-y, and MD, ME with use-yo 
To capture data semantics of the BPEL model in WSAs, Fig 4.6 (b) and (c) show 
two ways of modelling data exchanges. The dashed and solid lines denote the machine 
data flows and the control flows, respectively. In (b), for an arbitrary variable v, the 
machine with def-v will send message msg( v) to the machine with use-v directly. Based 
on the data exchange model (b), three problems may exist. 
1) Sending intermediate data values. 
2) Sending data to unreachable machines. 
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Figure 4.6: Modelling internal data exchanges 
Problem 1) exists in the example; machine Mw receives msg(x) from MA and uses 
x in its predicate pred. If pred is true, it starts the child machine 1\le. 1\le re-defines 
x. On one hand, Me sends msg(x) back to Mw for re-evaluating pred. On the other 
hand, Me sends msg(x) to Ms. The while loop continues until pred becomes false. 
Since Me is in a while loop, every time Me is executed, it will send message msg(;.r:) to 
Ms· If the while loop iterates n times, then Ms will receive n - 1 times of msg( x) with 
intermediate values of x. Nevertheless, Ms only needs the value of x in the final loop, 
so the decision of sending msg(x) should be made by Mw. 
Problem 2) also exists in the example. Ms has two child machines MD, 1\1£, where 
in a given time only one of the child machines can be executed but not both. Therefore, 
either 1\lD or 1\lE needs to receive msg(y). However, since MB cannot decide the choice 
of 1\lD or 1\ IE , MB will send msg(y) to 1\lD and msg(y) to ME. Suppose ME is not 
chosen to execute, MB will send msg(y) to an unreachable machine. Therefore, 1\lB 
should send msg(y) to 1\ls which can decide which child machine should receive the 
data. Furthermore, problem 2) may exist for a BPEL activity B with flow links, which 
will be associated a linkWrapper machine 1\lBwp and a core machine 1\lB· Since MBwp 
is the parent of 1\IB, 1\lBwp decides whether 1\lB can be started. MB can be started 
only when the predicate for the targetLinks is evaluated to be true in 1\lBwp ' So if lUB 
requires a data v, the message msg(v) should be sent to 1\lBwp which decides whether 
to forward it to 1\1 B· 
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The above two problems can be solved by adding the constraints of rule 2, shown 
III Fig 4.6 (c). For the first problem, Alc sends msg(x) to its parent M w , and .Alu' 
forwards ms 9 (x) to the same-level machine Ms. For the second problem, .AlB sends 
msg(y) to its parent Mj, and Mj fowards msg(y) to the same-level machine jUs, which 
in turn forwards msg(y) to one of M D , ME. Comparing (b) and (c). the (c) approach 
is clearer and more precise even though it requires additional message transfers. 
According to rule 2, Fig 4.7 below shows an algorithm to generate a data exchange 
path (machine sequence) for a machine-exdu-pair (d_node, u_node). The idea is to find 
a common ancestor node cpo The message msg (x) is sent upstream from d_node to a 
child node MCI of cp, while msg(x) is received downstream from a child node 1UC2 of 
cp to u_node. Finally MCI sends msg(x) to MC2. The worst-case time complexity of 
the algorithm is O(n2 ). 
1 foo (d_node, u_node) : path { 
2 IF (d_node == u_node) RAISE ERROR! 
3 d_path.add(d_node); 
4 u_path.add(u_node); 
5 d_cur = d_node; 
6 u cur= u node; 
7 WHILE ((ctpar == d_cur.parent()) != NULL OR (u_par == u_cur.parent()) != NULL) { 
8 IF (d_par!= NULL) { 
9 IF (d_par IN uyath) { 
10 IF (dyar == u_path[OJ) RETURN dyath.add(dyar); 
11 ELSE{ 
12 uyath = u_path. getNodesBefore( dyar); 
13 RETURN d_path.concat(reverse(uyath)); 
14 } 
15 } ELSE { 
16 dyath.add(dyar); 
17 d_cur = d_par; 
18 
19 } 
20 IF (u_par!= NULL){ 
21 IF (u_par IN dyath) { 
22 IF (uyar == d_path[OJ) RETURN uyath.insert(uyar,O); 
23 ELSE { 
24 dyath = d_path.getNodesBefore(uyar); 
25 RETURN d_path.concat(reverse(uyath)); 
26 } 
27 } ELSE{ 
28 uyath.add(uyar); 
29 u_cur = u_par; 
30 
31 } 
32 } 
33 RETURN NULL; 
} 
Figure 4.7: Internal data exchange algorithm 
61 
4.2 BPEL Data Flows 
In Fig 4.7, given (d_node, u_node) as input, two sequences d_path, u_path are created 
(line 2-3). Starting from d_node, u_node, it iteratively gets the parent nodes from the 
current nodes, denoted by d_par, u_par, until both root nodes are reached (line 7). The 
while contains two parts. First, it checks whether a common ancestor node is reached. 
1.1) d_par is in u_path(line 9-14): if u_node itself is the parent of d_node, then the 
output path is (d_node, u_node) (line 10); otherwise, the output path is the reversed 
elements of the u_path before the common node. 1.2) d_par is not in u_path(line 15-
18), d_par is added to d_path and d_par becomes the current node. Second, similarly 
it checks whether a common ancestor node is reached. 2.1) u_par is in d_path(line 21-
26): if d_node itself is the parent of u_node, then the output path is (d_node, u_node) 
(line 22); otherwise, the output path is the reversed elements of the u_path before the 
common node. 2.2) u_par is not in d_path(line 27-30), u_par is added to u_path and 
u_par becomes the current node. 
We use the variable x in Fig 4.6 as an example. From (a) we get the machine-exdu-
pairs for x are (MA, Mw), (MA, Ms), (1\le, 1\I w) , and (1\le, 1\15)' When applying the 
algorithm to the example, the data exchange paths for the above machine-exdu-pairs 
would be (MA, Mj, Mw),(MA, M j , Ms),(Me, Mw), and (Me, Mw, 1\ls) , respectively. 
B. External and Global Data Exchange Models 
Since the communication scheme between web services is message passing, BPEL 
processes exchange data by passing messages. There exist two ways to capture the 
interactions between BPEL processes: top-down and bottom-up approaches. The top-
down approach is firstly to design a conversation protocol to capture global interactions 
of BPEL processes, and secondly to design the BPEL models to implement the con-
versation protocol. The bottom-up approach is firstly to design BPEL processes, and 
secondly to derive the global interactions from the BPEL processes. [25] points out the 
advantage of the top-down approach over the bottom-up approach. However, from the 
testing point of view, it is especially important to verify the correctness of the BPEL 
interactions when a conversation protocol is missing. In our framework, we assume 
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that there is no conversation protocol to guide the design of BPEL process interac-
tions. Instead, we verify the correctness of BPEL process interactions by deriving a 
BPEL external data exchange model from individual BPEL processes. The external 
data exchange model can be easily constructed from BPEL activities by identif~'ing 
which partnerLink a message is sent to or received from. 
In Fig 4.8, the example on the left shows the messages passing between BPEL 
processes for the loan approval example, and the example on the right shows the derived 
BPEL external data exchange model where customer component is chosen as a tester 
and the rest of the components are selected as a SUT. 
(1 ) (2) 
Figure 4.8: External data exchange model 
A global data exchange model is the union of the internal data exchange models 
of invidual BPEL processes and the external data exchange model of these BPEL 
processes. See section for the loan approval example. 
4.2.4 Deriving BPEL Data Flows 
After modelling how data exchanges within a BPEL process and across BPEL processes. 
data flows call be derived for each variable so that we can check whether a defilled 
variable will be used later and whether a used variable has been previously defined. 
Let ;r be a variable. A du-pair of x is a transition pair (ti' tj) where ti is with df(x) and 
tj is with us(x). A def-clear path with respect to x is a transition sequence (tl' t2, .. , tn) 
where there is no df(x) in any of the transitions t2, t3'" tn-I· A data flow (or du-path) 
of:r is a transition sequence that (ti' tj) is a du-pair and there is a def-clear path from 
ti to t j with respect to x. 
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Definition 23. Let M I , M2 be two machines, there is a data flow from Ah to i\h. 
i.e. t2 E T2 is data dependant on tl E T I , iff there exists a variable x such that 
1) tl is with df(x). 
2) t2 is with us(x). 
3) There exists a def-clear path from tl to t2 with respect to x. 
The data flows for a variable x can be constructed by identifying du-pairs, and 
checking whether there is a def-clear path between the du-pairs. The data flows for a 
variable x can be derived automatically by model checking techniques, based on the 
annotations df(x), us(x) of transitions. For each du-pair (ti' tj) of variable J:, where 
ti E TMi , tj E TMj . In tj, x needs to be asserted that x has been defined previously. For 
the purpose of illustration, here we use machine-du-pairs retrieved from du-pairs, and 
use machine sequences retrieved from the transition sequences of data flows. The pair 
of machines with df(x) and us(x) is called machine-du-pairs. Based on the du-pairs of 
a variable, model checkeing techniques can be used to derive data flows for the variable. 
See section for the loan approval example. 
4.3 BPEL Basic Activities 
In this section, we will show the usage of WSA to model BPEL basic activities: recewe. 
reply, assign, invoke, throw, terminate, empty; the time related wait activity is not 
modelled in WSA. We use msg(x) to denote the internal data exchange message for 
variable x. Let M I , M2 be two machines, if MI sends msg(x) to lIh, then lIh is a 
data Sender of M2 and M2 is a dataReceiver of M I , with respect to x. For simplicity, we 
use dataSenders(x) to denote (dataSenderl ?msg(x ) .. I .. dataSendern ?msg(x)), where a 
machine may have l..n dataSenders. Similarly, we use dataReceivers(x) to denote the 
sending event list (dataReceiverl ?msg(x); .. ; dataReceivern ?msg(x )), where a machine 
may have 1 .. n dataReceivers. 
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4.3.1 Receive and Reply 
The receive and reply activities have the same machine layout as shown in Fig 4.9. For 
receive machine, after it is started, it can be interrupted before the message arrives 
(hI), or it receives a message op(x) from an external partner. In the latter case, 
it sends msg(x) to its dataReceivers and ends (t2.0). For reply machine, after being 
started and receiving msg(y) from its dataSenders, it can be interrupted before sending 
the reply message, or it sends the reply message with y as parameter to the external 
partner ( t2.0) . 
BPEL code' 
<receive partnerLink=pl portType=pt 
operation =op variable =xJ> 
<reply partnerLink=p1 portType=pt 
operation =op variable =y/> 
WSA transitions: 
12.1 :s2..>s1, parent?stop/parent!done 
receive: 
to.1 :sO..>s2, parent?start 
12.0:s2..>s3, pl?op(x) & "parent?stop/ dataReceivers(x); parent!done 
reply: 
to.1 :sO..>s2, parent?start & dataSenders(y) 
12.0:s2..>s3, [true] / pl!op(y); parentldone 
Figure 4.9: The machine of the receive and reply activities 
4.3.2 Assign, Throw, Terminate, Empty, Compensate 
The assign, throw, terminate and empty activities have the same machine layout, again 
shown in Fig 4.9. For assign machine, suppose x is a BPEL variable, the machine 
receives msg(x) from its dataSenders and then it sends msg(x) to its dataReceivcrs. 
The throw machine sends a fault message to its parent machine. The terminate machine 
sends a termination message to the process machine directly, so that the whole process 
can be stopped immediately. The empty machine ends after it is started. 
BPEL provides named and unnamed compensate activities. The named compen-
sate activity is used to start compensation on a specified inner scope that has already 
completed successfully, and the unnamed compensate activity is used to start com-
pensation on all inner scopes that have already completed successfully. A compensate 
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activity can only be enclosed in a faultHandlers activity, compensationHandler acti\"-
ity, or implicit created defaultTerminationHandler activity. Such activities are called 
FCT for short. When the compensate machine is started, it sends the compensate 
message to the machine of the nearest enclosing FCT activity, with a parameter which 
holds either the target scope name or a null value. As long as the FCT machine re-
ceives a compensate message from the enclosing compensate machine, FeT machine 
starts a compensateManager (see section 4.4.9) that take charge of the invocations of 
compensationHandlers. 
SPEL code· 
<assign> 
<copy> 
<from variable =x > ~B 
<to variable = y > to. 1 
</copy> sO s2 
<assign> 
<throw faultName=x faultVariable =y/> 
<terminate/> 
<empty/> 
<compensate scope="Q1"/> 
<compensate/> 
WSA transitions· 
to.1 :sO->s2, 
assign: parent?start & dataSenders(x)/ dataReceivers(x); parentldone 
throw. parent?startlparent!fault(f);parent!done 
terminate: parent?start/process!term; parentl done 
empty. parent? startlparentl done 
compensate(1): parent?start/Q:=Q 1; FCT!compensate(Q); parentldone 
compensate(2): parent?start/Q:=null; FCT!compensate(Q);parent!done 
Figure 4.10: The machine of the assign, throw, terminate. and empty activities 
4.3.3 Invoke 
Invocation comes in two forms, asynchronisation, in which the requester does not wait 
for a reply, and synchronisation. in which the requester does wait for a reply. The 
invoke machines with and without fault and interruption are shown on parts (1)(2) of 
Fig 4.11, respectively. Let Ai] be the invoke machine. In the synchronisation case, Ai[ 
receives msg(x) from its dataSenders and sends request message op(x) to the external 
partner ((to.I, t2.2)). With interruption, 1\i] ends before sending the request. In the 
asynchronisation case, a normal scenario without fault or interruption is (to.I' t2.0, t3.0). 
After receiving msg(x) from its dataSenders, 1\i[ sends the request op(.r) to the external 
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partner. M J waits for a response message op(y) from the partner, and sends msg(y) to 
its dataReceivers. Alternatively, when MJ receives a stop message, it stops immediatel", 
(hI, t3.1). When MJ receives a fault message from the external partner. it propagates 
the fault to its parent (t3.3). Note that the fault parameter of the invoke's response 
message is not explicitly declared in the BPEL model but declared in related \ \'SDL 
filp-s. 
B.PEL code: . (1) 
<Invoke partnerLlnk=pl portType=pt operation =op 
inputVariable =x/> 
<invoke partnerLink=pl portType=pt operation =op 
inputVariable =x outputVariable=y/> 
WSA transitions: 
to.1 :sO->s2, parenf?start & dataSenders(x) 
(A) If invoke has no @outputVariable, then: 
t2.2 :s2->s4, 'parent?stop(tm)/pi!op(x); parent!done 
(B) If invoke has @outputVariable, then: 
t2.0:s2->s3, 'parent?stop(tm) Ipl!op(x) 
t2. 
t2.1 :s2->s1, parent? stop(lm)/dataReceivers(y); parent!done 
13.0:s3->s4, pi ?op(y) & 'parenf?slop(tm)/dalaReceivers (y); parent!done 
13.1 :s3-> s 1, parent? stop(tm )/parent!done 
13.3 :s3->s3, 'pl?op(y) & 'parent?stop(lm)/parent!fault(f) 
Figure 4.11: The machines of synchronous and asynchronous invoke activities 
In the case of asynchronous form of invoke activity, it may have inline faultHandlers 
and a compensationHandler. To make our modelling easier, the invoke code is reformed 
to an equivalent version without inline handlers in an intermediate BPEL code. An 
example is shown in Fig 4.12. The left is the invoke activity with inline handlers and 
the right is the equivalent version without inline handlers. The semantics of scope, 
faultHandlers, and compensationHandler activities will be covered in section 4.4. 
4.4 BPEL Structured Activitites 
BPEL structured activities include sequence, flow, while, switch, pick, scope, evenHan-
dlers, faultHandlers, and compensationHandlers. In \YSA, each structured acti\·it.y 
corresponds to at least one compound machine, as stated in section 4.1.1. ~ ote that 
the machines of switch, pick, and faultHandlers acti\'ities have the same machine lay-
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<invoke partnerLink="Selier" portType="SP: Purchasing" 
operation="SyncPurchase" 
i nputVariable=" send PO" 
outputVariable="getResponse"> 
<catch faultName="SP:POFaulf' faultVariable ="POFault"> 
<! -- handle the fault --> 
</catch> 
<compensation Handler> 
<invoke partnerLink="Selier" 
portType=" SP: Purchasing" 
operation=" Cancel Purchase" 
inputVariable ="getResponse" 
outputVariable=" getConfi rmation"/> 
</compensationHandler> 
<linvoke> 
4.4 BPEL Structured Activitites 
<scope> 
<faultHandlers> 
<catch faultName="SP: POFaulf' faultVariable=" PO Fault"> 
<!- handle the fault -> 
</catch> 
<!faultHandlers> 
< compensationHandler> 
<invoke partnerLink ="Seller" portType=" SP :Purchasing" 
operation="CanceIPurchase" 
inputVariable ="getResponse" 
outputVariable ="getConfirmation"/> 
</compensationHandler> 
< invoke partnerLink="Selier" portType ="SP :Purchasing" 
operation ="SyncPurchase" 
inputVariable ="sendPO" outputVariable ="getResponse"/> 
</scope> 
Figure 4.12: Invoke activity with and without inline handlers 
out, but of course, different semantics. In order to simplify the mapping from BPEL to 
WSA, some additional code will be introduced in the intermediate BPEL code: 1) for 
the switch activity, the otherwise segment is added when it is missing; 2) for the scope 
activity, the terminationH andler segment is added, and the default compensationHan-
dler segment is added when it is missing; 3) for the jaultHandlers activity, the catchAll 
segment is added to when it is missing. 
For BPEL structured activities, we mainly illustrate the control dependencies, and 
for simplicity, do not include the messages related to internal message exchanges in the 
diagram. A BPEL structured activity may enclose one or more BPEL activities. \Ve 
introduce the following for the purpose of clarification . 
• Let AI, A2, A3 be BPEL activities. If there is no activity sequentially in-between 
Al and A2, then A2 is said a direct enclosed activity of AI. If A2 is in-between 
Al and A3, then both A2, A3 are enclosed in AI, and A3 is directly enclosed in 
A2 which in turn is directly enclosed in AI . 
• Let Q1, Q2 be two BPEL scope activities. When there is no scope, jaultHandler. 
or compensationHandler activity in-between Q1 and Q2, then Q1 is called a direct 
outer scope of Q2, and Q2 is called a direct inner scope of Q1' 
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4.4.1 Sequence 
In the sequence activity, the direct enclosed activities execute in sequential order. The 
full version of the sequence machine is shown in part (1) of Fig -l.13. The normal 
scenario is modelled in part (2) of Fig 4.13 with transition sequence (to.l, h2··, t(n+l).2) 
where n is the number of direct enclosed activities of the sequence. Let JIseq denote 
the sequence machine. When Mseq is started, it starts the first child machine (to.l)' 
After receiving the current child's done message, Mseq starts the next child machine. 
and this step continues until the last child is started (h2,'" tn .2). \Yhen the last child 
finishes, Mseq ends normally (t(n+l).2)' Alternatively, IIIseq ends abnormally at Sl when 
an interruption arises ((t i.3, ti.o, tu) or (ti.O, ti.l). 2 S; i S; 71 + 1). 
4.4.2 Flow 
BPEL code: 
<sequence> 
activity1 
activity2 
s1 ~n.') 1 activityn 
</sequence> ~
(2) to.1 t2.2 sO s2 ... 
Machine transitions: 
In sequence, let j,n denote the index and the number of direct child activities, 
respectively, where O<j<n+1. Let i=j+1 denote a statelD. We have: 
to.1 :sO.>s2, parent?start Ichild1 !start 
tl O:si->si, parent? stop(tm ),stopStatus :=true; childj !stop(tm) 
tl1 :si->s1, childj ?done [stopStatus=true)/parent!done 
(A) If it is not the last child, i. e. j !=n, then: 
ti.2: S~>Si'" childj?done & '(childj?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm)) I childl+,!start 
(B) If it is the last child, i.e. j=n, then: 
~+1).2: sn+f">sOO,childn?done & -'(childn?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm))/parent!done 
tl3:si->si, childj?fault (f) & -'parent?stop(tm)1 parent!fault(f) 
Figure 4.13: The machine of the sequence activity 
The flow activity enables concurrency. A flow starts all direct enclosed activities at 
the same time when it has been started, and completes when all the direct enclosed 
activities have completed. In a flow, the links specify the synchronisation dependencies 
between activities. Each link has exactly one source activity and one target activity. 
\Ve do llot lllodellinks ill a flow machine. we create a link Wrapper machine to capture 
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the synchronisation feature for each activity with links, which is covered m section 
4.1.3. 
A normal scenario is modelled in part (2) of Fig 4.14, with the transition sequence 
(to.l, t2.2). Let Mj denote the flow machine. When M j is started, it sends start messages 
to all its child machines (to. l ). M j ends normally after receiving all the done messages 
from its children (t2.2). Alternatively, part (1) of Fig 4.14 shows the full version of 
flow machine, with 81 as the abnormal end state when an interruption occurs. As long 
as one of the child machines raises a fault, the flow forwards the fault to its parent 
machine. If the flow receives faults from more than one machine, it propagates the first 
arrived fault (i.e. t he first fault in the FIFO fault Queue ) to its parent machine. 
4.4.3 While 
BPEL code' 
<flow> 
<links> 
<link name="11"/> 
<link name="lm"/> 
<llinks> 
activity1 
activityn 
<I flow> 
Machine transitions: 
s1 
~to.1nt2.2 f'\ (2)~
to.1 : sO..>s2, parent?start /child 1 !start; .. ; childn!start 
t2.0: s2..>s2, parent?stop(tm)/stopStatus:=true;child 1 !stop (tm); ... ;childn!stop(tm) 
t2.1: s2->s1, child1 ?done .. & .. childn?done(stopStatus=true]/parent!done 
t2.2: s2..>s3, child1 ?done .. & .. childn?done 
&"'( child1 ?fault(f) .. l .. childn?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm))/parent!done 
t2.3: s2->s2, (child1 ?fault(f) .. I .. childn?fault(f)) & -, parent?stop /parentlfault(f) 
Figure 4.14: The machine of the flow activity 
The while activity defines looping behaviour. The while condition is evaluated Clt 
the beginning of each iteration. If the condition is true, the direct enclosed activity 
executes repeatly; otherwise the loop ends. Two normal scenarios are modelled in 
part (2) of Fig 4.15, with transition sequences (to.l' t2.2, h2, t2.3) when the condition 
holds at least once, and (to.l, t2.3) when the condition never holds. Let l'vIw denote the 
while machine. l\Iw evaluatesthe condition when it is started. If the condition holds, it 
enters a loop to start the child machine and wait for child's done message ((t2.2, t3.2)). 
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The loop continues until the condition is evaluated to false. The while machine \\'ith 
consideration of faults and interruptions is shown in part (1) of Fig 4.F>. 
4.4.4 Switch 
BPEL code: 
<while condition = "xyz"> 
activity 
</while> 
Machine transitions' 
tD.1 :sO~s2, parent?start 
t2.1 :s2~s1, parent?stop(tm)/parent!done 
t2.2 :s2 '>s3, [@condition=true]/child!start 
t2.3:s2'>s4, [@condition=false]/parent!done 
t3.0 :s3.>s3, parent? stop(tm )/stopStatus:=true; child !stop(tm) 
t3.1 :s3.>s1, child?done [stopStatus=true]/parenMone 
t3.2:s3.>s2, child?done &"(child?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm)) 
t3.3 :s3.>s3, child?fault(f) & ..., parent?stop(tm)/paren~ fault(f) 
Figure 4.15: The machine of the while activity 
The switch activity provides conditional behaviour, where each direct enclosed activity 
is guarded by a condition. A switch consists of 1..* case segments and 0 .. 1 otherwise 
segment. The case conditions are evaluated in the order in which they appear, while the 
otherwise segment executes if no case condition holds. In order to make our modelling 
easier, when the otherwise segment is missing, a default otherwise segment is added to 
the switch activity in the intermediate BPEL code. A normal scenario is modelled in 
part (2) of Fig 4.16, with transition sequence (to.I, t2.j, t(j+2).2) where 1 ::; j ::; n, n is 
the sum number of case and otherwise tags in switch. To fullfil the sequential condition 
evaluation, the guard of each branch (hi) is modelled according three rules defined in 
the WSA transitions of Fig 4.16. Part (1) of Fig 4.16 shows the switch machine with 
consideration of faults and interruptions. 
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BPELcode' 
<switch> 
<case condition="pred1 "> 
activity1 (1 ) 
</case> .... 
<case condition="predn"> 
activitYn.1 
</case> 
<otherwise> 
activityn 
</otherwise 
<I switch> 
<otherwise> 
<empty/> 
<lotherwise> 
WSA transitions: tQ1+2.1 
t2. n 
In a switch, let j denote the index of case tags when O<j<n, and the index of otherwise tag when 
j=n, where n-1 is the number of case tags. Let i=j+2 be a state ID. We have: 
r1) If j=1, then guard1=@condition1 
r2) If1<j<n, then guardj=-> (@condition1 .. I .. @conditionj. 1 )&@conditionj 
13) If j=n, then guardn: -o(guard1.1 .. guardn.1) 
to.1 :sO->s2, parent?start 
12.0 :s2 ->s 1, parent? stop( tm )lparent !done 
t2.j:s2->Si, [guardjj/childj !start 
tL O:si->si, parent?stop(tm)lstopStatus:=true; childj !stop(tm) 
tl1:si->s1, childj?done [stopStatus=truejl parent!done 
tl3:si->si, childj?fault (f) &, parent?stop(tm)/parent!fault(f) 
tl2:si->sOO, childj?done &'(childj?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm)) I parent!done 
Figure 4.16: The machine of the switch activity 
4.4.5 Pick 
Similar to the switch activity, the pick activity also provides conditional behaviour, but 
each direct enclosed activity of it is guarded by a message. A pick activity consists of 
1..* onMessage segments and 0 .. * onAlarm segments. Each onMessage segment waits 
for a matching incoming message, and each onAlarm segment waits for a matching 
time-related alarm. In WSA, we do not model the time related o71Alarm behaviour. 
When a message arrives, the onMessage segment with matching message executes. 
When mutiple messages arrive simultaneously, one message will be selected, and the 
choice of message is implementation dependent. A normal scenario is modelled in part 
(2) of Fig 4.17, with transition sequence (to.I, t2.j, tU+2).2) where 1 :::; j :::; n, n is the 
number of onMessage segments. Part (1) of Fig .1.17 shows the pick machine with 
consideration of faults and interruptions. 
-.) 
1-
BPEL code· 
<pick> 
<onMessage partnerLink="partner1" 
portType="pt1" 
operation="m1" (1) 
variable="para 1 "> 
activity1 
</onMessage> 
<onMessage partnerLink="partnern" 
portType="ptn" 
operation=" m~' 
variable="para~'> 
activitYn 
</onMessage> 
</pick> 
WSA transitions' ~n+ . 
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\n+2).3 
~n+2)O 
~n+21.4 
In a pick, letj denote the index of on Message tags where 0<j<n+1 and n is the number of ooMessage tags. Note that 
the time related anA/arm behavior is not modeled in WSA. Let i=j+2 be a state ID. We have: 
to.1:sO->s2, parent?start 
12.0:s2->s1, parent?stop(tm)/parent!done 
12.j:s2->si. partnerj?mj(paraj) &.., parent?stop(tm) / childj!start 
ti.O :si->si, parent?stop(tm )/stopStatus:=true; childj!stop (tm) 
ti.1 :si->s1, childj?done [stopStatus=true] / parent!done 
ti.3:si->si, childj ?fault(f) &.., parent?stop(tm)/parent!fault(f) 
ti.2:si->sOO, childj ?done &",< childj?fault(f)l parent?stop(tm)) / paren~done 
Figure 4.17: The machine of the pick activity 
4.4.6 Scope 
A. Overview 
The scope activity provides a behaviour context for declaring variables, event Han-
dling, fault handling, and compensation handling. The fault handling and compensa-
tion handling features are important to support long running business transactions. A 
scope allows the declaring of variables which are accessible to any activity inside the 
scope. The outmost BPEL process provides a global scope, called process scope, which 
shares similar semantics of scope (see section -1.-1.7). A scope must have a primary 
activity, and optionally contain an eventHandlers activity, a faultHandlers activity, 
and a compensationHandler activity. The primary activity can be a BPEL basic or 
structured activity. When a scope is entered, its primary activity. event Handlers, and 
faultHandlers starts to run concurrently. \Vhen a scope finishes successfull)' (i.e. no 
fault or interruption occurrs), the scope starts the compensationHandlers. 
Scope and Event Handlers: In a scope, the eventHandlers acti\'ity runs concur-
rently with the primary activity, the event Handlers acti\'ity is enabled (resp. disabled) 
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when the primary activity starts (resp. completes). In WSA, we use start and dis-
able messages to model such enablement and disablement, respectively. Note that the 
eventHandlers activity continues running until it is disabled or stopped by the scope. 
Scope and Fault Handlers: Upon receiving a fault, the scope forwards the fault 
to its faultHandlers. The scope enables the faultHandlers after the scope's running 
primary activity and eventHandlers have been stopped. If the scope's fault Handlers 
cannot handle a fault, the fault will be re-thrown to the scope, so that the scope can 
propagate the fault to the direct enclosing activity. A scope ends abnormally if a 
fault arrives, no matter whether or not the fault can be handled or re-thrown by its 
fault Handlers. 
Scope and Compensation Handler: It is pointed out in [10] that a scope's 
compensationHandler is installed only when the scope completes normally. However, it 
is not clear whether the scope completing normally means that: 1) the scope's primary 
activity completes sucessfully, or 2) both scope's primary activity and event Handlers 
activity complete sucessfully. We adopt the latter interpretation, because the even-
tHandlers are considered as a part of the normal processing of a scope, and a fault 
thrown from the event Handlers will be forwarded to the current scope's faultHandlers. 
Thus, a scope is said to complete successfully when all its normal processing activi-
ties complete normally. Thereafter, the compensationHandler is installed for possible 
later invocation. If the process reaches a point where compensation will no longer be 
required, compensation activities can be forgotten. 
A scope needs to be compensated when its compensationHandler is explicitly or 
implicitly invoked by a compensate activity of the direct outer scope's faultHandlers 
or compensationHandler. In the case of a scope that needs to be compensated but 
its compensationHandler activity is missing, an implicit compensation handler will 
run. Such an implicit compensation handler is introduced in section 13.4.1 of BPEL 
1.1 [10] and is explicitly defined as a default compensationHandler in section 12.5.1 
of BPEL 2.0 [6], as shown in the BPEL code of Fig 4.19. It encloses an unnamed 
compensate activity that invokes the compensationHandlers of corresponding scopes. 
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The semantics of a compensationHandler activity will be covered in section .± ... tq. 
When a compensationHandler is missing, such a default compensationHandler activit~· 
will be added to the scope activity in the intermediate BPEL code. 
Scope Interruption: As stated in section 4.1.2, there exist two causes of interrup-
tions. An activity can be interrupted by its direct enclosing activity due to: 1) a fault 
propagation, or 2) a terminate message. For simplicity, we call them fault-stop and 
terminate-stop, respectively. Except for the scope activity, the other BPEL acti"ities 
handle these two kinds of interruptions in the same way, by stopping their enclosing 
activities and then ending abnormally. 
When a terminate activity is reached, all currently running activities must be termi-
nated immediately without any fault handling or compensation behaviour. Therefore, 
when receiving a terminate-stop, the scope handles it the same as other activities, 
by stopping their direct enclosing activities and ends abnormally. The direct enclos-
ing activities include the running primary activity, eventHandlers, and faultHandlers. 
Regarding the compensationHandler, all the compensationHandlers will be stopped 
directly by the process scope. 
When receiving a fault-stop, the scope activity can control such interruption to 
some degree. By receiving a fault-stop, if the scope's fault Handlers activity is running, 
it will do nothing but wait for the fault Handlers to complete; otherwise, if its fault-
Handlers activity is not running, then the scope will start a special fault handler. This 
special fault Handler is introduced in section 13.4.2 of BPEL 1.1 [10] and explicit ly 
defined as default terminationHandler in section 12.5.1 of BPEL 2.0 [6], as shown 
in Fig 4.18. When the default terminationHandler is started, it starts the unnamed 
compensate activity. By receiving a compensate message, it enables a compensate1Ian-
ager machine C H that manages the invocations of compensationHandlers (see sect ion 
4.4.9). The default terminationHandler activity will be added to the scope activity ill 
the intermediate BPEL code. 
B. Scope in WSA 
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<termination Handler> 
<compensate/> (1) 
</terminationHandler> 
WSA transitions: 
to.1:s0->s2, parent?start / compWSA!start 
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t2. 0:s2->s2, compManager?fault(f)/ tm:=false; compManager!stop(tm) 
t2. 1 :s2->s2, compWSA ?compensate (Q )/compManager!enable( Q) 
t2. 2:s2->s3, compWSA ?done & compManager?done/parent!done 
Figure 4.18: The machine of the default terminationHandler 
Let MQ be the scope machine, and P A, EH 5, F H 5, C H, T H be the machines of 
the primary, eventHandlers, jaultHandlers, compensationHandler, default Termina-
tionHandler activities, respectively. The F H 5, C H, T H are called FCT for short. 
Also a scope machine has a special child compensateManager C ill as the supporting 
machine to manage the compensation invocation. Note that a scope machine will start 
its C M, C H, but it will not wait for them to finish. Since a started C!'vI may not be 
enabled, and a started C H mayor may not be invoked. if the scope waits for them 
to finish, the parent machine of scope that waits for the scope's done message cannot 
progress, which in turn causes other related machines to wait. The C1U is enabled 
by the scope's FCT, so CM can propagate fault to, receive stop from, and send done 
message to FCT. The C H can propagate fault to, receive stop from, and send done 
message to the C ill of the current scope's direct outer scope. The semantics of compen-
sateManager machines and compensationHandler activities will be covered in section 
4.4.9. 
The scope machine has three Boolean variables jaultStop, termStop, childFault, 
with false as default values. The jaultStop, termStop indicate whether an incoming stop 
message is a fault-stop or terminate-stop. The childFault with true value indicates that 
the scope receives a fault from PA or EH5. In this case the scope cannot st.art the 
compensationHandler. 
Scope with faultHandlers: The scope machine with fault Handlers F H S is shown 
III Fig 4.19. When a scope ends norm all)' without receiving a fault from its FA 
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or EH S, the scope is in a successful-completed mode; otherwise the scope is in a 
unsuccessful-completed model when it receives a fault or it is interrupted. Two nor-
mal scenarios are modelled in part (2) of Fig 4.19. Firstly, if EHS exists, lHQ starts 
PA,EHS,FHS,CM, after PA has finished, the scope disables EHS. After EHS 
has finishes, MQ discharges F H. Finally, when the F H has finished, IIIQ ends nor-
mally in the sucessful-completed mode and starts CH ((to.I, t2.2, t3.2, t5.2)). Secondly. 
if EHS does not exist, MQ starts PA,FHS,CM, after PA has finished, lHQ dis-
charges F H S. Thereafter, MQ ends normally in a sucessful-completed mode and starts 
CH((tO.I, t2.4, t5.2)). 
The full version scope machine with faults and interruptions is shown in part (1) 
of Fig 4.19. When receiving a fault from either PA or EHS. IIIQ stops both of them 
and forwards the fault to FHS (h3, t3.3)' At state 84, MQ waits for the running 
P A, E H S to finish before enabling F H S (t4.0)' In this case, III Q ends normally in 
a unsuccessful-completed mode (t5.4)' When receiving a fault re-thrown from FHS, 
MQ forwards the fault to its parent machine (t5.3). For interruption, IIIQ responds 
to fault-stop and terminate-stop messages differently, as follows. First, if i\IQ receives 
a fault-stop when FHS has not been enabled, IIIQ stops the running PA.EHS, dis-
charges F H S, and starts T H. After the running child machines have finished, IIIQ 
ends abnormally ( (t2.0, t2.1), (ho, t3.1)). Second, when receiving a terminate-stop, J.\IQ 
stops the running P A, EH S, F H S, and ends abnormally after the running child ma-
chines have finished( (t2.00, hOI), (hoo, hOI), (t5.00, t5.0I))· As long as the scope ends 
abnormally, it is in a unsuccessful-completed mode. 
Scope without faultHandlers: Since the scope has no fault Handlers , the scope 
can either end abnormally in an unsuccessful-completed mode or end normally in a 
successful-completed mode. Two normal scenarios are modelled in part (.J) of Fig -L2(). 
Firstly, if EHS exists, MQ starts PA,EHS,CJH, "~IQ isables EHS after PA has 
finished. When EH S has finishes, IIIQ ends normally in the successful-completed mode 
and starts CH, i.e. ((to.I, h2, h2))' Secondly, if EHS does not exist. .\IQ starts 
PA,CM. After PA has finished, IIIQ ends normally and starts CH((tO.l.t'2-'l))' 
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BPELcode' 
<scope name="Q"> 
<activity> .... <Iactivity> 
<evenIHandlers> 
t2.3 4.0 
13.3 
</eventHandlers> 
<faultHandlers> 
default terminationHandle 
<temninationHandler> 
<compensate I> (1 ) 
<ltemninationHandler> 
s2 t2~S3 . t3.2 
, \3.0 
1200 ·sJ1 (Joo 0 ·;'5t5.3 
. t2. /' 5. 1 t .00 
<lfauIIHandlers> default compensationHandler: t2.01. 
<compensation Handler> <compensation Handler> s1 
</compensationHandler> <lcompensationHandlep: to.1 12.2 -
.... <compensate I> G 12.4 -
<lscope> (2 sO 52 
WSA transitions: 
Note.: PA: primary activity, EHS: eventHandlers, FHS: faultHandlers, CH: compensation Handler, TH: 
termlnatlonHandlerl. CM: compensateManager. At s4, a fault is forwarded to FHS. At s6, the scope 
finishes normally. At s7, the scope finishes after handling a fault. 
fA) When FHS eXists. refer to machines (1) (2) 
(A 1) If EHS exists, then state s3 exists (at s3, PA has finished): 
to.1 : sO->s2, parent?start IPA !start; EHS! start;FHS! start;CM !start 
t2.0: s2->s2, parent?stop(tm) [tm!=truej I 
faultStop:=true;PA!stop(tm); EHS !stop(tm); FHS!disable; TH! start 
12.00: s2->s2 , parent?stop( tm) [tm=truejl termStop :=true; PAl stop(tm );EHS !stop(tm );FHS! stop(tm) 
t2.1: s2->s1, PA?done & EHS?done & FHS?done & TH?done [fauItStop=truej/parent!done 
12.01 :s2->s1, PA ?done & EHS?done & FHS?done [termStop=true]/parent!done 
t2.2: s2->s3, PA ?done & ~ (PA ?tault(f) I EHS?tault(f) I parent?stop(tm)) IEHS!disable 
12.3: s2->s4, (PA?fault(f) I EHS?fault(f)) & ~ parent?stop(tmY tm:=false; childFault=true; 
FHS! fault(f XPA !stop(tm );EHS! stop(tm) 
t3.0: s3->s3, parent?stop(tm) [tm!=truej I faultStop:=true; EHS!stop; FHS!disable; TH!start 
t3.00:s~>s3, parent?stop(tm) [tm=truejl termStop:=true; EHS!stop(tm); FHS!stop(tm) 
t3.1: s3->s1, EHS?done & FHS?done & TH!done [faultStop=truej/parent!done 
t3.01: s~>s1, EHS?done & FHS?done [termStop=truej/parent!done 
t3.2: s3->s5, EHS?done & ~ (EHS?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm)YFHS!disable 
t3.3: s3->s4, EHS?fault(f) & ~ parent?stop(tm) Itm:=false; chiidFault:=true; FHSlfault(f); EHS!stop(tm) 
t4.0: s4->s5, PA?done & EHS?done'FHS!enable 
(A2)Otherwise, if EHS does not exists, then: 
to.1: sO->s2, parent?start IPA!start; FHS!start;CM!start 
12.0: s2->s2, parent?stop(tm) [tm!=truej I faultStop:=true; PA!stop(tm); FHS!disable;TH!start 
t2.00:s2->s2, parent?stop(tm) [tm=truejl termStop:=true; PA!stop(tm);FHS!stop(tm) 
12.1: s2->s1, PA?done & FHS?done & TH?done [faultStop=truej/paren~done 
t2.01 :s2->s1, PA ?done & FHS?done [temnStop=truej/parent!done 
t2.3: s2->s4, PA?tault(f) & ~ parent?stop(tm)/tm:=false; childFault:=true; FHS!fault(f); PA!stop(tm) 
t2.4: s2->s5, PA ?done & ~PA ?tault(f) I parenl?stop (tm)) I FHS!disable 
t4.0: s4->s5, PA ?done/FHS!enable 
15.00: s5->s5, parent?stop(tm)[tm=truejltermStop:=true; FHS!stop(tm) 
t5.01: s5->s1, FHS?done[termStop=truej/parent!done 
t5.3: s5->s5, FHS?fault(f) & ~parent?stop I parentlfault(f) 
t5.2: s5->s6, FHS?done & ,(FHS?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm))[chiidFault!=truej/parentl done;CH!start 
t5.4: s5->s6, FHS?done & ~(FHS?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm))[chiidFault=true]JparenMone 
Figure 4.19: The machine of the scope activity with faultHandlers 
The full verSlOn scope machine with faults and interruptions is shown in (3) of 
Fig 4.20. When the scope receives a fault, it propagages the fault to its parent ma-
chine (t2.3, t3.3)' For interruption, when receiving a fault-stop, l'vIQ stops the running 
PA,EHS and starts TH. After its running child machines have finished, MQ ends 
abnormally ((t2.0, t2.1), (t3.0, t3.1))' When receiving a terminate-stop, JIQ stops tIl(' 
running P A, EH S and ends abnormally after the running child machines have finished 
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~ , 
O t2, t23 t3 '=:'~' to,1 2 /13 (3) sO s2 - s3 ,s4 
12,0" ~t3. i)~, 
1200 t2.f,~30 13. {501 
t2.01 ' 
s1 
.. t2.4 (4)~~ 
(B) When FHS does not exist, refer to machines (3) (4) 
(B1) If EHS exists, then state s3 exists (at 53, PA has finished): 
to.1 : sO->s2, parent?start IPA !start; EHS!start;CM !start 
t2.0: s2->s2, parent?stop(tm) [tm!=true] I faultStop:=true; PA !510p(tm); EHS!stop(tm); TH!start 
t2.0?:s2->s2, parent?stop(tm) [tm=true]1 tenmStop:=true; PA!stop(tm);EHS!stop(tm} 
t2.1. s2->s1, PA ?done & EHS?done & TH?done [faultStop=true]/parent!done 
t2.01 :52->s1, PA ?done & EHS?done [termStop=true]/parent!done 
t2.2: 52->s3, PA ?done & 1PA ?fault(f) I EHS?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm}} IEHS!disable 
t2.3: S2->52, (PA?fault(f) I EHS?fault(f) & ..., parent?stop(tmY chiidFault:= true; parenl!fault(f) 
t3.0: s3->s3, parent?stop(tm) [tm!=true] I faultStop:=true; EHS!stop; TH!start 
13.00:s3->s3, parent?stop(tm) [tm=true]1 tenmStop:=true; EHS!stop(tm) 
t3.1: s3->s1, EHS?done & TH?done [faultStop=true]/parent!done 
t3.01: s3->s1, EHS?done [tenmStop=true]/parentldone 
13.3: s3->s3, EHS?fault(f) & -. parent?stop(tm) I chiidFault:=true; parentlfault(f} 
t3.2: s3->s4, EHS?done 
&-.(EHS?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm))[childFault!=true]/parentl done; CH!start 
(B2)Otherwise, if EHS does not exists, then: 
to.1 : sO->s2, parent?start IPA !start; CM!start 
t2.0: s2->s2, parent?stop(tm) [tm!=truejl faultStop:=true; PA!stop(tm); TH!start 
t2.00:s2->s2, parent?stop(tm) [tm=truejl tenmStop:=true; PA!stop(tm) 
t2.1: 52->51, PA ?done & TH?done [faultStop=truej/parent!done 
t2.01 :52->51, PA ?done [termStop=truej/parentldone 
t2.3: 52->s2, PA ?fault(f) & -. parent?5top(tm)1 chiidFault:= true; parent!fault(f) 
t2.4: 52->54, PA ?done & 1PA?fault(f) I parent?5top(tm))/parentldone;CH!start 
Figure 4.20: The machine of the scope activity without fault Handlers 
4.4.7 Process Scope 
The process activity shares most similar semantics of a general scope activity with 
some differences. We illustrate the differences in this section. The partnerLinks (the 
set of BPEL processes with which the current process interact) must be declared in 
the process. Since a process activity cannot be enclosed in a flow activity, it callnot 
contain any link. Thus, no linkWrapper machine is associated with a process activity. 
A process activity must have a primary activity, and optionally event Handlers and 
fault Handler activities_ In section 13.3.1 of BPEL 1.1 [10], it states that a process 
can be compensated after normal completion by platform-specific means. H< m-ever, 
it is not clear how to invoke the compensationHandler of process scope. In section 
12 of BPEL 2.0 [10], it states that a compensationHandler cannot be att ached to a 
process. We adopt the latter semantics. For fault handling, the process handl('s a fault 
in the same way as scope but if a fault is re-thrown from the process's faultlIandler. 
the process ends without propagating the fault. Hence. the process only can receive 
79 
4.4 BPEL Structured Activitites 
a terminate-stop but no fault-stop. As a result, different from the scope activit\-. the 
default compensationHandler and the default terminationHandler activities will not be 
added to the process activity in the intermediate BPEL code. 
The process machine is shown in Fig 4.21 below, where the machines of process 
with and without faultHandlers are shown in parts (1)(2) and (3)(cl) , respectively. 
Let Mp be the process machine, and PA,EHS,FHS be the machines of the primary, 
eventHandlers and faultHandlers activities, respectively. A process machine has similar 
structure as the scope machine. We mainly shows the difference here. 1\1p has a Boolean 
variable tm with false as the default value, which is the parameter of a stop message 
so that the scope machines can identify whether the incoming stop message is a fault-
stop or terminate-stop. Since a process activity is the top-level activity, so a process 
machine cannot receive a terminate-stop or fault-stop message from the parent machine, 
the variables faultStoP! termStop are not needed in Mp. Also, since the process activity 
is not associated with any compensationHandler, the variable childFault is not needed 
in Mp to distinguish whether the process ends normally in a successful-completed mode 
or not. 
Whenever Mp is entering a final state, it no longer requires any compellsation. If 
a CM or a CH is still running when a process is going to finish, this indicates that 
the C M has not been enabled and the C H has not been invoked by any enabled C 1\1. 
However, it is too complex to identify which C1\1 s, CH s are running. We use a simple 
solution to stop all the C M s, C H s of the enclosed scopes. 
Process with faultHandlers: Part (2) of Fig 4.21 shows the normal scenarios of 
the process machine, which are similar to the ones of the scope machine, except that J.\Ip 
will stop all running compensationHandlers of the enclosed scopes, if any, and ends nor-
mally. The scenarios follow the transition sequences (to.I' t2.2, t3.2, t5.2),(tO.I, h.j. t,S.2)' 
The process machine with faults and interruptions is shown in (1) of Fig 4.21. 'When 
Mp receives a fault from either PA or EHS, it stops both of them and forwards the 
fault to F H S (t2.3, h3)' When 1\lp receives a fault re-thrown from F H S, it docs not 
propagate the fault but ends abnormally (t5.3)· Since if a terminate activity is reached 
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</eventHandlers> 
<faultHandlers> 
<lfaultHandlers> 
</process> 
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t5lC\ to. 1 
WSAtransitions: (2) .. ~ (4) sO 
Let CMCHstops denote the send-event list: CM1!stop(tm); .. ; CHn!stop(tm),CH 11 stop(tm); .. ;CHn!stop(tm) to stop the running 
compensateManagers and compensation Handlers. Let termRE denote the receive-event list (tenmWSA1?term I 
termWSAn?term). . ... 
(A) When FHS exists, refer to machines (1) (2) (8) When FHS does not exist, refer to machines (3) (4) 
(A1) If EHS exists, then state s3 exists: (81) If EHS exists, then state s3 exists: 
to.1: sO->s2, ?start IPA!start; EHS!star\; FHS!start to.1: sO->s2, ?start IPA!start; EHS!start 
t2.0: s2->s2, termRE I tm:=true; 12.0: s2->s2, termRE I tm:=true; 
PA!stop( tm); EHS!stop(tm );FHS!stop(tm) PA!stop (tm );EHS! stop(tm); 
t2.1: s2->s1, PA ?done & EHS?done &FHS?done t2.1: s2->s1, PA ?done & EHS?done 
~m=truej/CMCHstops [tm=truej/CMCHstops 
t2.2: s2->s3, PA?done 12.2: s2->s3, PA?done 
& '(PA ?fault(f) I EHS?fault(f) I termRE) I EHS!disable & ' (PA ?fault(f) I EHS?fault(f) I tenmRE) 
t2.3: s2->s4, (PA?fault(f) I EHS?fault(f)) & ' tenmREI tm:=false; IEHS!disable 
FHS!fault(f); PA!stop(tm);EHSlstop(tm) 12.3: s2->s1, (PA?fault(f) I EHS?fault(f)) &, tenmRE I 
t3.0: s3->s3, termRE I tm:=true; EHS!stop(tm);FHS!stop(tm) tm:=false; PA!stop(tm);EHS!stop(tm) 
t3.1: s3->s1, EHS?done & FHS?done [tm=truej/CMCHstops t3.0: s3->s3, termRE Itm:=true; EHS!stop(tm) 
t3.3: s3->s4, EHS?fault(f) & ' termRE I tm:=false; t3.3: s3->s1, EHS?fault(f) & ' termRE I 
FHS!fault(f); EHS!stop(tm) tm:=false; EHS!stop(tm) 
t3.2: s3->s5, EHS?done t3.1: s3->s1, EHS?done [tm=truej/CMCHstops 
& '(EHS?fault(f) I termRE) I FHS!disable t3.2: s3->s4, EHS?done 
t4.0: s4->s5, PA ?done & EHS?done/FHS!enable &, (EHS?fault(f) I termRE) ICMCHstops 
(A2)Otherwise, if EHS does not exists,then: (82) Otherwise, if EHS does not exists,then: 
to.1 :sO->s2, ?start IPA!start; FHS!start to.1: sO->s2, ?start IPA!start 
t2.0:s2->s2, tenmRE I tm:=true; PA!stop(tm);FHS!stop(tm) 12.0: s2->52, termRE Itm:=true; PA!stop(tm) 
t2,3: s2->s4, PA ?fault(f) &, termRE I 12.3: s2->s1, PA ?fault(f) & ' tenmRE I 
tm:=false; FHS!fault(f); PA!stop(tm) tm:=false;PA!stop(tm) 
t2.1 :s2->s1, PA?done & FHS?done [tm=truej/CMCHstops 12.1: s2->s1, PA ?done [tm=truejl CMCHstops 
12.4: s2->s5, PA ?done & --<PA ?fault(f) I termRE) I FHS!disable 12A s2->s4, PA ?done 
t4.0: s4->s5, PA ?done/FHS!enable &, (PA?fault(f) I termRE) I CMCHstops 
t5.0: s5->s5, termRE I tm:=true; FHS!stop(tm) 
t5.1 : s5->s1, FHS?done [tm=truej/CMCHstops 
t5.3: s5->s1, FHS?fault (f) & 'termRE I CMCHstops 
t5.2: s5->s6, FHS?done & '(FHS?fault(f) I termRE) ICMCHstops 
Figure 4.21: The machine of the process activity 
then all running activities must be terminated immediately; a terminate machine will 
send the termination message directly to the process machine. \Vhen !lIp receives 
a termination message, it stops all the running child machines by sending stop mes-
sages with true-value tm, i.e. terminate-stop (ho, ho, ts.o). After receiving the dOllt' 
notifications from its child machines, Alp ends abnormally (t2.1, t3.1, tS.I)' 
Process without faultHandlers: Part (-1) of Fig 4.21 shows the normal scenarios 
of process machine, which are also similar to the ones in scope machine. They follow 
the transition sequences (to.I' t2.2, t3.2), (to.I> tLI)' The full machine with fault and 
interruption consideration is shown in part (3) of Fig -.1.21. As long as the .lIp r(,Cl'in's 
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a fault, it stops the running P A, EH S and ends abnormally (h3, t3.3). For interruption. 
when receiving a terminate message, Mp stops the running P A, EHS. After its running 
child mahines have finished, Mp ends abnormally ((ho, t2.1), (ha, t3.1)). 
4.4.8 Fault Handlers 
The faultHandlers activity is used explicitly to catch faults and handle them b~' ex-
ecuting the direct enclosed activity. Similar to the switch and pick activities, the 
faulthandlers activity also provides conditional behaviour, but each direct enclosed ac-
tivity of it is guarded by a fault message. The faulthandlers activity is always directly 
enclosed by a scope or process activity. A fault Handlers has L* catch segments and 
0 .. 1 catchAll segment. Each catch segment handles a matching fault message, and the 
catchAll segment handles any fault that cannot be caught by any other catch segment. 
If the catchAll segment is missing, an implicit fault handler will run. Such an implicit 
fault handler is introduced in section 13.4.1 of BPEL 1.1 [10] and explicitly defined 
as default faultHandler in section 12.5.1 of BPEL 2.0 [6], shown in the BPEL code of 
Fig 4.22. When the default faulHandler is entered, it starts the unnamed compensate 
activity and rethrows the unhandled fault. When the catchAll segment is missing, the 
default faultHandler will be added to the fault Handlers activity in the intermediate 
BPEL code. 
Let F H S be the machine of the faultHandlers activity. The normal scenario is 
modelled in part (2) of Fig 4.22, with transition sequence (to.I, t2.j, t(j+2).2) where 
1 ~ j ~ n, n is the sum number of catch and catchAll segments. To fullfil the 
fault name and fault variable matching evaluation, the guard of each segment (t2.j) 
is modelled according two rules defined in the WSA transitions of Fig 4.22. 
Part (1) of Fig 4.22 shows the full machine version with consideration of compen-
sation, faults, and interruptions. When F H S receives a compensate message from 
the compensate machine, it enables the compensateManager machine C H that takes 
charge of the invocations of compensationHandlers(see section -!.-!.9) (t(j+2) I), and 
waits for CH to finish. At state S2, F H S is started but not enabled, when receiving 
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<faultHandlers> 
<catch faultName="name" faultVariable="name'> 
activity1 
</catch> 
<catchAll> 
activity2 
</catchAII> 
</faultHandlers> 
Default fault handler: 
<catchAll> 
<sequence> 
<compensate /> 
<rethrow /> 
</ sequence> 
</catchAII> ~""I , 
WSA transitions: 4".2 
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~ n+2)3 
t(n+2).Q 
In a faultHandl~rs, let j denote the index of catch tags when O<j<n, and the index of catchAll tag when 
Fn, where n-1 IS the number of catch tags. Let i=j+2 be a state 10. Let CM denotes compensateManager. 
We have: 
r1) If j!=n, .then guardj: (f.name =@faultName& f.var =@faultVariable) I (f.name = @faultName& 
@faultVanable =null) I (f.var = @faultVariable & @faultName =null) 
12) If j=n, then guardn: -o(guard1 .. 1 .. guard n.,) 
to.1 :sO.,>s2, parent?start 
t2.0:s2">s1, (parent?stop(tm) 1 parent?disable) /parent!done 
t2.j:s2->si, parent?fault(f) & parent?enable [guardJlIchildj! start 
(A) When a compensate message arrives, then ti.4 exists: 
1i.0:si->si, parent?stop(tm)/stopStatus:=true;childj!stop (tm);CM !stop(tm) 
ti.1:si->s1, childj?done & CM ?done[stopStatus=true]/parent!done 
ti.2:si->s00, childj?done & CM ?done 
& "",<childj?fault(f) I compManager?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm))/parent!done 
ti.3:si->si, (childj?fault(f) I CM ?fault(f))& ~parent?stop(tm) / 
tm:=false; parent!fault(f);childj!stop(tm);CM !stop(tm) 
ti. 4:si->si, compWSA?compensate(Q) & ~parent?stop(tm) /CM !enable (Q) 
(B) When a compensate message does not arise, then tiA does not exist 
ti. O:si->si, parent? stop(tm)/stopStatus:=true;childj!stop (tm) 
ti.1:si->s1, childj?done [stopStatus=true]/parent!done 
ti.2:si->sOO, childj?done ~(childj?fault(f) 1 parent?stop(tm)) /parent!done 
ti.3:si->si, childj?fault(f) & ~parent?stop(tm) /tm:=false; parent!fault(f);childj!stop(tm) 
Figure 4.22: The machine of the faultHandlers activity 
a terminate-stop or a discharge message, F H S ends without executing any brachc~ 
(t2.0)' At states 83 ... 8n+2, FHS can be interrupted by a terminate-stop ((ti.O,ti.l)). 
Note the faultHandler only receives terminate-stop, because when the corresponding 
scope is interrupted by a fault-stop, the scope will not stop faultHandlers but wait for 
it to complete (see scope interruption in section -±.-±.6). As a consequence, when F H:"; 
receives a fault from its child machine, it stops the child and the running compellsate-
Manager and propagates the fault to its parent (ti.3)· 
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4.4.9 Compensation Handlers Invocation 
In order to support long running transactions, error handling in business processes re-
lies heavily on the concept of compensation to reverse the effects of previous committed 
activities. BPEL provides compensationHandler and compensate activities to control 
the reversal, by allowing the user to define specific undo activities. The BPEL compen-
sation only targets local transaction within a single business process, and a transaction 
protocol language is required for multiple BPEL processes [10]. The cornpcllsution-
Handler activity attempts to undo the work of a completed scope by the pre-defined 
activities enclosed in the compensationHandler. A scope's compensationHandler can 
only be invoked when a compensate activity executes. The compensate activity must be 
enclosed in the faultHandlers, default terminationHandler, or compensationHandlers of 
current scope's direct outer scope. 
An example of Fig 4.23 shows the hierarchy of invoking compensationHandler ac-
tivities. Let Qi be a scope and Pi, Fi , Gi , Ti be the primary, compensationHandler, 
faultHandlers, and default terminationHandlers activities of Qi. Q1 is the direct outer 
scope of Q2 andQ3, so G2 and G3 can be invoked when there exists a compensate activ-
ity in F l , Gl , T l . Also, Q2 is the direct outer scope of Q4, so Cel can be invoked when 
there exists a compensate activity in F2, G2 , T2. Note that C cJ cannot be invoked by the 
handlers of Ql and Q3 as they are not direct outer scopes of Q 4· For the compensate 
activity in F l , Gl , T l , if it is named Q2 then only G2 , G3 will be invoked; otherwise, if 
it is unnamed, then both G2 , G3 will be invoked in the order that they are started. 
Figure 4.23: The hierarchy of the compensationHaudler iIl\"ocat ions 
8-1 
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In order to model this hierarchy, we define a compensateManager machine to as-
sociate each scope acti vi ty. For a scope Q i, let F H Si, CHi, T Hi be the machines for 
the faultHandlers, compensationHandler, and default TerminationHandler activities. 
When the scope Qi is started, the compensateManager CMi starts. When one of the 
F H Si, CHi, T Hi receives a compensate message from a compensate machine, C .Ali is 
enabled. Becauses F H Si, CHi, T Hi cannot run at the same time, C Mi will be enabled 
once. In Fig 4.23, CM1 can invoke CH2 , CH3 , and CM2 can invoke CH4 · 
A. Compensation Handler 
A scope's compensationHandler is available for invocation only when the scope 
completes normally. Invoking a compensationHandler that has not been installed is 
equivalent to an empty activity. In Fig 4.24, let CHi, CMi be the compensationHandler 
and compensationManager of scope Qi. Suppose the current scope is Ql and Qo is the 
direct outer scope of Ql' The current compensationHandler machine is CHI· 
The normal scenario is shown in part (2) of Fig 4.24. When CHI is started, it 
sends an ok message to C Mo for registering its availability (to.I)' This message is 
important because in the case that Ql, Q2 are enclosed in a switch activity, if C Mo 
needs to invokes CM1 but Ql is not chosen to execute, then CMo will wait for the 
response from CM1 forever. Thereafter, CHI starts its child machine after receiving a 
compensate invocation from CMo (ho), and CHI ends when its child has finished. 
Part (1) of Fig 4.24 shows the full machine version with consideration of compen-
sation, faults, and interruptions. When CHI receives a stop message from the process 
machine before receiving a compensate invocation, it ends abnormally. When CHl 
receives a compensate message from the compensate machine, it enables the current 
compensateManager CMl (t3.4) and waits for CM1 to finish (t3.2). At this stage, \vhen 
CHI receives a stop message, it stops its child machines and the running compensa-
tionManager (t3.0)' According to section 13.4.3 of BPEL 1.1 [10], when a compen-
sationHandler receives a fault, the fault will be propagated to the one that invoked 
compensationHandler. Hence, when CHl receives a fault, it propagates to the C.\[o 
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<compensation Handler> 
activity 
</compensationHandler> 
Machine transitions: 
(2) sO to. 
4.4 BPEL Structured Activitites 
Let 01 be the current scope, and the direct outer scope IS 00. 
CMO, CM1 be compensateManagers of QO ,01 , respectively. 
to.1: sO->s2, parent?start I CMO!ok 
12.0: s2..>s3, CMO?compensate Ichild!start 
12.1: s2..>s1, process?stop(tm) 
(A) If the enclosed compWSA sends a compensate message: 
t3.0: s3..>s3, C~O?stop(tm)/stopStatus:=true; child!stop(tm);CM1 !stop(tm) 
t3.1: s3">s1, chlld?done & CM 1?done [stopStatus=true] I CMO!done 
t3.2: s3..>s4, child?done & CM1?done 
& -'(child?fault(f) I CM1?fault(f) I CMO?stop(tm))/CMO!done 
13.3: s3..>s3, (child?fault(f) I CM1 ?fault(f)) & -'CMO?stop(tm)/CMO!fault(f) 
t3.4: s3..>s3, compWSA?compensate(O) & -.CMO?stop(tm)1 CM1 !enable(O) 
(B) Otherwise if it does not enclose compWSA 
t3.0: s3..>s3, CMO?stop(tm)/stopStatus:=true; child!stop(tm) 
13.1: s3..>s1, child?done [stopStatus=true] I CMO!done 
t3.2: s3..>s4, child?done &-'(childj?fault(f) I CMO?stop(tm)) I CMO!done 
/3.3: s3..>s3, child?fault(f) & -.CMO?stop(tm)/CMO!fault(f) 
Figure 4.24: The machine of the compensationHandler activity 
Note that the compensationHandler machine CHi does not return its done message 
to the parent machine scope Qi, instead CHi returns the done message to its invoker, 
i.e. a compensateManager machine CAlo. 
B. CompensateManager Machine 
Due to the tight relationship between a compensationHandler and its invoker, we 
define a compensateManager machine specially to handle the invocation. \Yhen a FCT 
(faultHandlers, compensationHandler, or default terminationHandler activity) recei\'es 
a compensate message from its enclosing compensate activity. FCT enables the compe-
nateManager. Let CHi, CAli be the compensationHandler and compensation~lallager 
of scope Qi' Suppose the current scope is Qo, and Ql, '" Qn are the direct inner scopes 
of Qo. Let CAlo be the current compensateManager machine, shown in Fig 4.25. For 
the sake of simplicity, the full machine wrsion with consideration of faults and inter-
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ruptions is only included in the machine transition description but not shown in the 
machine layout. Its normal behaviour can be categorised into two cases. 
Machine transitions: t2 
Let FCT denote the machine that is one of the , CH or TH. 
Case1: for compensate with scope name Q 1 
Let QO be the current scope, it has direct inner scopes Q1, .. Qn. 
10.2: sO->s2, parenf?start & FCT?enable(Q) &" process?stop(tm) [Q=Q 1] 
10.1: sO->s1, process?stop(tm) 
t2.0: s2->s3, CH1 ?ok & "FCT?stop(tm)/CH1Icompensate 
t2.2: s2->sOO, "CH 1?ok & "FCT?stop(tm)1 FCTldone 
t2.1: s2->s1, FCT?stop(tm)/parentidone 
13 .0: s3-> s3, F CT? stop(tm )/stopStatus :=true; CH 1lstop( tm) 
13.1: s3->s1, CH1 ?done [stopStatus=true]/ FCTldone 
13.2: s3->sOO, CH 1?done & "(CH 1?fault(f) I FCT?stop(tm))/ FCl1done 
13.3: s3->s3, CH1 ?fault(f) & "FCT?stop(tm)/FCl1fault(f) 
Case2: for compensate without scope name, 
Let QO be the current scope, it has 3 direct inner scopes Q1 ,Q2 ,Q3. 
Suppose the completion order is Q3,Q2,Q 1. We have: 
10.2: sO->s2, parenf? start & FCT?enable (Q) & " process?stop(tm) [Q =nulO 
10.1: sO->s1, process?stop(tm) 
Let j be the index of CHs of Q1 ,Q2,Q3, 0<j<n+1, and let i=j+1. 
tLO :si">si, FCT?stop(tm )/stopStatus:=true; CHjlstop(tm) 
tL1 :si">s1, CHj?done [stopStatus=true]/FCT!done 
tL3: si">si, CHj?fault(f) & "FCT?stop(tm)/FCl1fault(f) 
(A) If it is the first CH, i.e.j=1, then: 
t2.2: s2.,>s3, CH1?ok & " (CHj?fault(f) I FCT?stop(tm)) ICH1 !compensate 
(8) Ifit is not the first or last CH, i.e.j!=1, j!=n, then: 
ti.2: si->si+1, CHj?done & CHj+1 ?ok & "(CHj?fault(f) I FCT?stop(tm))1 
CHj+ 11compensate 
(C) If it is the last CH, i.e. j=n, then: 
4n+1).2: sn+1.,>sOO,CHn?done &" (CHn?fault(f) I FCT?stop(tm))1 parent! done 
t2.4: s2->s4, CH2?ok & "CH 1?ok & "FCT?stop(tm) ICH2!compensate 
t2.5: s2->s5, CH3?ok & "(CH1 ?ok I CH2?ok) & " FCT?stop(tm) ICH31compensate 
t2.6: s2->sOO, ,,(CH1?ok I CH2?ok ICH3?ok) & " FCT?stop(tm)/FCl1done 
13.4: s3->s5, CH3?ok & "CH2?ok & "FCT?stop(tm)/CH3!compensate 
13.5: s3->sOO, ,,(CH2?ok I CH3?ok) & "FCT?stop(tm)/FCTldone 
t4.4: s4->sOO, "CH3?ok & " FCT?stop(tm)/FCl1done 
Figure 4.25: The compensateManager machine 
In the first case, there is a specific scope to be compensated. If the compell~ated 
scope is named Ql, the to-be-invoked compensationHandler is CHI· A normal sccnario 
is with transition sequence (ta.2' ha, h2)' At state 82, C1HO waits for the registration 
message ok from CHI. The ok message indicates that CHI is ready to be invoked. 
If the ok message from CHI has arrived, CAda in\'okes CHI b~' ~cIld.iIlg a compensate 
.,:>-
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message (t2.0); otherwise CMo ends without sending the invocation (t2.2). 
In the second case, there is no specific scope to be compensated. One of the normal 
scenarios is with transition sequence (to.2, t2.2, .. , t(n+l).2)' where n is the number of the 
direct inner scopes. Such a machine layout is the same as the machine of the sequence 
activity, where the corresponding compensationHandlers can be invoked one by one. 
To illustrate the alternative scenarios, we assume the current Qo has direct inner scopes 
Ql, Q2, Q3 with the completion order Q3, Q2, Ql' The idea is similar to the first case: 
if the ok message from the current CHj is not available, it checks whether the ok 
message of the next one CHj +1 is available, if it is available then it invokes CHj+l. 
Since the scope Qo starts its compensateManager CAIo after Qo has been started, and 
Qo always starts earlier than Q1, Q2, Q3, this indicates that CiUO must start earlier 
than CHI, CH2, CH3. As a result, this ensures that a compensateManager is always 
started when the corresponding compensationHandlers want to register by sending ok 
messages. 
Another interesting point here is to get the completion order of the direct inner 
scopes. For two arbitrary scopes Qi, Qj, the completion order is decided based on the 
nearest common enclosing machine of Qi, Qj. We illustrate this using the example in 
Fig 4.23, as follows. 
• If PI is a sequence activity, then Q2 completes before Q3· The invocation order 
• If PI is a flow activity, there exist two cases. Firstly, if Q2 and Q3 are data 
independent, then they can complete independently. In this case the invocation 
order can be either CH2, CH3 or CH3, CH2· Secondly, if Q3 is data dependent 
on Q2, which means either Q2, Q3 are source and target activities of a flo\\" link 
respectively, or Q3 needs the data from Q2. In this case, since Q2 completes 
earlier than Q3, the invocation order is C H3' CH2· 
• If PI is a switch or pick activity, then only one of Q2. Q3 will execute. There is 
no order applied, only the compensationHandler of the executed scope will s('nd 
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an ok message to the invoker. 
4.4.10 Event Handlers 
The event Handlers activity consists of a set of concurrent activities onMessage and 
onAlarm activities. The onMessage and onAlarm activities handle external message 
events and system alarm events, respectively. An alarm event is carried out at most 
once, while a message event can occur multiple times when the scope is actiw. \Ve do 
not model the time related onAlarm activities in WSA. In order to model the multiple 
messages and multi-thread behaviours of event Handlers , we associate the eventHandlers 
activity with EH S machines, each onMessage activity with a message event handler 
machine M EH, and each thread of onMessage activity with a f..I EH thread machint'. 
Each thread machine takes care of one message instance. We do not illustrate the 
thread machine here because it can be a machine for any BPEL activity. whose parent 
machine is MEH. For an EHS machine, its parent is a scope machine and its child 
machines are ME H s. 
BPEL code: 
<eventHandlers> 
<onMessage partnerLink="partner1" portType="pt1" 
operation="m1" variable="para1 "> 
activity1 
</onMessage> 
<onMessage partnerLink="partner n.'" portType ="ptn.," 
operation=" mo.," variable="paran., "> 
activity n.' 
</onMessage> 
<onAlarm for="duration"> 
activityn 
</onAlarm> 
</eventHandlers> 
Machine transitions: 
to.1: sO->s2, parent?start IMEH1!start; ... ;MEHn!start 
12.0: s2->s2, parent?stop(tm)/stopStatus:=true; MEH1 !stop(tm); ... ;MEHn !stop(tm) 
12.1: s2->s1, MEH1?done..& .. MEHn?done [stopStatus=true] Iparent!done 
12.2: s2->s3, parent?disable & -'(MEH1 ?fault(f) .. I .. MEHn?fault(f)) & -,:Jarent?stop(tm) I 
MEH1! disable; .. ;MEHn!disable 
12.3: s2->s2, (MEH1 ?fault(f) .. I .. MEHn?fault(f)) & -,:Jarent?stop(tm)/parent!fault(f) 
t3.0: s3->s3, parent?stop(tm) I MEH1!stop(tm); ... ;MEHn!stop(tm); stopStatus:=true 
t31' s3->s1 MEH1?done .. & .. MEHn?done [stopStatus=true] Iparent!done 
t3'2: s3->s4' MEH1?done .. & .. MEHn?done & -'(MEH1?fault(f) .. I .. MEHn?fault(f) I parent?stop(tm)) Iparent!done 
t3:3: s3->s3: (MEH1 ?fault(f) .. I .. MEHn?fault(f)) & -,:Jarent?stop(tm)/parent!fault(f) 
Figure 4.26: The machine of the eventHandlers acti\'ity 
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The EH S machine is shown in Fig 4.26. The normal scenario IS illustrated in 
(2) with transition sequence (to.l, h2, t3.2). When EH S is started, it starts all JI E H 
machines; the EH S will not end until it receives a disable message from the scope. 
When EH S receives a disable message, it forwards the message to its ;,II EH ma-
chines. EH S ends after all M EH machines have completed. Alternati\·ely. when 
E H S receives a fault from any ME H machine, it propagates the fault to its parent 
(h3, h3). When EHS is interrupted, it stops the MEH machines and ends abnormally 
BPEL code of MEHi 
<onMessage partnerLink=" partner" 
portType="pt" t2. 
operation="m" 
variable="para'> 
activity 
</onMessage> 
Machine transitions: 
tD.1: sO.,>s2, parent?start I count:=O 
t2.0: s2.,>s1, parent?stop(tm) [count=O]; parent!done 
t2.1 : s2.,>s2, partner? m(para) & ""Parent?disable & ""parent?stop(tm)/count=count+ 1; child !start 
t2.2: s2.,>s4, parent?stop(tm) [counI>O] Inumber:=count 
t2.3: s2..>s2, child?fault(f) &..., parent?stop(tm) [count>O]/parent!fault(f) 
t2.4: s2.,>s3, parent?disable &..., child?fault(f) &..., parent?stop(tm) [count>O] 
t2.5: s2.,>s5, parent?disable &..., parent?stop(tm) [count=O]1 parent!done 
t3.0: s3">s3, child?done &..., parent?stop(tm) [count>O] Icount=count-1 
t3.1: s3.,>s4, parent?stop(tm) [counI>O] Inumber:=count 
t3.2: s3.,>s5, [count=O]/parent!done 
t3.3: s3">s3, child?fault(f) &..., parent?stop(tm) [count>O] I parent!fault(f) 
t4.0: s4.,>s4, [number>O] I childlstop(tm); number:=number-1 
14.1: s4.,>s6, [number=O] 
16.0: s6..>s6, child?done[counl>0]/count:=count-1 
16.1: s6">s1, [count=O]/parent!done 
Figure 4.27: The machine of the MER for eventRandlers activity 
Fig 4.27 shows the 1\1 EH machine, since a 1\1 EH may start a thread for each 
message event instance, and the thread number is unknown, we model this by adding 
a variable count for the current thread number. Part (2) Fig -±.27 shows the normal 
scenarIOs. The first normal scenario is (to.I, hI. t2.4, t3.0, t3.2). \\-hen iII EH is started, 
. . 't' t d to ero (t ) The machine waits for an external message e\'t'llt the count IS Illl la e Z 0.1 . 
to arrive at 82, a new thread machine is started for each message instance. \\'hen it 
count b}' 1 and starts a ne\\' thread machine receives an external message. it increases 
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(t2.I). When it receives a disable message from its parent and the count is not zero. it 
enters state 83 to wait for its thread machine to finish (h4). \\Then one of its thread 
machines has finished, it decreases the count by 1, until all the thread machines ha\'e 
finished (t3.a). When the count is zero, the MEH ends normally (t3.2). The second 
normal scenario is (to.l, t2.5), where the M EH is disabled when count is zero, i.e. it 
has not started any thread machine. 
Two alternative scenarios contain the transition sequence (t4.0, t4.l. t6.0, t6.1): when 
MEH is interrupted (h2, t3.I), it stops its thread machines one by one until all the 
thread machines have been stopped (t4.0), then it enters state, 86, to wait for the thread 
machines to finish (t4. d. When a thread machine has finished, it decreases the COUll t 
by 1 until all the thread machines have finished ((t6.0, t6.1)). 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we analysed the BPEL control dependencies, and illustrated how to 
capture these dependencies in our proposed web service automaton (\VSA). We demon-
strated how to model BPEL basic activities and structured activities in WSA. The most 
interesting BPEL features, including scoping, fault handling, and compensation han-
dling, are also modelled. In addition, we also analysed the BPEL internal and external 
data dependencies. From our modelling BPEL in vVSA, we believe our \NSA is more 
suitable to model BPEL behaviour than the existing automata-based semantics, in 
that it can model most features of BPEL and it allows verification of BPEL data de-
pendencies in addition to control dependencies. In the next chapter, we will present 
our automatic test framework, where the BPEL control and data dependencies can be 
verified and then control flow and data flow testing can be manipulated. 
, 
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Autolllatic Test Framework 
As well known, it is hard to define a logically consistent and complete set of illteraction 
rules for asynchronously executing processes in a distributed system, so it is essential 
to apply automated validation tools in finding the inconsistellcies of the interactions. 
Also, it is tedious, time-consuming, and error prone to create test cases manually from 
design models, especially for complex modelling languages like BPEL. It is desirable to 
apply existing model-based-testing techniques in the domain of \veb services, so that 
the functionality of the BPEL processes can be checked. 
In the previous chapter, we analysed and modelled BPEL features in our proposed 
web service automata. Based on this analysis, we present a model checking based t ('st 
framework for BPEL processes, as model checking is all effective technique with ducd 
advantages of verification and test case generation. 
In our framework, in the first phase the general properties of the BPEL processes 
will be verified, and in the second phase the functionalities of the BPEL processes will 
be checked. NuSMV [18] and SPIN [:32], two of the most mature model checkers, art' 
used as two alternative engines in our framework. 
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5.1 Model Checking Background 
The idea behind model checking is to check whether a given model satisfies a given 
property, by exploring all alternatives of the given model. The model checking process 
is illustrated in Fig 5.1. As the two inputs of a model checker, the model is based on a 
finite state machine, and the property is expressed as a temporal logical formula. \ \"hell 
the given property is not satisfied, the model checker outputs a sC't of counterexamples. 
A counterexample is an execution path that will take the finite state model from its 
initial state to a state where the violation occurs. 
Model Checker counterexamples 
Figure 5.1: The model checking approach 
The SPIN model checker supports LTL temporal logic, and the NuSI\IV model 
checker supports both LTL and CTL temporal logic. LTL (Linear Time Temporal 
Logic) views time as a sequence of states with no choice as to which state is llext. The 
choice of next state is deterministic. CTL (Computation Tree Logic) views time as 
branching, so from a given branch alternative states may be reached. In our framework, 
we will use the LTL temporal operators [] (always), <) (eventually), X (next), and U 
(until); and the CTL temporal operators A (for all paths), E (there exists some path), 
G (always), F (finally), X (next). and U (until). 
5.1.1 In Verification 
The aim of the verification phase is to find errors in a design model, \\/here the syst l'lll 
properties for model checking will be encoded as desired properties. A dfsind pTOJ!crly 
describes the expected behaviour of a given model, i.e. what the model should do. By 
checking a BPEL model against a desired property, if there is all error in the BPEL 
model that will violate the property, the counterexamples will be generated to show 
the causes of the error. 
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A formal classification of design errors is based on the terms safety and liveness. 
The intuition of a safety property is that something bad never happens. A safety 
property can be verified by evaluating individual properties of states. This verification 
can always be done by a reachability analysis. When a safety condition is violated, the 
violation can be detected after a finite number of steps. For instance, a safety property 
can be a vending machine never dispenses coffee and tea at the same time. A general 
safety property can be described as []-.¢ in LTL, and AG-.¢ in CTL. The intuition of 
liveness property is that something good eventually happens. A liveness property can 
be verified by looking at a complete execution. For instance, a live ness property can 
be the vending machine eventually supplies coffee after the coffee-button is selected. A 
generalliveness property can be described as 0 ¢ in LTL, and AF¢ in CTL. 
The majority of properties belong to safety properties, such as deadlock-free and 
invariant preservation. An example of liveness properties is livelock-free. A livelock 
indicates that there exists a non-progress cycle. Both deadlock and livelock can be 
detected by reachabilitiy analysis. In section 5.4, we discuss some design errors that 
can be automatically detected in our framework. 
5.1.2 In Testing 
The attraction of applying model checking in testing is that model checking can auto-
matically produce counterexamples, which can be the basis for test cases. Proposals 
for applying model checking in coverage-based testing were made by [30, 33, 52]. The 
idea is to use a model checker to find test cases by formulating test purposes as trap 
properties. An example of a test purpose is 'a state is reachable'. A trap property is the 
negation of the original desired property, such that counterexamples can be generated 
for a non-error test model. The test case generation process is summarised as three 
steps: 1) a given test purpose is encoded into a trap property; 2) the model checker 
checks the given model against the trap property, and generates counterexamples; 3) 
test cases can be retrieved from the counterexamples. Test coverage can be achieved. 
by repeating such process for each test purpose for the given model. For instance, 
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suppose the test criterion is state coverage for a machine !II with states s1. 82. s3, s..±. 
this requires four test purposes where each corresponds to state 5! is reachable. By 
encoding the test purposes into trap properties, the model checker will search for coun-
terexamples for each test purpose. 
5.2 Framework Overview 
In this section, we will elaborate our proposed integrated framework for BPEL WI'-
ification and test case generation, shown in Fig 5.2. The framework provides three 
functions: verification of BPEL models, test cases generation for BPEL models, and 
test cases generation for WSDL models. On one hand, since BPEL is an orchestration 
language, the BPEL based test cases should be at the level of integration testing, which 
check whether the composed web services conforms to functional requirement. On the 
other hand, since WSDL is an interface language, the WSDL based test cases should be 
at the level of unit testing, which check the message types and responses of individual 
operations in remote web services. 
BPEL 
Model Checkers 
I--------IM SPIN/nuSMV k-------'-I~ 
I _________________ Fra'!l-eV!5lr~Core J 
Figure 5.2: Framework architecture 
In the verification phase, the user can check the correctness of t he design BPEL 
models. If there is any outputted counterexample, the user can modif~' the BPEL mod-
els and repeat the checking until no counterexample is produced. In the testing pha:-;!'. 
the user can choose the verified BPEL models as test models to derive test casl'~. where 
the test cases can be automatically retrieved from counterexamples. Furt hermore. the 
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user can choose WSDL models to generate test cases. The two levels of generated te:-it 
cases can be run on the common JUnit test execution engine. The test cases enable 
the user to input test data. 
In both phases, the BPEL models are analysed and transformed into our proposed 
web service automata (WSA), which in turn are transformed into Promela or 511\" 
models. Promela and SMV are the input languages of SPI~ and NuS11V model check-
ers, respectively. In order to tackle the state space explosion problem of model checking 
in the memory and to speed up the checking performance, some model simplification 
techniques will be introduced for WSA. 
A. Verification of BPEL 
The user selects one or more BPEL models as the system under test (SUT), and 
chooses a model checker. Inside the framework, after the model transformations, the 
model is model-checked against our pre-defined system properties such as clcadlock-
free and live-lock free (see section 5.4). If the model violates the properties, the 
framework outputs counterexamples. Thereafter, the user can modify and refine the 
BPEL models based on the counterexamples. This verification process continues until 
no counterexample exists. 
B. Test Case Generation 
The user selects one or more verified BPEL models as the SUT, picks a pre-defined 
test coverage criterion, and chooses a model checker. Inside the framework, the se-
lected test coverage criterion is encoded into a set of trap properties. After the model 
transformations, the model is model-checked against the trap properties (see :-iection 
5.5). A set of counterexamples will be generated. The transition IDs can be retrievC'd 
from the counterexamples. By the transition IDs, we can get the inputs, guards, and 
outputs of the corresponding transitions from WSA. Also, the message types of the 
inputs and outputs can be extracted from the WSDL interface. As a consequence, the 
test framework will produce BPEL based test cases that enable the user to input tl':-it 
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data. After executing the test cases, the user can verify whether the responses from 
the BPEL model are operating as expected. 
If the user wants to verify the individual operations of a published remote web 
services, a WSDL model can be selected. The framework produces test cases that 
enable the user to enter the service address and input the request data. After executing 
the test cases, the user can verify whether the responses from the remote service are as 
expected. 
5.3 Model Transformation 
In this section, we will first introduce how to simplify WSA for the purpose of improving 
the performance of model checking. Afterwards, we will briefly describe the mapping 
from WSA to Promela and from WSA to SMV. Finally, we will demonstrate how to 
enforce model checkers to explore all alternative paths, in the absence of actual input 
data values. 
5.3.1 Model Simplification in WSA 
Abstraction is important for formal analysis with model checking techniques. In WSA, 
the complex data type and the concrete data value of BPEL variables will be abstracted; 
also the BPEL predicates will be abstracted. The abstraction will not hinder the 
model checking but will help to speed up the model checking. To further simplify the 
model those redundant transitions and states related to faults and interruptions will 
, 
be removed. The model reduction can alleviate the state explosion problem inherent 
of model checking techniques. 
A. Abstraction of BPEL Predicates 
We introduce a symbolic predicate for those decision points where the no con-
crete value of message is available by the time of analysis. From the point of \"icw 
of model verification and testing, such a decision point could be considered a :-;ym-
bolic predicate which may equally be true or false. For example, in the loanapproval 
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example, the receive activity has two guarded outgoing links, where the guards are 
request.amount < 10000 and request. amount 2:: 10000. Here request is a BPEL vari-
able, which is assigned a value by a message from an external service. Since the act ual 
value of request is not determined by the time of static analysis, we use symbolic predi-
cates predl' pred2 to abstract the actual guards. Since the values of symbolic predicates 
would be equally true or false, the values of pred1 , pred2 can be (1,0), (0,1), (1, 1), (0,0) 
where 1,0 denote true and false respectively. However, pred1 ,pred2 is not allowed to 
be true or false at the same time, because the guards of outgoing links in an activity 
should be mutual exclusive. Therefore, some logical constraints need to be added to 
the symbolic predicates. In the example, the logical constraint is pred1 =1= pred2 . 
A symbolic predicate will be introduced at the control decision points of a BPEL 
model, where the condition expressions are explicitly modelled. The control deci-
sion points include the condition expressions in the transition Condition attribute of 
a sourceLink, in the condition of a while activity, and in the case and otherwise con-
structs of a switch activity. The predicate logical constraints can be automatically 
derived from the BPEL model, according to the following rules: 
• For the transition Conditions of sourceLinks in an activity, a symbolic predicate 
is introduced for each transitionCondition. These predicates should be mutual 
exclusive. Suppose pl,p2,p3 are the predicates, the logical constraint should be 
(pl/\ -.(p2 V p3)) V (p2/\ -.(pl V p3)) V (p3/\ -.(pl V p2)). 
• For the condition of a while activity, two mutual exclusive symbolic predicates 
are introduced. Let pI, p2 be the predicates. The logical constraint should be 
(pl/\ -.p2) V (p2/\ -.pl). 
• For the condition expressions in the case and otherwise constructs of a switch 
activity, a symbolic predicate is instroduced for each of them. Let pi denote a 
condition expression, where Pi, 1 ~ i ~ n -1, and Pn are the condition expressions 
of case and otherwise, respectively. The logical constraint should be (-,pl /\])2) V 
(-.(pl V p2) /\ p3) V (-.(pl V p2 V p3) /\ p4) .. V .. -'(Pn-2 V Pn-l V Pn). 
98 
5.3 Model Transformation 
Note that the above rules aim not to derive the logical constraints for all predi-
cates in a BPEL model. A specific tool is required to compute the predicate logical 
relationships precisely. 
B. Abstraction of BPEL Variable Types and Values 
A BPEL variable can be declared as one of the three types: \i\"SDL message t,"pe, 
XML Schema element, and XML Schema type. A WSDL message type and a Xl\IL 
element must be a complex type, while a XML Schema type can be either a simple or 
complex type. A complex type is a type with enclosed elements. \Vithout consideration 
of data type abstraction, two problems occur: 1) If the variable is a \\'SDL message 
type, we need to search the WSDL model for the declaration of such a message type, 
so that such a variable can be declared as a complex type in Promela or Sl\IV; 2) In 
SMV modules, for a variable with a complex type in an assignment expression or in a 
message sending, all the enclosed elements need to be parsed and handled one by one. 
Since such additional modelling heavily complicates the Promela and Sl\IV models and 
slows down the model checking,we abstract the complex types into abstract types 
without enclosed elements. An abstract type corresponds to the BPEL variable's type 
name itself. For instance, if a BPEL variable is declared as a WSDL message type 
orderDetails, the corresponding abstract type is orderDetails. So the \VSDL model 
does not need to include data type definitions in the mapping from BPEL to \\'SA. 
Since the data type is abstracted, the data value also needs to be abstracted. For 
instance, a BPEL variable request has data type creditInformationMessage, which is 
a complex type with element amount. There may exist request. amount in the modeL 
we simply abstract it into the BPEL variable itself request. In the case that a BPEL 
variable is assigned a value, we abstract the actual data value into defined. This ab-
straction will influence the predicate evaluation. With the above snnbolic: pn'<iicat('s, 
the abstraction of data value has no side-effect for model checking. 
C. Removal of Fault and Stop Propagations 
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As illustrated in section 4.4, the models with consideration of fault and interrup-
tions are significantly larger than the ones with only normal scenarios. If no fault 
can be thrown in a BPEL model, then any fault propagation related transitions and 
states of compound machines can be left out. Furthermore, if no fault is thrown and 
no terminate activity exists in a BPEL model, then the transitions and states related 
either to fault or stop propagation can be left out. As a result, the model size can be 
drastically reduced. 
5.3.2 From BPEL to WSA 
The detailed mapping from BPEL to WSA has been covered in chapter 4. The WSA 
has two purposes: 1) to define the operational semantics for BPEL models, and 2) 
to clarify the BPEL verification and test case generation problem at hand. \Ve be-
lieve it is essential to introduce the WSA as the intermediate representation between 
BPEL and model checkers. When the intermediate layer is not included, the complex 
BPEL features need to be analysed and modelled in the input languages of different 
model checkers. Also we need to consider how to simplify the model for each input 
language in order to alleviate the state explosion problem. This heavily complicates 
the model transformation, which may increase the possibility of error model transfor-
mations. When the intermediate layer is included, the BPEL features only need to be 
analysed and modelled in WSA once. As a non-hierarchical automaton model, WSA 
can be easily transformed to the automata-based input models of most model checkers. 
Therefore, this additional automaton layer not only reduces the cost of model checking 
BPEL but also enables a wider choice of model checking engines. , 
5.3.3 From WSA to Promela 
Promela is the input language of SPIN model checker. A Promela model can con-
tain three different types of objects: processes, variables, and message channels. All 
processes are global objects. The scope of a variable is global if it is defined outside a 
process declaration and local if it is defined within a process declaration. The data type 
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chan specifies message channels. The behaviour of a process is declared in a proctype 
block. The atomic sequence allows the enclosed statements to execute as one indivisible 
unit, non-interleaved with any other processes. The symbolic names used in the model 
can be declared either globally or locally in a mtype block. A user-defined type can be 
declared in a typedef block. An init process is required in each Promela model to start 
the proctype processes. Since Promela supports message communication via channels, 
it is straightforward to transform WSA to Promela. We can model the propositional 
operators on input events indirectly in Promela. For events with logical-AND elf\. e2, 
it is modelled as e1; e2. For events with logical-OR e11e2, an if construct can be used. 
For events with logical-NOT e1f\.-,e2, it can be modelled as e1; empty(channele2) where 
the function empty ( channele2) checks whether the queue for e2 is empty. 
In our transformation, each WSA machine corresponds to a proctype process. The 
incoming queues of each machine are declared as a set of global chan types, The in-
coming and outgoing events are denoted as channe1i? e, channelj!e respectively, where 
channeli, channelj correspond to the incoming queues of machine M i , M j respectively. 
Each process consists of two parts: 1) the variable declaration part, and 2) the be-
havioural modelling part. In the first part, the states, transition IDs (e.g. ti), and 
local variables of a machine are declared. In the second part, the transition relations 
are modelled, which are enclosed in a do loop. The if construct enables the selection 
of an enabled transition, or the selection of a true-value guard. In a transition, if 1) the 
incoming events are available and the propositional logic of the events are true, and 2) 
the guard is evaluated to true, then an atomic unit will be executed: the transition is 
enabled, the action is taken, and the machine moves to the next state. 
An example is shown in Fig 5.3. On the left is the Promela code for the process 
machine of the loan approval example. A global mtype declares the symbolic names 
of states, messages, and BPEL variable types that need to be used in the model. 
The process machine has two incoming queues, where the adminQ receives start or 
stop messages from others machines, and the doneQ receives the flow machine's done 
message. It can send a start message to the adminQ of the flow machine. On the right 
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mtype{nil, sO,s3 ,start ,done ,creditl nformationM essage}' 
proctype loanapproval(chan loanapproval_adminO, , 
} 
loanapprovaUlowDoneO,fiow_adminOX 
mtype state =sO; 
boo I t_O_O; 
bool U_1; 
do 
::state ==sO-> 
if 
::loanapprovaLadminO?start -> atomic( 
fi 
::state ==s1·> 
if 
fiow_adminOlstart; 
t_ 0_0 = 1; state = s1 ;} 
::loanapprovaLfiowDoneQ?done -> atomic[ 
t_1_1 = 1; state = s3;} 
fi 
od; 
chan loanapproval_adminO =[0] of{mtype}; 
chan loanapprovaLfiowDoneQ =[1] of{mtype}; 
chan fiow_adminO =[0] of{mlype}; 
init{ 
} 
run loanapproval(loanapproval_adminQ, 
loanapprovaLfiowDoneQ,fiow_adminQ); 
loanapprovaLadminQlstart ; 
(1) 
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::state ==s~> 
if 
::creditinformationMessage_seIO?msg(requesl)-> 
if 
fi 
:: pred_t_3_1 -'> atomic{ 
~eceive _to _assess= 1 ;receive_ 10_ approvaFO; 
~nvoke 2_I~nkWrapper_boolean _ setOlmsg(receive_ to _assess): 
Invoke4_hnkWrapper_boolean_setQlmsg(receive_to_approval~ 
fiow -.recelve1 JinkWrapperDoneQldone; 
t_3_1 = 1; slate = s4;} 
:: pred_t_3_2 -> atomic{ 
fi 
receive _to_approval=1 ;receive_Io _assess=O; 
invoke2_linkWrapper_boolean_setQlmsg(receive_lo_aSSess); 
Invoke4_hnkWrapper_boolean_seIQlmsg(receive to approval~ 
fiow-.receive1JinkWrapperDoneQldone; - -
t_3_2 = 1; stale = s5;} 
(2) 
Figure 5.3: An example of Promela model 
is a code fragment to show the case where the guards are explicitly declared. 
5.3.4 From WSA to SMV 
SMV is the input language of NuSMV. A SMV model is composed of a set of modules 
with the keyword MODULE. The module corresponds to a state machine that has two 
sections VAR and ASSIGN, where the VAR section declares the static part and the 
ASSIGN section declares the behavioural part. We call such a module an S"t\lV machine 
for convenience. A statement FAIRNESS running needs to be included to ensure each 
module corresponding to a state machine can execute fairly. A user-defined data type 
can be also declared as a module. A main module is required in each 8M\' model 
to start the SMV machines. Since 8MV language has no support for channels, the 
input queues of a WSA machine need to be modelled explicitly. \Yhen t he queue is 
implemented with FIFO manipulation, the state space will increase dramat icall~·. Thus. 
we model a queue with a simplified structure which holds only one message. The S:'-l\' 
model supports the propositional operators on input events directly. by u:-;ing L\:.\. ~ for 
AND, OR, NOT respectively. 
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In our transformation, each WSA machine corresponds to a Sr-.IV module. The 
different queue types are defined as SMV modules. The machine input queues are 
declared as one of the defined queue types. In a S~IV machine, the states, transition 
IDs, incoming queues, input events, output events, and local variables of a machine 
are declared in the VAR section. The transition relations are captured in the ASSIG.\ 
section. The next(x) denotes the next value of the x variable, where x can correspond 
to any variables declared in the VAR section. A transition is enabled by eyaluating 
the Boolean value of next(state) = si&next(e)&predi , where Si is the currellt ~tate, 
next( e) is the incoming event, and the predi is the guard. \\'hen the transition is 
enabled, the actions such as assigning values to variables and sending messages can 
be taken. The machine moves from one state to another by evaluating the Boolean 
value of state = Si&ti where Si is the current state and ti is the enabled transition. An 
incoming event becomes true when its queue has been set to true, indicating that the 
event has occurred. The parameter of an incoming event, if any, can be read from its 
queue when the incoming event has become true. On the left of Fig :").-1. the Sr-.l V code 
for the process machine of the loan approval example. 
In a SMV machine, a message with a parameter can be received in two steps: 1) 
the event is set to true when its queue has become true, 2) the parameter value is 
read from its queue when the event has become true. The right of Fig 5.-1 shows a 
fragment of a SMV machine. When the machine receives a message msg(request), 
the event corresponds to an event name msgJequest and a queue msgrequestQ, and 
the parameter corresponds to a parameter name request and a queue requestQ. After 
the next(msgJequest) has been set to true, the request. value can be read from the 
next(requestQ.data.value). The machine sends a message with parameter to a partner 
machine following similar steps, it first sets the partner's event queue to true, and then 
send the parameter value to the parameter queue. 
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MODULE admln Queue 
VAR -
data 
INIT data 
: Lnll,START,STOP}; 
=_nil; 
MODULE boolean Queue 
VAR -
data 
INIT dala 
: boolean; 
= 0; 
~~~ULE loanapproval(loanapprovaUlow} 
--STATES 
state 
--TRANSITIONS 
tOO 
t:':{:1 
: (50,51 ,53); 
: boolean; 
: boolean; 
-- EVENTS 
admin 
done_flow 
-- QUEUES 
admlnQ 
: Lnil, START, STOp}; 
: boolean; 
: admin_Queue; 
loanapproval doneQ flow 
-- INITIALIZATION -
INIT state 
: baolean_ Queue; 
INITt ° ° 
INITt:':1:':1 
INIT admln 
= sO; 
= 0; 
= 0; 
IN IT done flow 
ASSIGN -
--STATES 
next(stale} := case 
--TRANSITIONS 
slate = sO&t ° ° 
state = 51 &t-1-1 
1 --
next(L 0_ 0) := case 
: 51; 
: 53; 
: state; esae; 
next(state) = sO & next(admin = START) : 1; 
1 : t_O _0; esac; 
next(I_1_1) := case 
next(state) = 51 & next(done_flow) :1; 
1 : t 1 l' esac' 
--GET QUEUE MESSAGES - - , , 
nexl(admin) := case 
next(admlnQ.data!= _nil) 
1 
: adminQ.data; 
: admin; esae; 
next(done_flow) := case 
nextQoanapprovaL doneQJlow. data) :1; 
1 : done_flow; esae; 
--SEND MESSAGES TO PARTNER'S INPUT QUEUES 
next(flow.admlnQ.data) := case 
nextLO_O) : START; 
1 : flow.admina.data; esae; 
FAIRNESS running 
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MODULE message 
VAR 
value : Lnil, creditlnfonmationMessage}' 
IN IT value = _nil; , 
~~~ULE message_Queue 
data : message: 
MODULE receive1JinkWrapper(flow,receive1,invoke2JinkWrapper, 
VAR invoke4_tinkWrapper,pred_L3_1,pred_t_3_2} 
- EVENTS 
mS9-request : boolean; 
- QUEUES 
request_Q 
msg_requesL Q 
-- VARIABLES 
: message_Queue; 
: boolean_Queue; 
request 
receive-to-assess 
receive-to-approval 
-- INITIALIZATION 
IN IT msgJequest 
INIT receive-to-assess 
: message; 
: boolean; 
: boolean; 
INIT recelve-IO-<lpproval 
-TRANSITIONS 
next(I_3_1} := case 
=0; 
=0; 
=0; 
~ext(state) =s3 & nexl(msgJequest) & pred_I_3_1 '1. 
t_3_1; esae, 
nexI(t_3_2) := case 
~eXI(Slale) = s3 & next(msgJequest) & pred_I_3_2 : 1: 
-GET QUEUE MESSAGES : 1_3_2; esac; 
nexl(msg_request) := case 
next(msg_,equest_Q.data) : 1. 
1 : msg_reques~ 
--SEND MESSAGES TO PARTNER'S INPUT QUEUES 
esae; 
next(invoke2_linkWrapper.msg receive-ta-assess Q.data) := case 
nextL3_1)lnext(L3_2) - : 1; -
1 : invoke2 JinkWrapper .msg_receiv~to..assess a.data; esae; 
next(invoke2_linkWrapper .receive-to-assess_ O.data} = ~se 
nextL3_1) : 1; 
. 1 : invoke2JlnkWrapper.receive-lo-assess_Q.data; esae; 
nexl(lnvoke4_linkWrapper.ms9_receive-te>approval_Q.data) := case 
nextL3_1}lnext(t_3_2) : 1; 
1 : invoke4JinkWrapper.mS9-.receive-to-approval a.data: esac; 
next(invoke4_linkWrapper .receive-ta-approvaL Q.data) ;= Case 
nextL3_2) : 1; 
1 : invoke4JinkWrapper.receive-to-approval_Q.dala esac; 
-UPDATE VARIABLES 
nexl(requesl.value) := case 
next(msILrequest) : nexl(requesLQ·dala.value); 
1 : request.value; esac: 
next(receive-to-assess) := case 
nextL3_1) : 1; MODULE main 
VAR 
loan approval 
flow 
nextL3_2) : 0; 
: process loanapproval(loanapproval_flow); 1 : recelve-to-assess; 
: process f1ow(loanapproval,receive1JinkWrapper, next(receive-ta-approval) := case 
esac; 
Invoke2_lInkWrapper .lnvoke4_lInkWrapper); nextL3_1) 
ASSIGN 
next(loanapproval.admlnQ.data):= START; 
nextL3_2) 
1 
: 0; 
:1; 
: receive-to-approvat 
Figure 5.4: An example of SMV model 
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esae; 
In model checking, two kinds of system properties can be verified: general properties 
and model-specific properties. We do not consider model-specific properties because 
such properties are user-defined, so the user needs to have knowledge of temporal logic. 
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5.4.1 Pre-checking Illegal Cross-boundary Links 
In our framework, the illegal cross boundary links can be pre-checked in the first stage 
of analysing BPEL, so that the errors can be identified in the earliest stage. According 
to section 12.5 of BPEL1.1 [10], a link is said cross the boundary of a syntactic construct 
if the source (resp. target) activity for the link is nested within the construct but tlll' 
target (resp. source) activity is not. A link must not cross the boundar~' of a while 
activity, a serialisation scope, an eventHandler, or a compensationHandler. Also, a link 
that crosses a faultHandler boundary must be outbound. 
This checking can be done by getting the machine sequences for the flow links from 
the internal data exchange model (see section 4.2.3). Let l be defined in machine ,:\11 
and used in machine M4. Suppose the machine sequence for l is (.i\h, jh, i\h, ,,\1.1), 
this indicates that M I , M4 must not be the machines at the same level, if i\h, j[1 arc 
same-level-machines then MI will send the msg(l) to 1114 directly. Thus, one of i\h, Ah 
or both of them may be the parent nodes of lIh, or be the parent nodes of A14 · In 
either case, the link is cross boundary. Therefore, in the machine sequence for link l, 
if there exists a sub-sequence with one or more machines between the machine that 
defines l and the machine that uses l, then it indicates that l is cross boundary. 
In the case that the above sub-sequence contains a machine corresponding to t he 
while, serialisation scope, eventHandler, or compensationHandler activity, then the 
cross boundary link is illegal. In the case that the above sub-sequence cont ains a 
machine M corresponding to the faultHandler activity, and 1\1 is the parent node of 
the machine that uses l, then such cross boundary link is illegal and must be outbound. 
In either case an error will arise in the machine sequence. , 
5.4.2 Model Checking BPEL General Properties 
In our framework, we embedded a set of model-independent properties. so that they 
can be checked automatically during the model verification phase. 
A. Deadlocks 
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A deadlock is defined as two machines waiting for input from each other the S\'stem , , 
is unable to perform a transition. A state S is deadlock when S has no next state (i.e. 
no outgoing transition) and S is not a final state. A machine is deadlock-free if it has 
no deadlock state. A machine is terminating if one of its final states is finally reached. 
Since a machine with deadlock states cannot terminate as it cannot reach any of its 
final states, this indicates that a terminating machine is deadlock-free. So we can llSC 
such a machine terminating property to indicate a machine is deadlock-free. The BPEL 
process is said to be deadlock-free if all related machines are terminating, which can be 
described as {O Sfi} in LTL, and {EFs fi } in CTL, where Sfi = Sfil V .. E SliT! IS one 
of the final states of machine Mi· 
SPIN checks the deadlock and livelock by default, so no explicit termporal logic 
formula or configuration setting is required. In NuSMV, CTL formula can be used for 
deadlock and livelock detection. Let M be a machine with final states s /1, S /2, the 
deadlock-free formula for this machine is: SPECEF(M.state = sfl\J\J·state = S/2). 
Alternatively, the NuSMV 2.4 provides the check-f sm command to check the transition 
relation for totality. If the transition relation is not total then a potential deadlock state 
is shown. 
B. Unreachable Activities 
In the context of BPEL, we are only interested in checking the reachability of BPEL 
activities. A BPEL activity is reachable if it can eventually be executed, which means 
that the initial state of its corresponding machine can be reached. In \VSA, we have 
two kinds of supporting machines for BPEL activities: linkWrapper and compensate-
Manager machines. They need not be checked for the reachability of a BPEL activit."'. 
On one hand, an activity with target links can execute only when its join-cofl(iIt ion 
is satisfied by the incoming links. In WSA, all the incoming and outgoing links of all 
activity are handled in a linkWrapper machine. In the linkWrapper machine. if the 
. . d't" 1 ated to true then it starts the core machine. Therefore, tu check Jom-con '/, wn IS eva u , 
whether an activity is executable, we only need to check whether its core machilll' call 
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be started, so that its initial state can be reached. On the other hand, since compen-
sateManager machine is started to handle compensateHandler invocation, it will not 
influence the reachability of any BPEL activity. 
The reachability of all BPEL activities can be described as {O sod in LTL. and 
{EFsOi )} in CTL, where SOi is the initial state of machine ~l\Ji, and !IIi is not a link\\'rap-
per or compensateManager machine. This property is subsumed by deadlock-free check-
ing. 
C. Uninstantiated Data 
An assertion for a variable x enforces that as long as x is used, x needs to be 
previously defined. An assertion will be added for BPEL variables and target links. 
A false assertion of a BPEL variable indicates that the corresponding activity B that 
defines the variable is missing, B is not reachable, or B is deadlock. A false assertion of 
a target link indicates that a corresponding source link is missing, or there exist cyclic 
link dependencies. A cyclic link dependency can cause an unreachable activity. In 
[11], they point out that the assertions can also detect the interaction between BPEL 
control dependencies and data dependencies. An example is that a switch activity that 
encloses activities A and B, where B needs to use a variable x defined by A. By adding 
an assertion for x in B, the assertion can never be true such that the bad interaction 
between control and data dependencies can be detected. 
It can be observed that checking BPEL data dependencies for errors is very useful. 
In Promela, an assert(x! = nil) for variable :r needs to be added after receiving message 
msg(x), so that the SPIN can automatically check the assertions. If the assertion is 
not true, SPIN will report errors. In NuSMV, an CTL formula based assertion can be 
appended to a module: SPECAF(x! = null). 
D. Illegal Simultaneously-enabled Transitions 
In section 11.4 of BPEL 1.1 [10], the semantics is undefined when a process 1lI 
which two or more receive activities for the same partnerLink. portType. operation 
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and correlation sets may be simultaneously enabled. This constraint is also applied 
to the onMessage clause in a pick or eventHandler activity. There can ne\"er be two 
simultaneously running activities that write the same data. This problem has been 
pointed out in [46]. For multiple concurrently running machines, in their composed 
machine, there may exist a state with multiple simultaneously enabled outgoing tran-
sitions. Fig 5.5 shows an example. Let machine Mo contains a transition to from S02 
to S03, and machine MOl contains a transition tl from S12 to S13. \Vhen they run 
concurrently, the corresponding composed machine has a state (S02' S03) with simulta-
neously enabled transitions to and tl' The simultaneously enabled transitions can be 
categorised into three cases: 1) to, t1 have no receive event but the guards that can 
simultanousely true; 2) to, tl have different receive event lists el and e2; 3) to, h haw 
the same receive event list e. From definition 3 of section 3, the state (S02' S03) of cast' 
(1)(3) have non-deterministic transitions. In case (2), if both ?el: '?f2 are available, then 
the machine consumes one of them randomly. According to the above BPEL semantics, 
it allows case (1)(2) but not case (3). So we need to define a property for case (:)) to 
detect such illegal transitions, which can be described as [].(ti.1 /\ ti.2 /\ .. ti.n) in LTL, 
and AG.(ti.1/\ ti.2/\ .. ti.n) in CTL, where ti.l, k2, .. , ti.n is the set of outgoing evellts of 
a state Si that have the same receive event list. 
~ MO~~ 
Figure 5.5: Simultanously enabled transitions 
E. Illegal Inter-process Interactions 
In the inter-process interactions, the causal relationships bet \\"cell incoming and 
outgoing messages must be maintained. One solution is to choose multiple BPEL 
models as the SUT, and check the composite machines against deadlock. A light\\'eight 
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solution is to pre-check the possible conflicts before composition, using the anti-patterns 
proposed in section 3.4.2. 
5.5 BPEL Test Case Generation 
We apply the structural test coverage criteria to multiple machines. State and transition 
coverages are used for BPEL control flow testing, and all-du-path coverage is used for 
BPEL data flow testing. The variables and flow-links declared in BPEL models will be 
considered in data flow testing. We are interested in testing tIll' whole BPEL model. 
According to the machine hierarchy of the previous section, a test case should st art and 
end with the BPEL process machine Mproe. Following the propagation of the start and 
done messages between parent machines and child machines, we may assume without 
loss of generality that in the machine hierarchical graph, every machine is reachable 
from the BPEL process machine, and that the BPEL process machine is reachable from 
every machine. 
In the following definitions, let a BPEL process P associated with a set of machines 
{MI' .. , M n, Mproe}· 
Definition 24. A test case (or test path) of a BPEL process P starts from the initial 
state of M proe , and ends at one of the final states of AIproc-
Definition 25. A test suite covers a state s if there is at least one test case in the 
test suite that executes s. A test suite is said to achieve state coverage of a BPEL 
process P if it covers each state s E SlIIi·AIi E {l\h, .. , AIn , AIproc }. 
Definition 26. A test suite covers a transition t if there is at least one test case in 
the test suite that executes t. A test suite is said to achieve transition coverage of a 
BPEL process P if it covers each transition t E TIII; . lUi E V\h, .. , JIn, JIproc}, 
Data flow testing is interesting because it stimulates the sequences of operations 
h · h d fi d b tly use variable values It is an effectiw ~\'stClllilti(' IIwthod w lC e ne an su sequen . . 
f . f It D the du path coverage we adopt the definition from [[l1]. Let or exposmg au s. ror - , 
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x be a variable. A du-pair of x is a transition pair (ti' tj) where ti is with df(x) and tj 
is with us(x). A def-clear path with respect to x is a transition sequence (t l , t2 . .. , tn) 
where there is no df(x) in any of the transitions t2, t3'" tn-I. A data flow (or du-path) 
of x is a transition sequence such that (ti' tj) is a du-pair and there is a def-clear path 
from ti to tj for x. 
Note that we are only interested in the BPEL variables explicitly declared in a 
BPEL model (denoted as Vbpel) , and the data dependency between BPEL activities. 
Therefore, in our all-du-path coverage criterion, we only consider du-pairs {(ti, tj)lti E 
M i , tj E M j , i =I=- j} with respect to v where v E Vbpel. 
Definition 27. A test suite covers a du-path ph of a variable v E Vbpel if there is at 
least one test case in the test suite that executes ph. A test suite is said to achieve 
all-du-path coverage of a BPEL process P if it covers each du-path of each v E Vbpel. 
5.5.1 Test Coverage Criteria in Trap Properties 
Test Coverage Criteria in Trap Properties. Now we can encode the test coverage 
criteria into CTL and LTL temporal logic. [3:3] gives a detailed study of encoding 
various structural test coverage criteria into CTL. Based on their work, the negation of 
state, transition, and all-du-path coverage criteria are encoded into the CTL formulas 
as follows. Here M is a web service automaton . 
• {-.EF(ti 1\ EF sf)} where ti E TM, sf E SfMproc . 
• {-.EF(ti 1\ EX E[-.d(v)U(tj I\EF sf)])} where v E VM,ti E d(v),tj E u(v).sf E 
SfMproc' 
Suppose M is a web service automaton. The negation of state, transition, 
all-du-path coverage criteria are encoded into the LTL formulas as follows. 
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In SPIN model checker, each LTL formula needs to be converted into a Buchi 
A utomaton enclosed in a never claim. Since a never claim is to negate the enclosed 
Buchi automata, the input LTL formula for SPIN model checker should be the original 
property (the non-negated one). In Promela, we attach a never claim, corresponding to 
the user selected test coverage criterion, to the Promela model generated from \YSA. 
and use #define to declare the elements required in the never claim. Fig 5.6 (a) sho\\"~ 
a never claim for covering a state and a final state of the process machine. (>(p 1\ (>q) 
is the LTL formula for the enclosed Buchi Automaton. p denotes a state of a machine 
and q denotes a final state of the process machine. According to the above LTL state 
coverage, a set of the negations of such LTL formulas can provide state coverage of the 
BPEL model. Since SPIN can only verify one property in a run, SPIN needs to run II 
times for n pairs of (p, q). 
NuSMV model checker accepts either LTL or CTL formulas, and a formula ~tarts 
with the keyword SPEC in SMV models. Fig 5.6 (b) shows a CTL formula declaration 
for covering a state and a final state of the process machine. According to the above 
CTL state coverage, a set of such CTL formulas can provide state coverage of the BPEL 
model. Since NuSMV can verify more than a single property in a run, S~lV only needs 
to run once for a set of CTL formulas. 
#define p Qoanapproval_f1ow_receive1 :state == 52) 
#define q Qoanapproval:slate == s31110anapproval:stale == 51) 
(a) never { /* <>(p &&q) */ 
TO init: 
- if 
:: ((P) && (q))-> goto accept_all 
:: (1) -> golo TOJnit 
fi; 
accepLall: 
skip 
} 
(b) SPEC !EF Qoanapproval_f1ow~eceive1.stale = 52 
& EF 10anapprovaLsiate = s3110anapprovaLstate=s1) 
Figure 5.6: An example of state coverage 
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5.5.2 Symbolic Test Case Generation 
In a state machine with symbolic predicates (see section 5.3), in order to enforce a 
model checker to explore alternative paths, the predicates of different paths need to be 
true alternatively. This requires the values of symbolic predicates to be equally true 
or false. We apply Gray code (e.g. [8]) to compute the combinations of predicates, 
where two successive values differ in only one digit. With all thl' c()lllbillati()ll~, the 
model checkers can explore all the paths of a model. For two symbolic predicates 
pred1 ,pred2, the two-bit Gray code matrix is (pred1 ,pred2 ) : (0,0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (1,0). 
Here 1,0 denote Boolean true and false, respectively. After all the possible combillations 
of predicates have been calculated, we can apply the logical constraints introduced in 
section 5.3 to remove illegal combinations. In the case that pred1 , pred2 are mutually 
exclusive, the combinations (0,0), (1, 1) can be removed. 
The corresponding Promela code is shown below on the left of Fig 5.7. First, each 
symbolic predicate predi is declared as a global Boolean variable. Second, a Gray code 
matrix is constructed based on the declared symbolic predicates, the logical constraints 
on the predicates, if any, can be applied to the Gray code matrix. Third, two processes 
will be inserted into the Promela model: a runner process that assigns predicate values 
based on the above Gray code matrix, and a chooser process that chooses the current 
combination of predicates. The chooser process will be started by the init process . 
• ·Predicate Relationships 
·-pred1 1= pred2 
MODULE runner 
VAR 
pred1 : boolean; 
bool pred1 pred2 : boolean; 
boo I pred2 i: 1 . .2; 
f" Predicate Relationships ASSIGN 
pred1 1= pred2 " next(pred1) := case 
proctype runner(byte type) { i = 1 : 1; 
if i=2 :0; esac; 
:: type == 1·> atomic {pred1 = 1 ; pred2 = O;} next(pred2):= case 
:: type == 2-> atomic {pred1 = 0; pred2 = 1 ; } i = 1 : 0; 
} i = 2 : 1 ; esac; 
proctype chooser() ( next(i) := case 
run runner(1) ; i = 2 : 1; 
run runner(2) ; 1 : i + 1, esac; 
} FAIRNESS running 
Figure 5.7: An example of predicate handling 
Similarly, the SMV code is shown on the right of Fig 5.7. A runntT module d('dar(':-; 
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the symbolic predicates. After the Gray code matrix has been constructed based on 
the declared symbolic predicates, the logical constraints on the predicates, if an:,. can 
be applied to the Gray code matrix. Thereafter, the ASSIGN section will be inserted 
into the runner module, so that the runner can choose the current combination of 
predicates. The runner process will be started by the main module. 
5.5.3 From Counterexamples to Test Cases 
The test cases retrieved from counterexamples are called BPEL based test cases. The 
BPEL based test cases focus on the sequencing of invocations of the provided services. 
The transition names (ti) are modelled explicitly in Promela and SMV models, so that 
a transition name list can be retrieved from the generated counterexample. A test case 
can be derived from the transition name list, by extracting the corresponding transition 
input events, guards, actions, and output events from the associated WSA model and 
getting the message types of the inputs and outputs from the WSDL interface. A test 
case consists of a set of execution paths of the BPEL. The BPEL test generation is a 
kind of white-box testing that analyses the internal process definition. 
5.6 WSDL Test Case Generation 
The test cases generated from WSDL cover validation of single operations. The execu-
tion of test cases will invoke remote operations provided by the services. This kind of 
test case checks whether the implemented service operations conform to the published 
service modelled in WSDL. Note that the WSDL test generation is a kind of black-box 
testing that anlayses the service interface definition. 
5.7 Summary 
I th O h t presented an integrated verification and test framework for BPEL. n IS c ap er, we " , 
. d 1 h k' The framework allows the user to choose the sl'n'icl' under test usmg mo e c ec mg. 
(SUT), so that one or more BPEL models can be verified and be used to generat(' 1(':-;1 
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cases. For verification, both the illegal interactions of an intra-process or inter-processes 
can be verified. For test case generation, one or multiple BPEL processes can be tested. 
In the verification phase, a set of errors is automatically checked, including illegal cross-
boundary links, deadlocks and livelocks, unreachable activities, non-instantiate data, 
and illegal simultaneously-enabled transitions. In the testing phase, to test a BPEL 
program thoroughly, we need to cover different execution scenarios. So we apply the 
conventional test coverage criteria such as state, transition, and du-path coverage to 
thoroughly test the BPEL program. The generated BPEL based test cases can check 
the conformance of web service behaviour. The user can also test the conformance 
of the functions of the web services with the published WSDL interfaces. In the next 
chapter, we will introduce the tool architecture of our test framework, and demonstrate 
our approach via case studies. 
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Case Studies and Tool Support 
In the previous chapter, we presented our model-checking based test fralllC'work that 
can test single or multiple BPEL processes, by verifying general model properties. alld 
generating test cases based on structural coverage criteria. In this chapter, wc will 
use classic BPEL case studies to illustrate the modeling of BPEL processes in web 
service automata, and to evaluate the df<'ctiveness of our test framework. Then, w(' 
will provide a brief description of the tool support. 
6.1 Case Studies 
Our test framework supports verification of general properties and test case generation 
for BPEL processes. In the verification phase, firstly the pre-checking checks that there 
are no illegal cross boundary links in the SUT BPEL process. Secondly, by running 
the model checker, three general properties will be checked: deadlock-freedom, unin-
stantiated data freedom, and illegal simultaneously-enabled transitions freedom. ~ill(,(' 
the checkings for general properties in the verification phase are done automatically. 
we will focus on test case generation in the case studies. 
Every web service shall have its own business logics, so a web service should \)(' 
associated with a behavioral model in addition to the web servicC' interfacl' description. 
BPEL is a well known language for web sC'n'ice orchestration, and it is rich enough to 
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describe the behaviours of single services. We suppose a web service is associated with 
two models: a BPEL process as the behavioural model, and a WSDL description as the 
interface. In BPEL standard [10], four examples are provided: loan approval service, 
ordering service, shipping service, and auction service. The loan approval service covers 
flow activities with links. The ordering service covers sequence and flow activities with 
cross boundary links. The shipping service covers sequence and switch activities. The 
auction service covers flow and sequence activities. We will use the loan approval service 
as the main running example to illustrate how to model the BPEL processes in our web 
service automata, and show the difference between choosing single and multiple BPEL 
processes as the service under test (SUT). We will illustrate the ordering service and 
shipping service in brief. 
As covered in section 4.1.1, the hierarchical BPEL activities can be modeled as 
the relationships between parent and child machines. For the sake of simplicity, in this 
chapter, we use tree diagrams to represent both. For BPEL activities, a tree node 
denotes an activity, and a tree edge denotes the enclosement of activities. For WSA 
machines, a tree node denotes a machine, and a tree edge denotes the parent and child 
relationship of machines. 
6.1.1 Loan Approval 
The loan approval example includes four web services: customer, approval, assessor, 
and approver. The approval service acts as the orchestration service to interact with 
other services. The BPEL standard provides a BPEL process approval for the loan 
approval example. The business scenarios of the approval service is illustrated in part 
(1) of Fig 6.1. The approval service starts by receiving a request from the customer. 
If the request is less than 10000, it forwards the requests to the assessor; otherwise it 
forwards the request to the approver. The assessor evaluates the request and returns 
a risk result. The approver evaluates the request and returns an approved result. 
When the returned risk from the assessor is low then the approval service replies the 
customer by a granted loan; otherwise if the returned risk from the assessor is high, 
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the approval service calls the approver. After getting response from the approver, the 
approval service replies the customer of the loan decision. In addition to the approval 
service, the assessor and approver must have some business logics to decide whether 
an incoming request has high risk or low risk, and whether a high risk request can be 
granted. We add BPEL processes for the assessor and approver services. The business 
scenarios are shown in parts (2)(3) of Fig 6.1. 
service 
customer 
service 
service 
req 
approval 
(1) 
assessor approver 
service 
(2) service 
Figure 6.1: The business scenarios of the loan approval example 
(3) 
Fig 6.2 shows the hierarchical BPEL activities of the approval process. On the left 
hand side, the approval service uses a flow activity with links to control the enclosed 
concurrently running activities. On the right hand side, the assessor or approver service 
has a sequence activity to control the execution sequence of the enclosed activities, and 
uses a switch activity to decide whether to assign a high risk (resp. yes info) or a low 
risk (resp. no info) as the result. 
l::'}·~ process :ij 
s··~ flolJ 
.~ receive 
.l~ invoke Assessor 
.l~ invokeApprover 
.. ~ assign 
.~ reply 
~ "1.~ proee:::::: 
i2 ... ~ sequence 
1Ic~ receive 
8· ~ switch 
: .. -~ assignl 
, .~ assign2 
-co reply 
Figure 6.2: The BPEL activity hierarachy of approval, assessor, and approver 
To model the BPEL activities in WSA machines, basically each BPEL acti\'ity IS 
associated with a machine. An activity with source or target flow links is mapped to a 
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linkWrapper machine and a core machine. The parent and child relationships of \YSA 
machines is shown in Fig 6.3. 
;:;-1:1", r If' 
s~ flow 
'i'·'~, rece i veL inkTJrapper 
! ... ~ receive 
'~. "i~ invokeAssessorLinkTJrapper 
1 "l~ invokeAsseS8or 
:': ·l~ invokeApproverLinkTJrapper 
:" ..• ~ invokeApprover 
r+"t: ass iqnLinkTJrapper 
, "1~ assign 
'~. "l~ rep 1 yL inkTJrapper 
·1~ reply 
. .,.. 
' . .1 process 
S; .. ~ sequence 
~ receive 
~ .:~ switch 
~ assignl 
II-r~ assiqn2 
.,~ reply 
Figure 6.3: The machine relationships of approval, assessor, and approver services 
A. Single BPEL Process as the SUT 
When the approval BPEL process is selected as the SUT, the customer, assessor, 
and approver become testers. According to rule 1 of the section 4.2.3, the machine 
du-pairs and machine exchange sequences can be derived for BPEL variables and flow 
links. The graphical view of the internal data exchange model for the approval process 
is shown in the middle of Fig 6.4. 
assessor 
receive 
IinkWrapper (M0 
req,j1. - - ...c.eq,12 
- -
r-----~--~ ~- ~~--~ 
invokeAssessor 13 
IinkWrapper (fvh) 
..... 14 
Figure 6.4: Global data exchange model 
approver 
• For variable req, the machine du-pairs are (1\h, 1\[..), (1\h, 1\18). The machine 
sequences are (MI' M2, M3, M4) and (MI' M2, 1\h, 1\18)' 
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• For variable risk, the machine du-pair is (M4, M3). The machine sequence is 
(M4,M3). 
• For variable info, the machine du-pair are (M6, MlO), (M8, MlO). The machine 
sequences are (M8, M7, Mg , MlO) and (M6, M5, Mg , MlO). 
• For links h, l2, l3, l4, l5, l6, the machine du-pairs are the same as the machine se-
quences, which are (M2, M3) , (M2' M7), (M3, M7), (M3, M5),(M5, ]"1g), (~~h. ],,19 ), 
respectively. 
According to the du-pairs of BPEL variables and links, the assertions for BPEL 
variables flow links will be added to transitions where the variables are used. 
The machines for the approval process is shown in Fig 6.5. In the diagram, we 
use LW as short for linkWrapper. In the receive, invokeAssessor, invokeApprover, and 
reply machines, when it interacts with a machine of the external BPEL process and 
that process is not a part of the SUT, then the partner machine is simply named tester. 
In WSA machines, four symbolic predicates are introduced: the receive linkWrapper 
has predicates predl,pred2 where pred1 =J pred2, and the invokeAssessor linkWrapper 
has predicates pred3,pred4 where pred3 =J pred4· 
When the assessor process is chosen as the SUT, the graphical view of the internal 
data exchange model for the approval process is shown on the left of Fig 6.4. For req: 
(MI' M2)' For risk: (M3, M2, M5) and (M4, M2, M5)' According to the internal-data-
exchange machine sequences and the mapping rules of BPEL to WSA, the assessor 
process can be transformed into the state machines in Fig 6.6. Similarly, the machine 
can be derived in the same way when the approver process is chosen as SUT. Since all 
the BPEL features are analysed and captured in WSA, the transformation from \\'SA 
to Promela or SMV are straight away. 
Next, we can enter the stage of test case generation. Fig 6.7 shows three scenarios 
when the approval, assessor, and approver are selected as the SUT respectively. The 
edge with arrow from a tester to the SUT denotes a test input to the SUT, and the 
edge with arrow from the SUT to a tester denotes a test output from SeT. The te:-;t 
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to.1: sO->s2, ?start /fIowlstart 
12.4: s2->s7,flow?done 
flow machine: 
~tO~12'y:\ ~
to.1: sO->s2, process?start I 
receiveLW!start; 
invokeAssessorLW Istart; 
InvokeApproverLW Istart; 
assignLWlstart; replyLWlstart 
12.2: s2->s3, receiveLW?done 
& invokeAssessorLW?done 
& invokeApproverLW? done 
& assignLW?done 
& replyLW?done/processl done 
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invokeAss8SSQrLW machine- t3 2 ~~ loyokeAppmyerlWmacblOeo to 2 1 t3 1 sO s2 s3 s4 ~. 13 sa 52 s3 54 
note: pred3: risk=low; pred4: risk=hlgh not·· 
Iink1:receive-to-assess' link3'assess-to-a . e. .recel o-appro 
link4: assess-lO-setMes~age' . pproval hnk3 :assess-lo-approval; lin kti: approva~to-reply 
to.2: sO->s2, flow?start ' to.2: sO->s2, flow?start 
& invokeReceiver?msg(req) 12&.1. s2->s3. recelVeLW?msg(link2) 
12 l' 2 . recelveLW?msg(req) 
· . s ->s3, recelveLW?msgQink1) [link2*tJe Ilink31=trueJI 
& recelveLW?msg (req)[link1=true]1 invokeAPproverl;tart: InvokeA rove~ 
InvokeAssessorlstart; InvokeAsses50rlmsg(req)t3 l' -">s4' k A r? pp .msg(req) 13 l' . . .,.,. Invo e pprove done 
· '. s3->s4 InvokeAssessor?done & invokeApprover?msgOnf~)1 
& InvokeAssessor?msg(risk)[pred3]1 . link3:=false'link4 .=t' r . hnkS:=true; flow Idone; replyLW 'msg( info) 
· ,. ue. replyLW Imsg OinkS) 
InvokeApproverLWlmsg Oink3); . . 
assignLWlmsg(link4); flow Idone InvokeApprover machine; 
t3.2: s3->s4, invokeAssessor?done ~t()~~~ 
& invokeAssessor?msg(risk)[pred3JI "6
hnk3:=true;hnk4:=false; to. 1: sO->s2. invokeApproverLW?start 
Inv~keApproverLwlmsg Oink3); & invokeApprover7msg(req) 
asslgnLWlmsg(hnk4); flowldone 12.0: s2->s3. [true]1 testerlapprove(req) 
tO~12.£f:\t3~ S ~~
t3.0: s3->s4, tester?approveQnfo) I 
invokeApproverLWlmsg(info); 
invokeApproverLWldone 
replyL W machine' 
note: pred 1: req < 1 0000; 
pred2: req>=1 0000; 
link1 ;receive-te-assess' Iink2:receive-te-approv~1 to .1.: sO- > s2.invokeAssessorLW?start 
to.1; sO->s3, flow?start/receive!start & InvokeAssessorLW?msg(req) 
~t~tLG ~
t3.1: s3->s4, receive?done 12.0: s2->s3, [trueJI testerlcheck(req) 
& receive?msg(req)[pred1 JI t3:0: s3->s4, tester?check(risk) I 
link1 :=true; IInk2:=false; flowl done InvokeAssessorLWlmsg(risk); 
invokeAssessorLWlmsg Oink1); invokeAssessorLW Idone 
invokeApproverLWlmsg(link2); assignLW machine: 
invokeAssessorLWlmsg(req) ~2 12.1 t3. 
t3.2; s3->s4, recelve?done sO s2 s3 s4 
& receive?msg(req)[pred2JI . 
link1 :=false; Iink2:=true; flowl done note: hnk4:assess-te-setMessage; 
invokeAssessorLWlmsg Oink1); IInkS:setMessage-to-reply 
invokeApproverLWlmsg(link2); to.2: sO->s2,flow?start 
invokeApproverLWlmsg(req) 12.1: s2->s3, InvokeAssessorLW?msg Oink4) 
receive machine' Vlnk4=trueJ/asslgnlstart; ~O~~ t3.1: s3->s4 assign?done & assign?msgOnfo)1 
d0-~ linkS:=true; flowldone; replyLWlmsg(linkS) 
to.1: sO->s2, receiveLW?start ~. '. 
12.0: s2->s3, tester?request(req) I sO 52 
receiveLWlmsg(req); 
receiveLWldone to.1: sO->s2, assignLW?start/info:=yes; 
assignLWlmsgOnfo); assignLWldone 
note: linkS:seLMessage-to-reply; 
IlnkS:approval-te-reply 
to.2: sO->s2, 
flow?start & (assignLW7msgQnfo) I 
invokeApproverLW7msg(info) ) 
121: s2->s3, assignLW?msgQinkS) & 
invokeApproverLW7msg(linkS) 
VinkS=true IlinkSI=trueJI 
replylstart; replylmsg(info) 
t3.1: s3->s4 reply?donel flowldone 
Figure 6.5: The machines for the approval BPEL model 
framework can generate a set of test cases based on the selected SUT, where each test 
case corresponds to an execution scenario of a BPEL process. The message types of 
the test inputs and test outputs of a SUT are based on the message type declared in 
WSDL. In a test case, each test output from SUT is asserted to be not null, so that a 
test case fails if not an assertion is violated. 
Since a test case covers a sequence of BPEL activities, III the following, we use a 
sequence of BPEL activities to illustrate a test case. First, when the approl'ul BPEL 
process is selected as the SUT, the test inputs to the SUT would be rtq, risk, app, and 
the test outputs from the SUT would be req, app. "Yhen choosing a control-flow based 
test coverage criterion. three test cases will be generated: 
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process machine: 
"~O tO~012~ V~~ 
to.1:s0->s2. ?start Isequencelstart 
12. 4: s2->s7 ,sequence ?done 
sequence mach',ne: 
~t~1f::'i2~~~.~t~ 
to.1: sO->s2. process?start Ireceivelstart 
t2.2: s2->s3, receive?done Iswitch Istart 
t3.2: s3->s4, switch?done Ireplylstart 
t4.2: 54->55, reply?done IProces~ld n 
switch machine: sO 
pred1: req<2500; pred2: req>=2500 
to.1: sO->s2, sequence?start ~0'1 
& receive?msg(req) 
12.1: 52->53, [pred1]/assign1Istart s2 
12.2: s2->s4, [pred2]1 assign2!start12 ~2 
t3.2: s3->sOO, assign1?done 
& assign1 ?msg(risk) 53 s4 
replylmsg(risk);switch Idone 
t4.2: s4->sOO, assign2?done t3. ~4.2 
& assign2?msg(risk) 
replylmsg( risk) ;switch !done soo 
receive machine" 
~O~~ 
to. 1: sO->s2, sequence?start 
12.0: s2->s3, tester'?check(req)1 
switch ?msg( req);sequence!done 
~:g 
to.1: sO->s2, switch?start I 
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risk:=low; switch1msg(rlsk).swtlch'done 
re:0~~~t~ 
·~~d~ 
to. 1: sO- >s2, sequence ?start 
&switch?msg (nsk )klsk :=risk 
12. 0: s2- >s3, [true]/ testerlcheck( risk); 
sequenceldone 
Figure 6.6: The machines for the assessor or approver BPEL model 
(1 approval 
(SUT) 
Figure 6.7: A single BPEL process as the SUT 
• tel: <receive, invokeAssessor, aSS'lgn, reply>. The alllowed data ranges for t('st 
inputs req, risk are req < 1000, risk = low, respectively. 
• tc2 : <receive, invokeAssessor, invokeApprover, reply>. The allowed data ranges 
are req < 10000, risk = high, and info = yes or info = no. 
• tc3 : <receive, invokeApprover, reply>. The allowed data ranges are req >= 
10000, and info = yes or info = no. 
For example, the test input and output sequence of test case tel is: 1) the tester 
customer inputs a req to the approval, 2) the approval outputs the req to the t ('st ('I' 
assessor, 3) the tester assessor inputs a risk to the approval, -1) the approval outputs 
an info to the customer tester. 
When choosing the du-path test coverage criterion for BPEL \·cuiahlcs. the paths 
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for each BPEL variable are as follows. For req: <receive, invokeAssessor, assign. reply 
> ,<receive, invokeAssessor, invokeApprover, reply>, and <receive, invokeApprover, 
reply>; for risk: <receive, invokeAssessor, assign, reply> and <receive, invokeAsses-
sor, invokeApprover, reply>; for info: <receive, invokeAssessor, invokeApprover, re-
ply> and <receive, invokeApprover, reply>. After merging these paths, the generated 
test cases are still the tel, tc2, tc3 as above. 
B. Multiple BPEL Processes as the SUT 
Since the internal-data-exchange model of a BPEL process is fixed, when more than 
one BPEL process is selected as the SUT, the state machines associated with approval. 
assessor, and approver services are similar to the ones in Fig 6.5 and Fig 6.6. The 
difference is that if an activity A interacts with an external service's activity B and the 
external service is a part of SUT, then in A its partner machine is named B (instead 
of naming it as tester). For instance, if approval and approver services are selected 
as SUT, then the invokeApprover machine of approval service will interact with the 
receive and reply machines of the approver service. In the testing phase, Fig 6.8 shows 
an example when the approval, assessor, and approver are selected as SUT. 
approval 
Figure 6.8: Multiple BPEL processes as the SUT 
There exists a test input req to SUT and a test output info from SUT. The in-
teractions between approval, assessor, and approver are internal and not observable 
by the tester. Let S, L, A denote the shorthands for assessor, approval. and approver 
services. When choosing a control-flow based test coverage criterion, five test cases will 
be generated: 
• tel: <L.receive, L.invokeAssessor, S.receive, S.switch, S.assignl, S.reply. 
L.invokeAssessor, L.assign, L.reply>. 
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• tc2: <L.receive, L.invokeAssessor S receive S switch S . 2 S 
,. ,. ,.asszgn, . reply, 
L.invokeAs~essor, L.invokeApprover, A.receive, A.switch, A.assignl, A.reply, 
L.invokeApprover, L.reply>. 
• tc3: <L.receive, L.invokeAssessor, S.receive, S.switch, S.assign2, S.reply, 
L.invokeAssessor, L.invokeApprover, A.receive, A.switch, A.assign2, A.reply, 
L.invokeApprover, L.reply>. 
• tc4: <L.receive, L.invokeApprover, A.receive, A.switch, A.assignl, A.reply, 
L.invokeApprover, L.reply>. 
• tc5: <L.receive, L.invokeApprover, A.receive, A.switch, A.assign2, A.reply, 
L.invokeApprover, L.reply>. 
When choosing the du-path test coverage criterion for BPEL variables, the req is defined 
by the tester and userd by S.switch; the risk is defined by S.assignl or S.assign3, and 
used in L.invokeAssessor; the info is defined by L.assign, A.assignl or A.assign2, 
and it is used by L.reply. After merging the test pathes for req, risk, app, the generated 
test cases are the same as above tel, tc2, tc3, tc4, tc5. 
6.1.2 Purchase Order 
The purchase order example includes five web services: ordering, purchasing, schedul-
ing, invoicing, and shipping. The BPEL standard provides the ordering BPEL process. 
We will consider the case when the ordering process is selected as the SUT. The or-
dering service acts as the orchestration service, and its business scenarios are shown in 
Fig 6..9. The ordering service starts by receiving a purchase order request PO from the 
purchasing service. Then, the process executes three sequences concurrently. The first 
sequence assigns shippingRequest with PO and sends shippingRequest to the shipping 
service, and then it gets the shipping price shippinglnfo and the shippillgS('hedule 
from the shipping service. The second sequence sends PO and shippinginfo to the 
invoicing service for the order price and shipping price calculation, and then it gets the 
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invoice from the invoicing service. The third sequence sends PO and shippingSchedule 
to the scheduling service for scheduling the product and shipment. The order services 
ends by providing an invoice to the purchasing service. 
By using the flow link ship-to-invoice, the process needs to get the shipping price 
shippinginJo from the shipping service before sending it to the invoicing service. By 
using the flow link ship-to-scheduling, the process needs to get the shippingSchedule 
from the shipping service by sending it to the scheduling service. 
purchasing 
service 
shipping4-~~~r.=~~ 
service shipping Info ~ 
shipping 
Schedule 
----.-,~~=--__ p invoIcing 
service 
ordering service 
Figure 6.9: The business scenarios of the ordering service 
For the ordering process, the relationships for the BPEL activities and the WSA 
machines are shown on the left and right of Fig 6.10, respectively. 
The machine du-pairs for BPEL variables and links are listed as follws: 
• For variable PO: (receivel,assign211},(receivel,invoke212},(receivel,invoke231); 
• For variable invoice: (receive223,reply3); 
• For variable shippingRequest: (assign211,invoke212); 
• For variable shippinglnJo: (invoke212,invoke222); 
• For variable shippingSchedule: (receive213,invoke232); 
• For link ship-to-invoice: (invoke212Link Wrapper, invoke222Link Wrapper); 
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;t;"I:~ invoke231 
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'+ .,~ 1nvoke222 
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+ ~ 1nvoke232 
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Figure 6.10: The BPEL activity hierarchy and machine relationships of ordering service 
• For link ship-to-scheduling: (received213Link Wrapper, in voke232Link Wrapper). 
According to the above machine du-pairs, the internal-data-exchange machine se-
quences for BPEL variables and links are listed as follows: 
• For PO: <receivel,fiow2,sequence21,assign211 >, < receive 1,fiow2,sequence22, 
invoke221 >, <receivel,fiow2,sequence23,invoke231 >; 
• For invoice: <receive223,sequence22,fiow2,reply3>; 
• For shippingRequest: <assign211,invoke212Link Wrapper,invoke212>; 
• For shippinglnfo: <invoke212,invoke212LinkWrapper,sequence21,sequence22, 
invoke222Link Wrapper, invoke222 >; 
• For shippingSchedule: <receive213,receive213LinkWrapper,sequence21,sequence23, 
invoke232Link Wrapper, invoke232 >; 
• For link ship-to-invoice: <invoke212Link Wrapper, sequence21, sequence22, 
invoke222Link Wrapper>; 
• For link ship-to-scheduling: < received213Link Wrapper. sequence21, sequence23, 
invoke232Link Wrapper>. 
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Accordingly to the derived machine du-pairs, the assertions can be added to the 
transitions where the variables or links are used. Since there is no branch in this 
example, no symbolic predicate will be introduced. As a consequence, one test case will 
be generated: tel: < receive1, assign211, invoke212, receive213, invoke231 , invoke232, 
invoke211, invoke222, receive233, reply3>. 
6.1.3 Shipping Service 
The shipping service interacts with a customer only, so the shipping process acts as 
the SUT. Its business scenarios are shown in Fig 6.11. The process starts by receiving 
a shipRequest from the customer. If such request is completed, the process returns a 
shipN atice to the customer. If such request is not completed, the process resets the 
itemsShipped and enters a loop. In the loop, the process assigns the number of items 
in a shipN atice and returns the shipN atice to the customer, as a partial shipment. 
Thereafter, the itemShipped is increased. The loop continues when the itemShipped 
is smaller than the request amount. 
customer service shipRequest 
shipRequestcomplete 
I 
shipNotice: = shipRequest I ~-,-~ 
shipNoticei~~L----.. 
customer _-+----1 
service 
itemsCount: = someNumbe 
'----,--~ 
customer shipNotice 
service 
shipping service 
itemsShipped: =0 
itemsShipped 
= itemShipped + itemsCoun 
Figure 6.11: The business scenarios of the shipping service 
The relationships for the BPEL activities and the WSA machines are shown on the 
left and right of Fig 6.12, respectively. 
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Figure 6.12: The BPEL activity hierarchy and machine relationships of shipping service 
The machine du-pairs the internal-data-exchange machine sequences for the BPEL 
variables and links include: 
• For variable shipRequest: the machine du-pairs are (receive1,assign211), (receivel, 
while222); the machine sequences are < receive 1 , switch2, sequence21, assign211 > 
and < receive1, switch2, sequence22, while222 >. 
• For variable shipNotice: the machine du-pairs are (assign211,invoke212), 
(assign22211, invoke22212), (assign22211, assign22213); the machine sequences 
are the same as machine du-pairs. 
• For variable itemShipped: the machine du-pairs are (assign221,assign22213), 
(assign22213, while222); the machine sequences are < assign221, while222, 
sequence2221, assign22213 > and < assign22213, sequence2221, while222 >. 
Accordingly to the derived machine du-pairs, the assertions can be added to the 
transitions where the variables or links are used. Four symbolic predicates are intro-
duced. The switch2 machine has pred1,pred2 where pred1! = pred2, and the while222 
machine has pred3,pred4 where pred3! = pred4. Three test cases can be generated, as 
follow. 
• tel: <receivel,switch2,assign211,invoke212>; 
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• tc2: <receive1,switch2,assign221, while222,assign22211, invoke22212. assign22213. 
while222>; 
• tc3: < receivel, switch2, assign221, while222 >. 
In Fig 6.13, when choosing different BPEL processes as the SUT, it summarizes the 
corresponding state space, predicate combination number, du-pairs for BPEL variables 
and flow links, and the number of test paths. 
BPEL Loan approval selVice Shipping 
(Features) 
Ordering 
(flow,links) SelVice Service 
SUTs Approval Assessorl Approval, Approval, Approval, (sequence, (flow, links, 
Approver Assessor Approver Assessor, switch, while) sequence) 
Approver 
State Space 203 91 296 361 413 152 241 
Predicates 4 2 6 6 8 4 Hone 
(combination) (4) (2) (8) (8) (16) (4) 
Def.Use Pairs 11 3 14 14 11 1 9 
Hum. of test paths 3 2 3 4 3 3 1 
Figure 6.13: Case Study Summary 
In the work of [44], the author also uses these case studies from the BPEL standard 
to evaluate their SPIN based verification tool. In terms of state space, they shows that 
the state space of the approval process is the largest, resulting in 3516 states, due to 
the asynchronous semantics of concurrency. It can be observed from the case study 
summary that for those BPEL processes with concurrency feature, the state space of 
our web service automata are a lot smaller, because of its support for multiple input 
events. 
6.2 Tool Support 
Our test framework has been implemented as an Eclipse plugin, which is a component 
of the DBEStudio for the EU project DBE [7]. The plugin includes a BPEL test case 
wizard and a WSDL test case generator. 
The BPEL test case wizard consists of three components: the user interface. the 
transformation engine, and the model checker manager. A snapshot of the user illte[-
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BPEL Test Scenario 
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------------
D,\workspaces\runtlme-New _corl'lgur atlon\mytest\sdI\Ioanappr",11 Browse I 
,..... ..... .... _._---------
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o Gener 01 Properties 
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(!) Branch Coverage 
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o CTL/LTL Temporal Logic 
------------------~ 
___ -:-:.m __ .. -:-:.-~~.--- .. -.-.. -J 
I <Back I rlle •. r> Finish II Cancel 
Figure 6.14: A snapshot of the BPEL test wizard 
face is shown in Fig 6.14. It allows the user to choose a BPEL process as the service 
under test (SUT), and choose the WSDL interface model. The partner web services of 
the selected BPEL process can be chosen as a component of the SUT. Then a model 
checker can be selected to verify the general properties and to generate test cases. 
Inside the test framework, the XSLT transformation engine manages the mappings 
between models, which is using Saxon's XSLT 2.0 processor. For pre-processing, the 
engine manages the mappings for the model checkers, including BPEL-to-WSA, \VSA-
to-PROMELA, WSA-to-SMV. For post-processing, the engine manages the mapping 
. 
from counterexamples to transition sequences, and the mapping from transition se-
quences to test cases. The mapping to test cases is based on the transition sequence. 
the web service automata, and the WSDL description. The WSDL provides t he test 
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cases with message types for the test input and test output of a service under test 
(SUT). The Java model checker manager takes charge of the invocation of the model 
checker and handling the predicate combinations. The WSDL test case generator is 
developed in the context of the DBE environment; it parses test cases from the \YSDL 
interface. Then, the user can remotely invoke the functions of a published web service. 
Both BPEL based test cases and WSDL based test cases are in JUnit format. Hence, 
the test cases can be run against the JUnit execution engine directly. The user allows 
entering the test input (data) via a user interface. 
6.3 Summary 
In this chapter, we introduce the tool developed for our test framework. We use the 
case studies from the BPEL standard to evaluate the effectiveness of our framework. 
Since state space explosion is the main issue of model checking techniques, in order to 
improve the performance of a model-checking based tool, it is essential to reduce the 
model state space. We have shown by case studies that our web service automaton 
can alleviate the state space explosion problem when the machines are concurrently 
running. This fits in with the web service paradigm because web services are designed 
to execute independently in a distributed environment. Also, our abstraction of message 
type, message value, and predicates helps to speed up the model checking. 
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Conclusions and Future Work 
7.1 Conclusions 
In this thesis we have defined an operational semantics for the BPEL languag<'. and 
presented an automatic test generation framework for BPEL models. \ \'(' address!'d t 11<' 
research question of applying model-based-testing techniques to t 11(' domain of BPEL-
based web service orchestration, so that the functionality of the design model call be 
systematically verified. 
The current formal semantics proposed for BPEL can be categorised under t Im'(' 
branches: Process Algebra, Petri-net, and Automata. Our goal is to <llltolllat (' the 
generation and execution of test cases for composed \\'eb services. Model c\\('ckillg is 
an effective technique for automated test generation, and most mature model checkers 
use automata as the underlying formal model. Hence, we follow the automata branch. 
Web service automaton (WSA) has been proposed with two purposes: 1) to define the 
opcrational semantics for BPEL models, and 2) to clarify the BPEL wrificatinn and 
test case generation problem at hand. The Boolean expression over input cn'llts is in-
troduced for the purpose of modelling concurrency, fault propagation, and interruption 
features of BPEL language in a more natural \\'a)', and also as a meallS to reduC!' UIl-
necessary state space. By analysing the control dependencies and data dependencies o[ 
BPEL activities we demonstrated how to model the most interest ing BPEL [eat llres in 
, . 
131 
7.1 Conclusions 
WSA, such as concurrency, synchronisation, dead-path-elimination, and scope-based 
fault handling and compensation handling. Based on web service automata a test , 
framework is presented based on model checking techniques for verifying the general 
properties and for generating test cases of BPEL models. 
Referring to the literature review chapter, we are not the first ones to propose formal 
semantics and apply model checking to verify BPEL processes, but we are the first to 
thoroughly model BPEL features in terms of automata, and to provide a test framework 
that can test the functionality of both single and multiple BPEL processes. Our main 
contributions lie in the following aspects. First, we modelled the most advanced features 
of BPEL thoroughly in terms of automata, a formalism which is most suitable to model 
checking tools. Second, we analysed the control dependencies and data dependencies of 
BPEL separately so that control flow testing and data flow testing can be applied. By 
modelling the data dependencies, we made the internal interactions of BPEL activities 
explicit. Third, we provided a unified message passing semantics for the interactions 
within a single BPEL process and between multiple BPEL processes. This enables us 
to test not only the behaviour of single BPEL processes, but also the compatibility 
of multiple BPEL processes. Fourth, in addition to verifying the general properties of 
BPEL processes, we applied the structural test coverage criteria to multiple machines. 
Accordingly, test cases can be generated for single or multiple BPEL processes, so that 
the functional conformance of the BPEL processes can be checked. The framework also 
supports test case generation for WSDL in the context of DBE environment [7], so that 
the interface and type conformance can be verified. 
In chapter 2, we reviewed the Petri-net, Process Algebra, and automata based 
approaches as the formal semantics for BPEL; we discussed the current test cases gen-
eration approaches and testing techniques in the domain of web service orchestration; 
also, we studied the existing works with consideration of data dependencies in orches-
tration models; finally, we highlight the reasons to propose web service automaton as 
a conclusion. 
In chapter 3, we provided the formal semantics of Web Service Automaton, and 
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identified several anti-patterns for the interaction compatibility of BPEL processes. The 
propositional input events of WSA can capture various BPEL features. For instance, 
the logical-AND operator can capture the synchronisation feature. The logical-OR 
operator can model the fault propagation. The logical-AND together with logical-~OT 
can model the higher priority events such as interruptions. 
In chapter 4, we analysed the BPEL control dependencies and data dependencies. 
By analysing the data dependencies, the hidden internal interactions between BPEL 
activities are modelled as data message exchanges between machines. The data de-
pendency analysis allows us to model the internal interactions of BPEL activities and 
the external interactions between BPEL processes, by means of the message passing 
mechanism. Thereafter, we investigated the behavioural semantics of BPEL activities 
in details, based on the analysis result of the control and data dependencies. In the 
literature, we are not aware of any automata approaches for BPEL with consideration 
of scoping, fault handling, event handling, and compensation handling features. Even 
though many Process-algebra approaches and Petri-net approaches include these fea-
tures in their formalisms, due to the complication of these features, there are only a few 
works specifically analysing these features in depth. We demonstrated how to model 
these advanced features in web service automata. 
In chapter 5, we introduced our test framework, which is based on model checking 
techniques. Since NuSMV and SPIN model checkers are already used on a regular 
basis for the verification of real-world applications, they are used as two alternative 
verification and test generation engines in our framework. The advantage of using 
model checking for test case generation is that only feasible test cases will be gener-
ated. However, the state space explosion problem is known to be inherent to model 
checking techniques. In order to alleviate the state explosion problem, we abstracted 
certain part of the BPEL processes in WSA. The abstraction will be applied to the 
complex data types and concrete data values of the BPEL variables, and to the BPEL 
predicates. The abstraction will not hinder the model checking but it helps to speed 
up the model checking. To further simplify the model, those redundant transitions and 
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states related to faults and interruptions will be removed. In our framework, the gen-
eral properties of the BPEL process is verified in the first phase, and the functionality 
of the BPEL process can be checked in the second phased. In this two-phase testing 
process, the model checking tool acts as the verification and test case generation engine, 
respectively. In the property checking of BPEL processes, our analysis result of data 
dependencies can not only easily identify illegal cross-boundary links before running 
the model checker, but also allow the model checker to evaluate the non-instantiate 
data. As pointed out by Ankolekar [11], detecting non-instantiate data is useful to 
indicate harmful interaction between control and data dependencies. In test case gen-
eration for BPEL processes, structural test coverage criteria are applied to multiple 
machines. The state and transition coverages are used for BPEL control flow testing, 
and all-du-path coverage is used for BPEL data flow testing. Note that in the state 
and transition coverages, we do not include the supporting machines (i.e. linkWrapper 
and compensateManager machines) in the test case generation. This reduces the state 
space exploration in model checking. Because we abstract the BPEL predicates into 
symbolic predicates, the predicate combinations will be constructed to force the model 
checker to explore all the alternative paths. Since the test cases can be generated with-
out inputting actual data, we call it symbolic test case generation. Our test framework 
supports two kinds of test cases. The BPEL-based test cases at the level of integration 
testing can check the behaviour conformance of web service interactions and various 
business scenarios. The WSDL-based test cases at the level of unit testing can check 
the interface conformance between the implementation and the WSDL of individual 
services. 
In chapter 6, we outlined the implementation of our framework. The web service 
automaton has been encoded in XML format. The transformation engines have been 
implemented in XSLT templates, which cover the front-end mapping from BPEL to web 
service automata, the back-end mappings from web service automata to the Promela 
and SMV for the SPIN and NuSMV model checkers respectively, the mappings from 
transition traces to JUnit test cases, and the mapping from WSDL interface to JUnit 
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test cases. The modules developed in Java include: the GUI allowing the user to 
select the single or multiple BPEL SUT (service under test), the model checker. the 
test coverage criterion, the BPEL internal data exchange machine paths, the predicate 
combination and reduction, the invocation of the model checker, and the transition 
traces retrieval from the generated counterexamples. We used the case studies from 
BPEL standards [6, 10] to evaluate the effectiveness of the test framework. 
7.2 Discussion 
An open issue is to prove the correctness of the model transformation, i.e. the preser-
vation of the BPEL semantics. One solution is to transforming the two kinds of models 
into a third common formalism, and checks the equivalence between the models in the 
common formalism. This solution relies on the assumption that the further transfor-
mations are correct. An example can be found in [23], Forster uses BPEL and Message 
Sequence Charts (MSCs) as· the implementation and specification, respectively. Both 
MSC and BPEL are transformed into a common formalism called Finite State Pro-
cesses (FSPs). By trace equivalence checking, it is possible to determine whether the 
BPEL processes preserve the behaviour of MSC model. In this example, the mappings 
from MSCs and BPEL to FSPs needs to be proved corrected. An alternative solution 
is to partially verify the formal model against the BPEL features. Some BPEL features 
are encoded into temporal logic properties, so that the model checker can be used to 
check the formal model against these BPEL features. Xu et al. [59] adopt this solu-
tion. Nakajima [44] suggests that the correctness of the translation can be verified via 
the inspection, which is aided by the modularity of the translation. The modularity 
comes from the multi-layer mappings from a model to another. Currently, we adopt 
the simplest inspection approach. This is a trade-off between the soundness of a formal 
approach and the simplicity of an informal approach. Also, given a set of BPEL pro-
cesses that are known as correct, we can partially check the transformation correctness, 
by running the model checker to verify the general properties, such as deadlock-freeness 
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and absence of non-instantiate data, of the target models. 
7.3 Future Work 
Currently, we applied the conventional state and transition test coverage criteria to 
multiple machines. An extension of this work is to define additional test coverage 
criteria which are suitable for integration testing, so that the functionality checked by 
less model checking time and effort. Also, currently the framework provides a GUI for 
the user to input test data. The question of how to automatically generate appropriate 
input data as parameters in the test case remains a topic for further research. 
Also, our test framework enables the user to choose test coverage criteria, but does 
not allow the user to define specific test purposes. An interesting future work is to 
support on-the-fly test criteria without the need of writing temporal logic manually by 
the user. In [65], Zhao et al. apply SPIN model checker to verify the UML statechart 
model against Message Sequence Chart (MSC) model. The event sequence derived 
from the MSC model are encoded into a Buchi Automaton and listed in the never 
claim block in Promela. When checking a statechart against the event sequence, since 
the event sequence is negated in the never claim, if there exists a counterexample, then 
the statechart matches the event sequence. In the domain of web services, we can 
apply the similar approach in generating test cases. For a single BPEL process, the 
event sequence can be inputted by the user, so a test case can be generated to check 
the conformance of the BPEL process against the event sequence. For multiple BPEL 
processes, WS-CDL [36] as a choreography language provides a conversation protocol 
between BPEL processes. The desirable event sequence can be derived from the WS-
CDL protocol, so that the conformance of the interactions of BPEL processes can be 
checked against the global conversation protocol. 
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